

The Oracle

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WHAT MANPOWER ANALYSTS OWE DECISION MAKERS... "DARE TO BE DIFFERENT"

by John Di Genio

The following essay was published in the Summer 2002 Career Program (CP)26 Manpower and Force Management Bulletin, Volume 10, Issue 6 and was the 2001 General Lesley McNair Essay award winner. The author's mention of Korea is dated, though the core responsibilities discussed are absolutely on the mark.

**"... [T]he priority is to shape that smaller workforce to ensure the right mix of skills, experience, and training."
– Helen T. McCoy, Former ASA (FM)**

The military services employ numerous analysts: manpower analysts, budget analysts, logistics analysts, force developer analysts, management analysts, operations research analysts, etc. Although covering different disciplines, all analysts essentially owe decision makers the same type of analytical support, which I call responsibilities. Core responsibilities are requirements analysts have traditionally owed decision makers. "Emerging" responsibilities are simply "add-ons" to the traditional core responsibilities analysts should consider to meet today's challenges and ever-growing demands. Although these responsibilities apply to all analysts, they represent the core values of every CP26 careerist. With this as our starting point, let's begin by discussing how professionals in CP26 adhere to the guiding principles contained in the "Core Responsibilities."

Core Responsibilities

Analysts owe four "Core Responsibilities" to decision makers. I call these "Core Responsibilities" the "4-Cs" for "Candor," "Clarity," "Cost Effectiveness," and "Conditional." These traditional responsibilities are at the very heart and soul of what an analyst should produce for decision

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT: — — — — —



MG Robert Dyess, Director
FA50 Executive Agent

Force Management Practitioners;

Fellow FA50s,

There is a sign on a local church here in the Northern Virginia area (saw it on the local TV news station)...it says, "If you are praying for snow, please stop!" By now, we have seen the end of it. The Cherry Blossoms, nationally celebrated here in the National Capital Region, are upon us; we are more than ready for Spring this year.

In my last message, I spoke to you about growing the FA50 population and increasing our authorizations across our great Army. I am glad to say we are moving toward that goal. We recently received confirmation of two approved billets; one O4/MAJ billet for ARCYBER and one O5/LTC billet for NORTHCOM.

This is a positive statement across the entire Army. Also, I am proud to announce that on the last MAJ selection board we promoted 81% of CPTs within the FA50 Community. Our promotion rate was 16% above the Army average and is a testimony of the hard work and dedication of our FA50 Officers. As our Army transforms to a smaller force, the capability and selfless service of our officers is more and more in demand.

The upcoming Senior Force Management Seminar (SFMS) is a great professional development tool for our senior leaders. This is an opportunity for our LTC(P)s, COLs and GS15 Civilians to learn from our senior leaders and engage in professional development topics that will provide information on current activities across the Army. LTC Stephon Brannon and his team will provide more information about the SFMS later on in this edition of the ORACLE.

In closing, I want to encourage all of you to continue the terrific job you do every day. You are the future of our Army and it shows in the job you do on a daily basis. Thank you for your support and commitment.

MG Dyess

Thank you,

MG Robert Dyess

ARMY STRONG!

Dare continued from cover

makers. Even though circumstances change with time, these core responsibilities have remained constant. Let's start with the most important of the core responsibilities, "Candor and Frankness."

Candor and Frankness. This is the most important of the core responsibilities that analysts owe decision makers. This responsibility includes telling the truth, even when people do not want to hear it. There is nothing wrong with reaching conclusions that do not agree with what a decision maker had in mind. As professional force managers, we have to be prepared to tell study sponsors, senior executives, and other decision makers that workload, budget, or force structure data do not sustain a particular position – no matter how popular that position may be. In accepting this responsibility, skilled manpower analysts and force managers have to be willing to revise conclusions and recommendations as the facts change. Candor ties in nicely with the second of the core responsibilities, "clarity."

Clarity. How many times have you finished reading a study or report completely dumbfounded on how the analysts arrived at their conclusions and recommendations? Instead of a smooth flowing, comprehensible report that leads to logical conclusions, the report contains vague innuendo, meaningless bureaucratic jargon, or conclusions and recommendations that come from left field. Many times, a review of the raw data indicates that the information presented in the report has been "watered down" and "sugar coated" to be more acceptable. Proficient manpower specialists and force managers have to be clear and precise in presenting all the facts to the decision makers. Our arguments have to be sequential and lead to logical conclusions and recommendations. In addition, force managers need to remember that no amount of fancy graphics with all the "bells and whistles" and animated presentations could ever be used to cover-up faulty, misleading analyses.

Too often, analysts arrive at conclusions and make recommendations because of "apprehension," instead of the facts. For whatever reason, some analysts believe presenting controversial or contentious issues that disagree with their leadership's way of thinking is hazardous to career progression. Nothing could be further from the truth! We are paid to do just that! Professional manpower and force accounting analysts owe decision makers the hard, cold facts surrounding an issue. Without these facts, decision makers will develop manpower and force structure policy and guidance without knowing all the implications and consequences of their decisions. Indeed, CP26 is no place for professional "Yes Men." Force Management analysts, however, should remember we are not the decision makers. Analysts conduct the research, present the "pros" and "cons" of each alternative, and recommend an alternative that is consistent with survey methodology and study objectives, enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization, improves a system, solves a problem, or that answers a question. As professional analysts, we cannot force the decision maker's hand; he is free to make his own, independent decision – regardless if he uses our recommendations or not.

