



THE Oracle

“MRAP”

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FROM THE Q-COURSE MRAP: What Do We Do Now?

by Major William W. Horn V

Students attending the FA50 Qualification Course at AFMS prepare and submit a research paper as part of their studies. The best written or most interesting papers are selected for publication in the Oracle. Using MRAP as his example, in the following paper Major William Horn asks, in so many words, how do we go back and touch all the bases skipped in getting an urgently needed capability fielded as quickly as possible? (Opinions presented are the author's.)

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle has been selected to fill an urgent operational need for the theater commander. Acquisition at such a rapid rate, while beneficial to commander and the soldier who need it now, often presents a plethora of challenges that otherwise would be identified and addressed if done through the normal and deliberate process. Using the domains of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), the decision to purchase over 10,000 MRAPs at a cost of over \$10 billion dollars is analyzed.

Operation Iraqi Freedom is now in its fourth year, and the insurgents' weapon of choice against coalition forces has been the IED, or the Improvised Explosive

Device. They are the largest producer of casualties in theater, and the enemy has shown very deadly ingenuity in employing these weapons. Made from all types of explosives, from artillery shells to fertilizer, and detonated with anything from cell phones to washing machine timers, the IED is easy to make, highly



Sgt. Mark B. Matthews photo

The first shipment of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP) arrived at Camp Liberty in western Baghdad and are being fielded to units who operate in areas with the highest threat levels. These are the first of an estimated 7,000 MRAP vehicles expected in theater by early summer.

Read About It In THE Oracle

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT

Army Will Also Pure-fleet the Patriot



BG Charles A. Anderson
Director, Force Development
Executive Agent for FA 50

Team,

Since I took over the job of Executive Agent for Functional Area 50 about 15 months ago, the Army and our FA have undergone a tremendous amount of change. We have initiated an Army Modernization Strategy to rapidly field the best equipment available to the current force, upgrade and modernize existing systems, identify and incorporate new technologies derived from Future Combat System research and development, and ultimately field FCS to the Brigade Combat Teams. The first three elements of the strategy are happening right now. Most visible of the many systems being sent over to the fight has been the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles. MRAPs have already proven themselves as lifesavers. Interestingly, this issue of the ORACLE includes a thought piece by one of our FA50 Qualification Course students on the topic of MRAP and other ONS-related accelerated fieldings and how we might

have to adapt our processes to meet the inherent challenges of “catching up” with doctrine, training, organizational changes, maintenance capability and so forth. Under the Mod Strategy, the Army will also pure-fleet the Patriot force, prepare for introduction of the Joint Cargo Aircraft, Armed Recon helicopter and other systems, and fully implement ARFORGEN.

And at the forefront of all these efforts are Force Management Officers and civilians. On the ARSTAF, at the Army Commands and Army Service Component Commands, Corps and Division headquarters, Force Managers are making Transformation happen. “Creative Managers of Change” is more than a snappy slogan, it describes what you are doing across the Army every single day.

Another phrase you’ve heard a thousand times by now, about “the most extensive transformation of our Army since WWII,” is not just hot air—the Army in 2030 will be vastly different from the Army of 2008. And it is not that far away—officers newly assessed into FA50 today will be colonels and general officers then.

Within the Functional Area, the Q Course is now fully established. We have even begun offering a second iteration of the course per year, allowing us to accommodate more Reserve Component officers and Career Program (CP26) civilian students. We are also keeping a close eye on the OPMS process, and will ensure that our equities are protected as changes in ILE and officer lifecycle management are discussed. Advanced educational opportunities for FA50s include the fully-funded MBA Program at George Mason University here in the National Capital Region, and we have begun discussions with the Naval Postgraduate School on other options. FA50s also have the chance to serve as Army Fellows at the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center. Most of the credit for the success of our proponency efforts must go to Ms Donna Wood, Acting Chief of the FA50 PPO for more than a year. Donna is leaving us, as you probably know, to take on new proponency challenges in the Simulation Operations (FA57/CP36) PPO as Program Manager for CP36 civilians. She departs with our deepest thanks and appreciation for her great work, and also with my personal thanks for a job well done.

As I prepare to move on, too, I want to encourage you all once again to keep up the terrific job you all do every day. As Transformation and Modularity proceed, the Army is charging into the future and Force Managers are in the lead. Yours are among the most important jobs in the Army. I wish all of you the very best.