Conditional ("What if"). To be a benefit to the command, manpower analysts and force structure specialists have to be flexible enough to quickly respond to "what if" questions from command decision makers. Analysts will not always have the luxury of time to complete all the research needed to produce a complete product. This is especially true during deployments. Force managers may be asked questions about augmentation and equipment arriving into theater to support contingency operations. Environmental, military, or political circumstances may demand that the decision maker choose a specific course of action before the analysts have completed their research. During crisis, it will be of little use for an analyst to say, "I need

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to conduct more research, Sir, before I could answer that question." Indeed, there may be a need for more research to come up with a complete solution. However, analysts should be willing to provide answers that can be supported by research that has been completed up to that point. I am not advocating that CP26 analysts give knee jerk responses to questions that address issues that have yet to be examined or researched. Given this situation, analysts should candidly tell the decision maker that he doesn't know – but, he will find the answer before the next session.

Cost Effectiveness. Although Secretary McNamara brought this principle to the department more than fifty years ago, economic considerations remain a key criterion in making decisions within the Department of Defense. In these resource-constrained times, agencies want to implement programs and adopt those recommendations that give them the "biggest bang for the buck." To deserve support, a program should have its benefits weighed against the costs of implementing it. As professionals, we are the stewards of public resources which are placed in our trust. Therefore, we owe decision makers unbiased assessments of the various manpower and force structure programs or recommendations being considered. What good is a force structure if the costs far outweigh the benefits?

Emerging Responsibilities

In addition to the traditional core responsibilities, there are new emerging responsibilities that analysts owe decision makers. I have identified four that probably represent the analysts' expanding roles in aiding decision makers. They are "Daring Out-of-the-Box Thinking," "Focus on the Outcome," "New Scenarios," and "Why."

Daring Out-of-the-Box Thinking. Analysts and force managers need to be creative when developing alternatives. Conventional thinking could hinder the analyst's ability to arrive at

a solution to a unique problem or situation. Moreover, analysts should never lose sight of the "big picture." Many times, careerists in CP26 only focus on a specific part of a problem or an issue. Hence, the conclusions and recommendations tend to be too parochial and narrowly focused to be used on a broader scope. Let's turn to an example from Korea for a clearer understanding of this responsibility.

Eighth United States Army employs Korea Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) Soldiers. The KATUSA program allows Korean soldiers to become more acquainted with U.S. customs and military traditions. The program focuses heavily on the cross-cultural interchange of ideas, values; and moves to promote a spirit of cooperation and trust between U.S. and Republic of Korea military personnel in the defense of the peninsula. In the past, manpower professionals have used the standard Army Availability Factors published in AR 570-4, "Manpower Management," to calculate the amount of effort a KATUSA soldier contributes to an organization's armistice workload. However, organizations have argued that these published availability factors overstate the level of support that the command receives from KATUSA personnel. For example, KATUSAs dedicate five hours a week for directed Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and English proficiency training. This time is not captured in the published availability factors. Inflating the amount of effort that the command can expect from its KATUSA personnel could potentially result in a lack of recognition for the adequate staffing requirements needed to accomplish validated workload demands. Consequently, our professional manpower requirements determination staff took a hard look at the KATUSA program, compared and analyzed the standard and Korean soldier unique unavailable times, and developed a distinct KATUSA availability factor of 102 hours a month to properly account for additional unavailability times for ROK Government directed training, leave,

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and in-and out-processing. A bit of creativity, initiative, and good, old-fashioned practicality helped professional force managers within Eighth United States Army to take a good, hard look at the printed, standard availability standards, and develop a more realistic benchmark to accurately measure the workload efforts of KATUSA personnel. The challenge that we, as professional manpower analysts and force managers, have

today is "**Dare to be different.**" Question the status quo! Use innovative ways to use personnel assets more efficiently and effectively.

Focus on the Outcome. Force Management professionals should should consider the long-term outcomes of their conclusions and outcomes. If not thoroughly explored, today's recommendations for additional staffing requirements, force structure, and method improvements may become tomorrow's problems and headaches. Temporary "fixes" are not "fixes." Manpower analysts and force managers need to consider all the possible implications of their conclusions and recommendations to make sure that the recommended alternative permanently corrects a staffing problem or improves a system. Otherwise, future analysts in CP26 will be stuck "re-inventing the wheel."

New Scenarios. Manpower analysts and force managers need to develop new scenarios and be the "standard bearers" for new ways of doing business. "We always did it that way" or "business as usual" are poor answers to give command decision makers. These responses also stunt professional growth and development. A process, procedure, or scenario may have been relevant in the past. However, with the passing of time, they may have become obsolete. The analyst's challenge is to determine if these ways of doing business are still current, and if not, how they can be creatively improved, modified, or re-engineered to reflect the current operating environment. Analysts need to have a keen sixth sense for the future. We must be comfortable in dealing with probability and uncertainty – the so-called "gray area" where "right" and "wrong" answers have yet to be published. Furthermore, CP26 careerists should be able to tell the decision makers how these changes will affect resources, planning, operations, and readiness.

Korea is a fine example of the "changing
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The Oracle is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army's FA 50 Personnel Development Office (PDO). Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.

Headquarters Department of the Army
Office of the Director, Force Development DAPR-FPO
FA 50 (Force Management) Proponency Office
700 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0700

Please submit all material for publication and comment to Sean Tuomey at 703-692-4462 or email michael.s.tuomey.civ@mail.mil

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MESSAGE FROM THE PDO CHIEF . . .



LTC Stephon Brannon
Chief, FA50 Personnel
Development Office

Teammates;

As we go into the spring, I am glad to report our success in building FA50 presence across the Army. As of today, we have increased our authorizations in two major commands. The first one being Army Cyber where we have an approved O4/MAJ billet working within the ARCYBER G-3/8 Capabilities Division, and the second approved billet is in NORTHCOM. This position will be the Chief, Global Force Management Branch, and will officially appear on the FY16 document. This is a good news story and a great accomplishment.

We could not get here without the dedication and teamwork from two talented FA50 Officers. With that said, I would like to recognize their efforts and offer many thanks to LTC Langdon Lucas (NORTHCOM) and MAJ Daniel Rogne (ARCYBER) for working with the leadership and assisting with gaining authorizations for both commands. We are far from being done and I will continue to ask for your assistance to look within your staff directorates for positions we can recode into 50A billets.

As mentioned in my last message, my team and I are working hard to provide you with more professional development opportunities to enhance your career as an FA50. Recently my office provided to the field the Summer FY14 broadening opportunities for CPTs and MAJs. Please review MILPER message #14-045 to learn more about these broadening opportunities. Selected participants will be funded by HODA G3; this is at no cost to your command. I ask each of you to take advantage of these broadening experiences and we will continue to provide more opportunities to the community as they become available.

As a reminder to the field, the Senior Force Management Seminar (SFMS) and the Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony will take place during the last week of May 2014. The SFMS is scheduled for 28-29 May 2014 with the Hall of Fame Ceremony taking place in the afternoon on 29 May 2014. Both events will take place in the Pentagon Conference Center (PCC) and registration is currently available on the FA50 Webpage.

Finally, I ask that the FA50 Community join me in congratulating the following FA50 officers on their selection to Major:

Bennett, William R.

Bowden, Dwayne E.

Bruno, Terrence

Bullock, Stephanie

Carr, Glen

Carter, Johnathan

Gottschall, Viviana

Hudson, Edward

Luoma, Kyle

Oliver, John

Rhea, Joel W.

Riveralopez, Eliezer

Swinford, Jeffrey S.

This is a great accomplishment and it is an opportunity for our officers to continue their success by promoting the expertise and experience of what a FA50 can provide to the leadership. Great Job!

As you know, there will be many challenges in 2014. These challenges will demand our very best, seasoned and experienced officers. So I will ask that you continue to strive for success.

ARMY STRONG!



Chief, FA50 Personnel Development Office

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environment." The current mission of United States Forces Korea is to deter aggression from North Korea. Recently, North and South Korea have taken positive steps to end fifty years of hostility on the peninsula. These measures include the successful North - South summit, family reunions, and a plan to reopen the North - South Railway. On the other hand, North Korea still maintains a large, forward deployed military presence along the 38th parallel and is continuously improving its ballistic missile capabilities; this is hardly a position suggesting "peaceful reconciliation". To complicate matters, statements from the Administration and Congress suggest that the United States should pay careful attention to China as an emerging regional threat in the Pacific Rim.

With these concerns, Korea now becomes even more vital as a forward deployed power reception platform to counter potential regional threats. Professional manpower analysts and force managers in Korea have to determine: (1) what new funding, personnel resources, equipment, and materiel will be needed, (2) what new force structure / force mix will be required to maintain the peaceful integrity of the region, and (3) what new, state-of-the-art equipment and technologies, training requirements, and personnel specialties will be needed to assure that the United States fields a well-supported, modern force in defense of the Pacific Rim.

Why? It is not enough that analysts answer "What if" questions from decision makers. Analysts should now challenge conventional thinking by asking "Why." For example, at one installation in Korea, the post shuttle bus used to run every half hour from 7:00 AM to 10:00 PM. Concerned, conscientious Resource Managers asked "why" was this shuttle service essential every half hour. Analysts and force managers within Resource Management collected data that revealed that the shuttle buses were practically empty during parts of the day. Consequently, the professional

Resource Management analysts were able to make sound, cost effective recommendations that did not degrade the shuttle service. This came about because an analyst asked "why." Think of the efficiencies you could possibly realize at your own installations by simply asking "why."

"Why" questions do not only apply to base operations and installation management and manpower functions. These questions are also applicable to critical operational questions and concerns. For example, why does a theater require a specific piece of equipment? Why does a command need specific personnel requirements to accomplish its assigned mission? Why is a command performing "unique" responsibilities – such as United States Forces Korea using Army personnel assets to perform ration control data administration? What training is available to familiarize in-coming information management / Signal Corps personnel on the Global Command and Control System – Korea? Although these kinds of questions make some "uncomfortable," they need to be asked to assure that staffing, ways of doing business, and programs are economical, efficient, and meet current mission requirements. Ideas, inspirations, imagination, and improvements start by asking "why." Afterwards, analysts use creative thinking to develop alternatives that improve the current ways of doing business.

Conclusion

Traditionally, manpower analysts and force managers owe decision makers the basic core responsibilities -- "Candor," "Clarity," "Conditional ("What if" questions)," and "Cost Effective" recommendations and alternatives. Analysts should be open and frank with decision makers. We should be clear, concise, and logical when developing alternatives and recommendations. Manpower specialists need to be prepared to answer "what if" questions and develop alternatives that are efficient and effective. Today,

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in addition to the basic core responsibilities, CP26 professionals owe decision makers four additional responsibilities to meet ever-growing demands and challenges -- "Out-of-the-Box Thinking," "Focus on the Outcome," "Developing New Scenarios," and asking "Why." Manpower analysts should challenge conventional thinking by getting "Out -of-the-Box" and ask "Why." Furthermore, analysts and force managers should take the time to consider the implications and future impacts of their (our) conclusions,

alternatives, and recommendations. In addition, manpower professionals should be comfortable with developing new scenarios and ways of doing business. More importantly, CP26 careerists need to have an open mind and imagination to come up with workable methods to determine staffing needs and force structures that the department will use and urgently need in the 21st century. 🧩

LAST ISSUE'S WHAT'Z'IT...

Kudos to MAJ Dan Rogne, first out of 15, to call out last issue's "What'Zit"! The M249 collapsible butt stock project was in response to a U.S. Army Sergeant's (stationed in Iraq) request to have a collapsible butt stock similar to what is used on the M4 assault rifle. Changing combat conditions and Soldier comfort drove the need for this adjustable item. The available paratrooper collapsible stock exists, but without adjustability and features desired in the fixed stock. Using his ingenuity, this sergeant adapted an M4 collapsible butt stock to his M249 SAW. While functional, this adaptation lacked the standard vertical shoulder and chin rest as well as the robustness needed in the field for this heavy weapon.