.....
Chuck Anderson



Sgt. Michael Connor photo

Army Pfc. Jeremy Shelton from Monticello, Ga., kicks the tire of his brand new mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle during preventive maintenance checks and services at drivers training at Camp Liberty Nov. 11. Shelton is with Company B, 1-30th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. This is the first fielding of the MRAP in the division.

prolific, easy to hide, and very difficult to counter. The Army has developed several approaches to reducing the impact of the IED on our Soldiers. New doctrine and organizations have been implemented and stood up, such as the engineer route clearance companies and the JIEDDO (Joint IED Defeat Organization). Substantial pre-deployment training is conducted on the identification of IEDs, convoy procedures and IED reaction drills. Several new pieces of equipment have been rushed to the field, including electronic jammers, thermal sights, and up-armored HMMWVs. The new Basic Officer Leader Course II (BOLC II) provides our newest leaders a solid base of IED knowledge, and we are quickly trying to increase the number of EOD trained personnel within the ranks.

Out of all these approaches to identify an IED “solution,” the MRAP, or Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle is now at the forefront in regards to resourcing. Already procured in small numbers by both the Army and Marine Corps to fill JUONS (Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements) and ONS (Operational Needs Statements) requirements from theater, the MRAP was made the Department of Defense’s highest priority acquisition program by Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Brook, 2007), with an estimated procurement cost of over \$10 billion dollars. LTG Stephen Speakes, Deputy Chief of

Staff, G-8, has praised the efforts under way to “provide the capability to the Soldiers now, not to think about it, not to pontificate about it, but to deliver” (Miles, 2007). This dedication to providing the Soldier the best protection available immediately is exactly what they deserve, however such rapid acquisition of the MRAP will have a multitude of additional impacts on our Army that have yet to be determined and could ultimately adversely affect the acquisition of the Future Combat System in the years to come. This paper will attempt to identify some of the major impacts of the MRAP procurement using the DOTMLPF domains (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Personnel, and Facilities), and offer some possible solutions and alternatives.

The MRAP has been around for quite some time, most notably in the South African and Israeli armed forces. The Army is now using it as an immediate materiel solution to provide better underbody protected vehicles. It has a raised “V-shaped” undercarriage which deflects much of an IED’s blast out and away from the hull of the vehicle. According to the 2007 Army Modernization Plan, “the MRAP family of vehicles will provide operating forces multiple, mission-role platforms capable of defeating and mitigating the effects of IEDs and other casualty-producing threats currently seen in Theater” (U.S. Army G-8, 2007). While some people, such as Congressional Representative Gene Taylor, from Mississippi, believe that the Army should replace all of its HMMWVs in theater with MRAPs (Brook, 2007), the Army sees the MRAP as an augmentation rather than a replacement. This is because the MRAP’s size and weight do not allow it to accomplish all requirements currently met by HMMWVs and up-armored HMMWVs, such as use in air assaults. The 2007 Army Modernization Plan puts the different variants of MRAP into three categories: CAT 1 comprises Mine Resistant Utility Vehicle/Urban Combat Operations, and can accommodate six or more personnel. These will be the most numerous, the smallest and distinguished by having four wheels. CAT 2 comprises Multi-Mission (convoy escort, troop transport, ambulance, EOD, combat engineer), and can accommodate ten or more personnel. CAT 3 comprises Mine/IED Clearance (Buffalo), and can accommodate six or more personnel (U.S. Army G-8, 2007).



Sgt. Michael Connor photo

Soldiers from Company B, 1-30th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, drive a new mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle, or MRAP, through an off-road confidence course at Camp Liberty, Iraq, Nov. 7, 2007.

These are the largest, heaviest and distinguished by its large robotic arm. The Army and Marines currently have approximately 700 MRAPs in theater and have

ordered another 6,415 using \$5.4 billion in the 2007 budget (Miles, 2007). In order to field the large numbers requested as quickly as possible, several different models from different contractors have been ordered. Using CAT 1 as an example there are five different vehicles from five different contractors.

Since the MRAP has already been fielded in small numbers the doctrine in which we will employ it is already being developed by the Soldiers on the ground and the units in field, and like all doctrine it will be continually refined. However if we end up purchasing upwards of 10,000-plus MRAP vehicles, how do we use the substantial capability we will have inherited once operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have come to a close? Obviously units like the 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain Division, who likely needed the MRAP the most because of their lack of armored vehicles, cannot replace their HMMWVs for MRAPs one-for-one. They would lose their ability to be rapidly deployed. One potential solution might be the eventual establishment of a MRAP APS (Army Prepositioned Stock). A maritime MRAP APS would not hamper the rapid deployment of light units, while allowing them to quickly link-up with the force protection that an MRAP provides. An even more detailed plan would be to have a land-based MRAP APS set in Southwest Asia, where we are most likely to be involved for a long time to come in some capacity even after the end of OIF and OEF, and a maritime MRAP APS somewhere in Southeast Asia to cover future potential hotspots.