US Army Arsenal Research Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal New Jersey and Savit teamed up to develop a new collapsible butt stock specifically designed for the M249. This new design would need to utilize the current hydraulic buffer as an interface which limited engineering options. Combining our skills and creativity, a superior design was documented and several early prototypes were produced using production tooling. By fate, two Special Forces sergeants arrived the day we performed several engineering tests on these early versions. We seized the opportunity to discuss this design with the two Sergeants and as a result, we were rewarded with positive feedback with a request to personally field test the unit. Their input resulted in changes to the telescoping locking lever which incorporated a "witches chin" hand rest. This feature is similar to the existing M249 fixed stock. The soldiers felt strongly that this new butt stock would be perfect for the troops and would have an immediate impact in the battle conditions they are currently faced with in Iraq. The M249 collapsible butt stocks are to be field tested in Iraq by several special forces units with the purpose of assessing the design in realtime battle conditions.

THIS ISSUE'S "WHAT'Z'IT"?





TRANSITIONAL FORCE GENERATION ☆☆ IN AFGHANISTAN ☆☆

by LTC Tim Leitch, LTC (P) Mike Yocum, MAJ Mark Donahue, MAJ Dennis Watters, and CPT Terry Horner

US Army force managers are central to helping NATO forces in Afghanistan, Afghan security forces, and Afghanistan itself “move on” rapidly to their future beyond direct military operations in Afghanistan. In 2014, the NATO forces in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are projected to complete its shift from a combat to a support role known as the “post-ISAF” mission.

This article outlines the ISAF force generation process in 2012/2013, a critical time of transition into the “post-ISAF” mission. It also details the processes and procedures Army force managers are involved in at all levels in ISAF to generate coalition and US Forces. It is written from the perspective of the command that coordinates conventional military operations for ISAF, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC). The reader

will hopefully understand from it why a force management position in Afghanistan is possibly the most rewarding, and without a doubt, one of the most challenging and educational positions a force manager can have.

Combined Force Generation

Headquarters in Afghanistan generate force structure utilizing the NATO force generation process known as “the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements” (CJSOR). The CJSOR for Afghanistan is administered by Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), the NATO Headquarters with a historical direct relationship to NATO “troop contributing nations” (TCN). Since NATO has no forces of its own (less a few small specialized units) it must depend on TCNs to provide troops for operations.

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Contact Info: Please note the new numbers for the PDO staff!

FA50 Personnel Development Office

Chief

LTC Stephon Brannon

703-545-1807

stephon.m.brannon.mil@mail.mil

Program Manager

Ms. Patsy Campbell

703-545-1838

patsy.d.campbell.civ@mail.mil

Program Manager

Mike McDaniel

703-545-1665

michael.r.mcdaniel10.civ@mail.mil

Program Manager

Sean Tuomey

703-692-4462

michael.s.tuomey.civ@mail.mil

HRC FA50 Career Manager

LTC Jamie Garcia

502-613-6681

jamie.garcia@us.army.mil

Army Reserve Officers

OCAR, Chief, Force Programs

COL Pete Colon

703-806-7316

pedro.colon@usar.army.mil

National Guard Officers

Chief, Force Management

COL Mark Berglund

703-607-7801

mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil

Manpower and Force Management

Career Program (CP26)

Ms. Michelle Davis

703-692-6884

Michele.r.davis21.civ@mail.mil

FA50 Website:

www.fa50.army.mil

FA50 on Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/Army.FA50>

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AFMS Online: <http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil>

Smart Quote:

"The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say "I." And that's not because they have trained themselves not to say "I." They don't think "I." They think "we"; they think "team." They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don't sidestep it, but "we" gets the credit. This is what creates trust, what enables you to get the task done." — Peter Drucker

The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) in Afghanistan represents the pinnacle of NATO force generation process development. During the Cold War, NATO could depend on a relatively static force structure and battlefield; subsequently, it used “force plans” to deploy forces. In 1995, for operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO established a CJSOR precursor to field forces rapidly and flexibly wherever they are needed. Until 2003, this process was “ad hoc”, but as described later, NATO developed the current CJSOR into a relatively complex process to enhance responsiveness.

CJSOR in Afghanistan

The CJSOR for Afghanistan develops force requirements in six-month increments a year in advance of projected requirement fill and are numbered for the year in which they are developed. For example, CJSOR 12.5, developed the latter half of 2012, established force requirements for the last half of 2013.

CJSOR management is mechanically simple. A master Excel spreadsheet maintained by SHAPE contains the specific unit requirements and is the product by which commands at all levels track requirements and unit resourcing. SHAPE assigns discrete requirements serial numbers against which all pertinent information about that serial is annotated (type of unit needed, TCN supplying or proposed to supply, when requirement is needed, where it is located, etc.).

CJSOR development is a “bottoms up” process. Staffs from Regional Commands upward develop specific unit requirements collaboratively based on commanders’ guidance; projected operational conditions; and campaign plans and related documents. These include the IJC strategic campaign

plan, the Security Force Assistance Concept of Operations (CONOPs), and published functional planning guidance, such as the IJC air estimate for theater air support requirements. Commands at all levels staffed the requirements within their purview en route to final SHAPE approval for the total theater requirement.

SHAPE then engages TCNs to provide resourcing for these approved requirements. SHAPE conducts this “resourcing phase” of the process in collaboration with theater HQs to address rapidly changing conditions in theater and in the ability and willingness of TCNs to provide units.

One challenge to assembling units to resource requirements was addressing national troop “caveats”. Almost without exception (and including the US) the 50 TCNs placed restrictions, known as caveats, on troop usage. These caveats include a number of factors, such as geographical limitations, time of commitment, and command status, to name just a very few.

Staff officers had to take all caveats into account when developing a SHAPE “offer” (position) to TCNs that identified which nation’s troops were the most appropriate for specific missions and operational areas. Once the offer was built, resourcing culminated in force generation conferences, where TCN representatives came together to “bid on” and finalize their troop commitment.

Some facts illustrate the scope of change that CJSOR addressed during the time described in this article. During calendar year 2013, overall IJC force requirements dropping from over 110,000 to less than 44,000 in response to increasing transition of Afghan forces in




Figure 1: US Force Managers work in coalition with Allied, International Security Assistance (ISAF) Forces, Afghan, Joint Forces Command and US focused teams across all command levels to generate forces.

the lead for security. 2013 also saw a peak and subsequent reduction in security force assistance teams as these teams trained their Afghan counterparts to a state of operational readiness. Another milestone addressed was developing a “Command and Control (C2) Evolution” of headquarters from RC-level upward to reflect their changing role as the theater postured itself to transition to a post-ISAF mission in 2014.

In a break from the normal CJSOR process, strategic plans for various post-ISAF mission scenarios drove development of “illustrative” CJSORs to address these scenarios as SHAPE approved the penultimate ISAF CJSORS. This deviation from the normal CJSOR development timeline, driven by lessons learned in the Iraq drawdown, allowed a longer lead time for planners to assess the type and timing of

decisions needed to transition theater force structure to its post-ISAF mission.

US Force Generation in Support of CJSOR

US focused force generation teams managed US force generation processes in support of the overarching CJSOR process to generate US force commitments. Much as CJSOR Force Managers had to strive to master the nuances of over 50 different national agendas, US force managers had to understand the nuances of unique US service force management procedures.

Reconciling service differences required force managers to master several unique concepts and associated terms to administer from a common baseline. One is the force management level (FML), the number which reflects total US force requirement numbers in theater. Theater

FML levels are set in response to presidential directives.

During the time addressed by this article, IJC managed FML constraints by establishing force caps for subordinate commands and requiring them to identify “bill payers” for any new requested capabilities. Although this did not mean that a command would not get a newly requested capability (regardless of force cap), this system was an effective management check to force ongoing requirements scrutiny.

Another key concept was the use of “force tracking numbers (FTNs)” to track discrete unit or unit equivalent requirements and, importantly from the CJSOR perspective, tie US troop and unit commitments to specific CJSOR serial numbers. Although conceptually similar to unit identification codes (UICs), FTNs are utilized

more flexibly in that they can identify everything from force packages to discrete basic service units to the multitude of specialized security force assistance teams that were unique to Afghanistan and not captured in the unit types of any of their parent services.

In addition to the DoD enterprise systems used for force generation (Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM), Force Requirements Database (FRED), and the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), FTNs are also used in conjunction with several purpose built spreadsheets and databases in theater to provide the level of resolution needed to manage FML. These were based on the United States Forces –Afghanistan (USFOR-A) so called “68k/34K” spreadsheet that allocated FML among all US forces in Afghanistan. The spreadsheet



Figure 2: The CJSOR developed force structure in 6-month increments a year ahead of BOG; “illustrative” CJSORs began shaping post-ISAF force structure in 2012 for various post-ISAF scenarios.

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provided FTN level of detail on forces transitioning theater, a scorecard that showed subordinate command FML levels, and a tracking mechanism for the mobilization dates of COMPO 2 (National Guard) and COMPO 3 (Reserve) units.

IJC then developed its own “FML tracker” spreadsheet which provided subordinate command FML management levels by FTN, as well as latest arrival dates (LAD) and “boots on ground” (BOG) dates. This data along with historical analysis of actual BOG numbers combined with various algorithms provided future force trends and formed the basis of periodic briefings to the Commander IJC. IJC subsequently disseminated this information throughout theater and the DoD to provide data for senior leader decision making relative to force structure levels

Underpinning these plain looking trend-lines was the daily administrative turbulence of managing the various force generation actions needed to transition forces through theater. Forces projected to come into theater required request for forces (RFF) or request for assistance (RFA). Units that had their mission or tour length modified required full or partial redeployment orders (REDEPODs), curtailments (mission cancelled after mobilization) or “off-ramps” (cancellation prior to deployment) or re-mission orders if their mission had changed significantly

Force managers accomplished all these actions through closed coordination with subordinate and higher commands. The centerpiece of these efforts was a weekly theater force generation coordination teleconference with USFOR-A, ISAF, and all subordinate commands. IJC force managers also participated in teleconferences in support of HQDA, CENTCOM, FORSCOM, Coalition Forces, and Army National Guard and

Reserves Forces force generation processes. Quarterly theater conferences and quarterly CENTCOM conferences provided opportunities to discuss force generation in more detail and to provide process training to new participants.

Equipping

The “Military Police Readiness Report” section on the right side of Figure 1 contains a list of items typically included in a readiness report. The list is subject to the addition or deletion of topics based on assessments of current field requirements or on feedback from commanders regarding specific requirements.

IJC force managers also played a key role in generating theater equipping requests. The IJC force generation cell analyzed and provided concurrence (or alternate courses of action) in support of RCs or Task Forces. These included Joint Urgent Operational Needs statement (JUON) and Operational Needs Statements (ONS). During 2013, the reduction in FML from 68K to 34K provided plenty of opportunity for the IJC team to communicate the reduced requirement to the Title X equippers (ARCENT and FORSCOM with the plan, and USFOR-A with the solution). Critical force protection items and other “game changing” systems were top priorities as American forces in theater transitioned to the post-ISAF mission.

Conclusion

After serving in a tour in the Afghanistan Theater, force managers will be well prepared for a variety of missions. Their exposure to direct coordination with service and DoD staffs and coalition forces during one of the most complex operations in recent history provides them a depth of experience in a few months that it would take years to garner otherwise. 🧩

MG (R) ROBERT B. ROSENKRANZ TO BE HONORED AS THE 2014 FORCE MANAGEMENT HALL OF FAME INDUCTEE



The The FA 50 PDO proudly announces the nomination of MG (R) Robert B. Rosenkranz as the 2014 Force Management Hall of Fame inductee. General Rosenkranz brings extraordinary distinction to the Hall of Fame and the Force Management Community.