In the second DOTMLPF domain, organization, the question is how do we integrate MRAP into our current structure? The closest we have come so far is the development of route clearance companies or teams within the engineer community. Since the MRAP is an augmentation to the HMMWV to improve force protection, and otherwise provides similar capabilities as the HMMWV, our current unit organizations should most likely not change. However if a BOIP (Basis of Issue Plan) was ever established, it could emulate, for example, how the Ranger Regiment manages its mortars. A mortar platoon in the Ranger Regiment does not have just one mortar system. It has the 120mm, 81mm and 60mm mortar systems, and decides which system to use based upon the mission requirements. Using

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this approach would cause significant motor pool issues, which will be discussed later with the facilities portion, but would allow units to tailor their equipment (MRAP, up-armored HMMWV or HMMWV) based on the requirements and limitations of the mission to be accomplished.

Right now training with the MRAP is pretty much on the job, or perhaps the Soldier gets a short class within the confines of the FOB (Forward Operating Base), as all available MRAPs are being shipped to the user as quickly as possible. Since it will be some time before we can produce the numbers required in theater, it is going to be even longer before we can produce enough MRAPs to allow the next-to-deploy units to “train as we fight” back in CONUS. At the risk to the units in theater, a training set of a minimum number of vehicles (1-2 platoons’ worth) needs to remain here in CONUS and rotated from post to post, so that the BCTs getting ready deploy can rotate their subordinate units through them to execute drivers and CLFX (Convoy Live-Fire) training. Having an MTT (Mobile Training Team) made up of combat veterans who have used the MRAP accompany the training set could help to facilitate training and ensure the transfer of current doctrine and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures). This could be modeled after New Equipment Training (NET).

An even bigger problem is what to do if the contractor support/maintenance runs out or is unavailable. We will need to train Army mechanics so we can fix the MRAP as close to the battlefield and as quickly as possible, in order to get it back into the fight. This will be a tremendous challenge when there are potentially nine different MRAP vehicles, three or more different types within a unit, and currently not knowing what types they might get until they get them. Contracted maintenance, even with the inherent problems associated with it, seems to be the only viable solution for the immediate future. School trained MOS mechanics would be more practical once we know what types of MRAPs are going where.

Already some of the materiel challenges have been identified, most notably the nine different types of MRAPs, and when talking about mechanics you also have to think about spare parts and recovery. John Young, the DoD MRAP task force chairman, told a

joint hearing of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Expeditionary and Air and Land Forces Subcommittees, “We may encounter manufacturing, spare parts and maintenance issues as we accelerate, but Secretary Gates and the entire Defense Department leadership team agree we should accept these risks in order to provide more capable vehicles to our troops as absolutely fast as possible” (Miles, 2007). In the near-term the best way to mitigate the issues Mr. Young describes is through training the operators how to use field-expedient methods of repair and self-recovery until the spare part bin can be built up and additional recovery vehicles can be produced.

The Leadership and Education domain of DOTMLPF is closely tied to the Doctrine and Training domains. If the MRAP does remain in the Army inventory for an extended period of time, then maybe a Convoy Leaders Course should be established that would look like a shorter version of the Mechanized Leaders Course at Fort Benning for the family of Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It would give junior officers and NCOs an introduction to the MRAP, focusing on employment and TTPs. It could also be used as a train-the-trainer course or to develop company Master MRAP, similar to a Bradley Master Gunner. The most challenging part within the education domain is going to be the development of the maintainers, which bleeds into the personnel domain.

Hopefully none of nine different MRAPs being procured requires any special specific training for the operation of the vehicle, meaning a HMMWV driver can drive a MRAP. That being the case, the main personnel problem is maintaining two different vehicle fleets. In the Personnel domain the simple math is more vehicles equals more man-hours for maintenance equals more people. The man-hours can be mitigated somewhat if, for example, a unit leaves its HMMWVs at home, flies to another location and then falls in on an MRAP APS. The unit draws the same number of MRAPs as it had HMMWVs back home. The problem now becomes one of skill as the mechanic must now be knowledgeable on potentially ten different vehicles. This can be partially solved by contractors, but because contractors are not always near the front lines, this usually increases a unit’s logistical tether and recovery time for damaged or broken vehicles.

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The last DOTMLPF domain is Facilities, which usually takes the longest to get something accomplished because of the five year lead time needed for funding. An increase of 17,000+ vehicles means a lot more motor pool space is going to be needed and additional bays to maintain them. However, because of the increased size and weight of the MRAP, a lot more analysis is needed to be done to ensure that we do not have problems similar to those the Army had when it first fielded the M1 tank to Germany in the 1980's to replace M60-series tanks. Maintaining MRAP APS sets abroad and afloat would greatly reduce the potential facilities impact in CONUS while maintaining our strategic responsiveness.

Now after only scratching the surface in identifying potential MRAP purchase impacts, might there be a different, even better way that could provide the Army the same capability the MRAP does? Here are two alternatives.