From 1975 to 1995, MG Bob Rosenkranz had significant responsibilities and major achievements of great benefit to the US Army and DoD in operational and strategic level force management, force structure plans, force development, force integration, organizational requirements approval, strategic force planning, manpower management, force modernization, equipment management and associated resource management.

In 1975, MG (R) Rosenkranz led the Schweinfurt Military Community with its many challenges in force management, manpower and equipment allocations to achieve a high degree of military readiness in providing essential base support services and sustainment in the 3rd Infantry Division Area of Operation and Responsibility.

In 1985, MG (R) Rosenkranz spearheaded analysis, planning, education and instruction at the Institute of Advanced Russian and Eastern European Studies relative to the strategic and operational relevance of US Military and US Army force structure, doctrine, and military readiness during the Cold War with opposing Soviet and Warsaw Pact Forces.



In 1989, while at OSD (Policy) and HQDA, OCSA and G-3, he was responsible for the force management decisions and processes required to support three major world events and conflicts and the planning for end strength reductions of over 250K Active, 445K R/C and 164K Civ. MG (R) Rosenkranz led the first of several strategic defense transformations to US Army force structures, capabilities, doctrine, readiness, force modernization, mission priorities and infrastructures for training, logistics, installations, medical and command and control. These included the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Just Cause.

As Commander, US Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, from 1992 to 1995, with a downsized Army in the post-Cold War era, MG (R) Rosenkranz's command assessed the effectiveness of weapons systems, materiel, doctrine and design of organizational requirements and capabilities; mainstream critical force management. The US Army of the 1990s, was smaller but needed to be more ready, modernized, deployable, versatile and lethal. Modernization remained an imperative for force management, as well as operational test and evaluation missions. Digitization, Information Technology, Communications Technology were all effectively led and superbly managed by MG Rosenkranz in direct support of force management requirements and the strategic goals of the Army's senior leadership.

After retirement in 1995, MG (R) Rosenkranz continues to apply his experience and skills to the Defense Industry in key leadership positions, many of the positions requiring significant work and application of force management capabilities. We are honored by his induction and his achievements in Force Management.

DEVELOPMENT OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATOR

by LTC Jason Liggett

After attending and presenting at several FA 50 professional developments I felt compelled to write this article. I would first like to recognize the FA 50 proponent team and thank them for this continued initiative. This program is integral to the future success of our functional area, officers, and the commands they serve. The topics addressed should help provide a broader perspective of the Army and sharpen the skill sets of force managers. During many of the sessions our senior officers stressed the key factors in the development of FA 50 officers. The consistent theme of discussion was the need to be knowledgeable across the spectrum of all functions in both force management and force integration. I began to assess my own path as an FA 50 and what I did to personally prepare for my duties and responsibilities. I want to focus on two key areas: knowledge and relationships. I wanted to share my experiences in this article as the road map I followed to assume my duties as an Organizational Integrator at FORSCOM. This road map may assist officers in their development, assumption of duty positions, and professional progression. The shared lessons are provided as examples I believe will benefit new FA 50 officers who come to the community or those transitioning into new positions throughout the Army.

I had the unique opportunity to experience Force Management and Integration from completely two different perspectives first as a Military Police Officer and now as a Functional Area 50 Officer. I was selected to be the Organizational Integrator (OI) for Standard Requirements Code (SRC 19) Military Police for Forces Command in January 2013. At the time a basic knowledge base in FM&FI attending formal training through the Army Force Management School

(AFMS) four week course and on the job working eighteen months as an ARFORGEN Integrator (AI) in the FORSCOM Readiness Division. As an AI I was responsible for Fort Campbell and the 101st ABN Division dealing with all equipping, manning, training, and readiness issues as their primary conduit into FORSCOM. The time spent in the Readiness Division was critical in my development as my first tour at a Four Star level Headquarters. It provided great insight on the larger Army requirements for Combatant Commanders, and importance of staff synchronization and coordination at all levels. I learned the importance and daily affects our work had in ensuring that our formations were properly manned, equipped and trained, that would enable commanders to execute mission around the world.

As I began my tour as an Organizational Integrator I attempted to consolidate and organize the experience and knowledge shared with me by the officer I was replacing. I quickly built continuity books to consolidate relevant documents for my execution of my job. I consider it my book of all knowledge for SRC 19 which I still use to this day and consistently update. As I began to work issues the book was an excellent tool to keep me afloat during my assumption of duties. However, it was not all encompassing as I had first thought. Especially when I hit the right seat portion of my cross over I realized I needed more knowledge than a single book could contain. The information contained in the book provided a base line of knowledge to work issues but I soon realized I needed to have a broader perspective and further my educational foundation.

The FM leadership expected me to be the Subject

Organizational Integrator continued on page 19

Matter Expert (SME) for all of SRC 19. I developed a strategy to further my educational foundation not only for my SRC but for force management s a whole. My next step was to begin enhancing relationships within my directorate to gain a more comprehensive view of the overall process. I spent time with each branch in FM&FI to learn how they fit into the overall picture and what they offered to integrators for the mission. This would not make an expert in their respective areas but would enable me to gain an appreciation and understanding of the capabilities within the directorate. It cannot be overstated that when you show interest and appreciation for individual's area of expertise they are more than willing to assist.

My development also included mentorship and guidance from our leadership which allowed me to apply my previous operational experience for other initiatives within force management. I coordinated visit the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS) as part of my transition. I contacted USAMPS and set my itinerary for the site visit. I met with the Assistant Commandant (AC) of USAMPS, National Guard and Reserve Assistant Commandant's during the initial part of my visit. I expressed that I was part of their extended team and their direct link for all SRC 19 related issues at FORSCOM. Some of the key engagements were with the Directorates from Proponency, Material Development, Concepts Organization Doctrine Development Division (CODDD), and Capabilities Development & Integration Directorate (CDID). As a results of my visit issues I have dealt with as an integrator at FORSCOM have been solved quickly through the prior establishment of relationships during my visit to USAMPS and the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) staff, the higher headquarters for USAMPS. The staffs at USAMPS and MCOE were impressive in their insight and knowledge exponentially increased my educational foundation in SRC 19 and as an organizational integration officer.

The culminating event in the assumption of duties and an OI was the visit with my counterpart at the Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) during

my first exposure to Total Army Analysis (TAA) Panels. The officer I was replacing had already completed the extensive preparation leading up to the panel. I had an opportunity to study his work and go through the process with him in viewing this process it became apparent how essential that all analysis, briefings, and command concurrence is completed prior to the panels. As the organizational integrator in this forum you are the FORSCOM Commanding General representative on the ground and are the spokes person for the FORSCOM position for the SRC and how it affects his overall structure and mission.

A highlight for my professional growth has been my current selection and focus as a lead action officer on the BCT Reorganization and 490K by FY15 at FORSCOM. This has provided exposure and opportunities to assist the FORSCOM Commander to set the conditions in force structure and readiness. The staff coordination and synchronization with the FORSCOM staff, HQDA, and supporting commands for this effort that has incalculable in my development.

The method I have shared in furthering my knowledge and relationships as integrator is provided as an example approach to a new position or assignment. I would anticipate the examples offered will spur discussions between officers on techniques or approaches for future success in assignments. The foundation I set enabled me to become an effective OI for my SRC and allowed opened greater opportunities within FM & FI. In close I recommend continually building your knowledge base, fostering relationships at all levels, and be the subject matter expert in your area of responsibility.

LTC Jason Liggett is originally from California and received his commission from ROTC as a Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG). He holds a bachelors degree in history from Northern Arizona University and also holds a masters degree in Business and Organizational Security Management. Originally a Military Police Officer, he became an FA 50 in 2010. LTC Liggett is currently assigned to HQs FORSCOM as an Organizational Integrator. 🧩



The ARCENT Force Generation Branch and Global Force Management by MAJ Daniel R. Stanton III

The Army Central (ARCENT) Force Management Division has four branches: Force Generation, Force Integration, Force Structure, and Force Readiness. The Force Generation Branch is central to bridging the Army and Joint Communities in the Global Force Management (GFM) process and systems. The result of which is the reallocation of Army forces to Central Command (CENTCOM) by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). While Field Manual 3-93 (Theater Army Operations) doctrinally places the GFM function inside the Future Operations Division, ARCENT has task organized it inside the Force Management Division since 2009.

With Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coming to a close at the end of 2014 and Operation New Dawn already complete, it is important to look at the role of GFM or Force Generation within ARCENT and the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). There has been some sentiment that current GFM systems are largely in place to resource the current wars and will be significantly reduced when OEF ends. While it is true that CENTCOM will have fewer forces in the AOR in 2015 and beyond, it remains a Combatant Command (COCOM) with few forward assigned forces and an enduring deterrence mission. The reallocation of assigned forces via Requests for Forces (RFFs), the Secretary of Defense Operations Book (SDOB), the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), and the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) will continue for the foreseeable future.

An overview of Force Generation at ARCENT

Force Generation's work is roughly organized into three areas: emergent requirements, rotational requirements, and GFM. Emergent includes the management of RFFs and RFF Modifications. Rotational includes the management of Change Requests, GFMAP Modifications, (Latest Arrival Date / Boot on Ground Date) LAD/BOG Shifts, and Redeployment Orders (REDEPODs). GFM includes the annual requirement submission to recodify existing RFFs into the next fiscal year, planning efforts, and special projects. These three categories mirror discrete branches at the CENTCOM Force Management Division. The action officers in the ARCENT Force Generation Branch are trained in all three areas. Taken together, the processes and products described below allow for the management of allocated forces.

An RFF is the most commonly known piece of the GFM process. A rough comparison for an RFF from a FA50 perspective is an Operational Needs Statement that requests forces instead of equipment. Technically, an RFF is a request from a Combatant Commander for forces or capabilities to address requirements that cannot be sourced internally. While all RFFs are owned by the Combatant Commander, they typically originate at the service component command level. Within the ARCENT headquarters, RFFs are executed jointly among the force managers (process experts) and the overseeing staff section and/or subordinate requesting element (subject matter experts), future operations, and planners. This approach enables

vetted requests to process through GFM quickly and effectively. An RFF is the vehicle that drives capability reallocation within GFM.

A single RFF can encompass one or more capabilities. Each capability is captured or tracked through a discrete Force Tracking Number (FTN). The last seven digits of an FTN is its requirement ID, which remains constant throughout fiscal years. This allows for emergent requirements to be communicated on rotational basis as needed. Upon approval, emergent capabilities are codified and tracked in GFM databases by their FTNs.

The SDOB is the SECDEF Order for reallocating forces amongst Combatant Commanders. The primary function of the Force Generation Branch is to manage the process that gets RFFs with ARCENT equities approved in the SDOB. As FA50s, our expertise and understanding of the institutional military uniquely qualifies us to drive this process through the stakeholding organizations. Our understanding of Total Army Analysis, Force Structure, and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) helps us to better nest COCOM requirements with Army capabilities.

SDOB decisions are codified in the GFMAP. The GFMAP contains the additional fidelity needed to allow the COCOMs and the force providers to maintain a common understanding and manage associated deployments. The Joint Staff modifies the GFMAP whenever the SDOB is signed. The GFMAP is the authoritative document that the Force Generation Branch uses to determine the status of current deployed and future deployers sourced against validated ARCENT/CENTCOM requirements. The GFMAP is a component of the GFMIG which captures the overall force assignment, allocation, and apportionment information into an authoritative GFM document in support of the Department of Defense's strategic guidance. The scope of the GFMIG is broader than the Force Generation Branch, and has implications throughout the headquarters.

The annual requirements submission is the mechanism for the COCOM to communicate its force

allocation requirement to the SECDEF and GFM community. Submission is generated two years in advance of execution and is determined in a series of Action Officer, Colonel, and General Officer updates and boards within ARCENT. The force management team then carries the Army's portion of the CENTCOM submission to a series of CENTCOM FM led conferences. Once adjudicated, the annual submission is ultimately a COCOM product with Army Service Component Command input. The annual process does not replace the need of an RFF to birth a new requirement. It simply allows selected existing requirements to continue as needed.

Three times a year, the ARCENT force management team supports Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and CENTCOM hosted Force Flow Conferences. These are led by the strategic movement community and underpinned by the GFM community. The deliverable for this conference is a transportation feasible plan within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database taking the form of Time Phased Force Flow Data (TPFFD). This conference and overall cooperation amongst stakeholders is critical to reconciling unit rotations with transportation assets as planned force reallocations are executed.

The Force Generation branch manages additional processes within the GFM construct: RFF Modifications and Change Requests are employed to make adjustments to existing FTNs. Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) activation requests in response to a contingency or changing strategic/operational circumstances request preapproved capabilities at home station to rapidly deploy to the AOR. LAD/BOG shifts request are submitted when the arrival or departure of a unit needs adjustment. REDEPORDs are the mechanism for ending valid requirements and redeploying the unit sourced against requirements or not deploying the follow on units.

Automated systems and databases are critical to the ensuring the DoD leadership, force providers, and COCOMs are able to smoothly request capabilities, determine force reallocation, and execute movements.

CONGRATULATIONS TO THE FOLLOWING
FA50S WHO MADE THE CENTRALIZED
SELECTION LIST



Michael L. Hall
Robert L. Jones, III
Jason S. Liggett
Rick L. Montandon
Matthew N. Olson
Timothy R. Sullivan
George Polovchik III
Daniel M. Zerby



The FA50 Office, along with the entire FA50 population, congratulates the listed officers announced as Centralized Selection List (CSL) selectees. Let's continue to celebrate FA50 success with congratulations to these eight officers.

ARCENT continued from page 21

Keytools used by the ARCENT team: Force Requirements Enhanced Database (FRED) is the database managed by CENTCOM to capture allocated force within the CENTCOM AOR. FRED is not the database of record, but has been essential to this AOR's ability to design and analyze annual requirements prior to formal submission. The Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM), now taught in the FA50 course, is the Joint Staff (J33) managed database of record for the GFM process. The authority of the SDOB and GFMAP in turn underpin the JCRM database. Additionally, the Force Management System Website (FMSWeb) is critical throughout the GFM process. Using FMSWeb data allows ARCENT to better nest requests with Army capabilities and optimize ARFORGEN's ability to support.

The Future of Force Generation at ARCENT

GFM actions are linked to current operations, future operations, and planning efforts throughout ARCENT. The Force Management / Force Generation team works to keep this information synchronized throughout the staff in order to meet the needs of the CENTCOM Commander.

As contingency funds reduce, the already increasingly difficult resourcing of the CENTCOM requirement will worsen. While we are managing fewer FTNs as OEF draws to a close, the remaining requirements are requiring more staff resources to manage inside the GFM process. In FY17, the ARCENT HQ will be reducing by 50% in the conversion to the 5.4 MTOE. This reduction will make it more difficult for the command to resource the Force Generation mission.

Barring a significant change in the strategic situation within the CENTCOM AOR, a sizable steady state presence will be required forward for the foreseeable future. Unless there is a paradigm shift towards basing assigned forces in the region, this presence will be predominately allocated forces. The ARCENT leadership will continue to rely on the unique skill set and knowledge base of their FA50s to ensure this mission is accomplished.

MAJ Daniel Stanton is from Huntington, New York and received his commission from ROTC. He holds a bachelors degree in Industrial Engineering from Clemson University and is starting his Master of Business Administration at the University of South Carolina this summer. Originally a Quartermaster Officer, he became an FA 50 in 2011. MAJ Stanton is currently assigned to US Army Central Command as a Force Integration Officer. Dan is married to Meredith Stanton M.D., of Atlanta, Georgia. They have two sons (Murphy and Miller).

Contact:

MAJ Daniel R. Stanton III

USARCENT G38, FMD

DSN: 312-889-8272

COM: 803-885-8272

VOSIP: 302-367-8272

SIPR: daniel.r.stanton.mil@mail.smil.mil

NIPR: daniel.r.stanton.mil@mail.mil

Where can I find information about FA50? You can find information about FA50 in DA PAM 600-3 Chapter 31 and at <http://www.fa50.army.mil/>. If you have an AKO account, you can also check out <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/194547>. You can also email questions to FA50PP@conus.army.mil.

2014 FA50 Senior Force Managers Seminar

FORCE MANAGERS PREPARE FOR A READY AND MODERN ARMY

28, 29 MAY – PENTAGON CONFERENCE CENTER RM B6



The Senior Force Managers Seminar (SFMS) is a professional development opportunity for senior members of the Army Force Management community to hear and discuss issues with the Army Leadership. FA50 COLs and LTC(P)s of all compos, and select senior Force Management DA civilians (GS14/15) are invited to participate. Officers recently selected for promotion or for CSL positions are strongly encouraged to attend. Speakers come from across the Army staff as well as other organizations like FORSCOM, TRADOC, NGB, and the USAR. Presentations and discussion provide information on current topics.

Information about the 2014 SFMS and registration can be found on the FA50 website at <http://www.fa50.army.mil/sfms>.