The first is the JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle). In 2006, the Joint Services had already developed a requirement to replace the aging HMMWV fleet and increase the force protection over the current up-armored HMMWV (Pike, 2006). Focusing on the JLTV instead of the MRAP would have led to a common chassis and would eliminate having two separate vehicle fleets. The JLTV would also provide better mobility operating in all environments, such as jungle and mountainous terrain, than the MRAP. However all the technologies associated with the KPPs (Key Performance Parameters) for the JLTV have not yet been fully developed, thereby all but

eliminating the JLTV as an immediate solution for the needs of the theater commander. The technologies may be able to be accelerated, but the cost in doing so would most likely be too great.

The second alternative is to mass produce an economy version of the Stryker, maintaining the armor protection of the current version, but leaving off some of more expensive electronic equipment, such as the remote weapon station with thermal sight. The Stryker's performance in IED strikes has been commendable and increasing Stryker production might be easier than what is currently being done with MRAP. This would facilitate any future decision(s) to add more Stryker BCTs, like the Army is currently pondering with an eighth Stryker BCT. Additionally the common chassis would help to mitigate the increased cost of the Stryker versus the MRAP.

In the end it all comes down to Soldiers, and providing them with every available resource to keep them safe and allowing them to do their jobs now. LTG Speakes says the Soldiers in Iraq need the MRAP more than anything else (Brook, 2007). What the Army needs to do now though is some concurrent planning to start developing the long term strategy of what to do with this \$10 billion dollar MRAP investment after its operational need has passed by. \$10 billion dollars is also a number that will grow considerably through life of the vehicle and once all the DOTMLPF challenges are addressed. ◉

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
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PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE PPO



Mr. Sean Toumey



Mr. Ronnie Griffin



Ms. Donna Wood

The FA50 PPO farewelled two of our long-time contract support staff at a luncheon on 31 January. **Mr. Sean Toumey** joined the PPO in 2004 to provide doctrine and policy development support. He was the principal author of a number of PPO initiatives, including the still-developing FA50 Lessons Learned/Collection and Analysis Team project; revision of FM 100-11 (coverage of Army Force Management will eventually be incorporated into a new FM); ensuring proponency equities are being protected in the ongoing updates to FM 3-0 (Operations), FM 1-01; AR 71-32 (Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies) and DA Pam 611-21 (Military Occupational Classification and Structure); and many other actions. Sean will be the Chief of the Content Development Branch of FDQ (Strategic Communication). He is also the Commander of the USAR's 1398th Deployment Support Brigade, headquartered at Curtis Bay, Baltimore, Maryland.

Ronnie Griffin (MPRI) has moved to Davis-Paige Management Systems to support DAMO-TR. Ronnie was an invaluable member of the PPO, providing oversight for the FA50 Qualification Course, the RAND Fellowship Program, the GMU Military MBA Program

and other professional development opportunities for Force Management Officers. Ronnie successfully established a second annual iteration of the Q Course, and was able to increase RC and civilian attendance. Ron and Sean will both be missed, and we wish them well in their new assignments.

More changes in the Proponency Office. **Donna Wood**, who has been the Acting Chief of the PPO for more than a year, is also leaving. Donna has moved to the G-3/5/7's FA57 (Simulation Operations) Proponency, DAMO-MS, where she is the Program Manager for Career Program (CP) 36 civilians. The CP36 office is co-located and closely integrated with the FA57 Proponency. This is a great opportunity for Donna to put her proponency skills to work in helping to advance the careers of Army civilians. FA57/CP36 have done some really interesting things with respect to strategic communications, merging of their offices and support structures, and collaboration on training and certification of military and civilian M&S specialists. The SimOps proponency may have some lessons-learned that we Force Managers can take advantage of, we have therefore extracted a promise from Donna to stay in touch with FA50. Best of luck! ○

* In the last issue of the Oracle, the article titled USAR Force Management: Translating Strategies into Capabilities, we inadvertently omitted the name of one of the co-authors. The article was written by LTC Timothy Zack and Mr. Mark Gerner (Calibre Systems, Inc.). A corrected copy of the newsletter is available at www.fa50.army.mil.

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY RESERVE MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

by MAJ Brian K. Jones



ARMY RESERVE MEDICAL TRANSFORMATION

On 16 July 2003, the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) directed the implementation of the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRRI) to restructure the Army Reserve into a fully synchronous, responsive force. One of former Army Reserve Commander LTG James Helmly's lasting imprints on the Army Reserve (AR) was transforming it into a more deployable force by reducing the generating force and creating additional go to war or MTOE structure.

With nearly 60% of the Army's medical assets in the AR this directive had a profound impact on AR medical headquarters structure. It transformed the one major subordinate medical command, Army Reserve Medical Command (AR-MEDCOM) which commanded and controlled (C2) all AR medical forces, into three major subordinate medical commands splitting command and control of medical units. The two new commands, 3rd (left) and 807th (right) Medical Deployment Support Command (MDSC) would now C2 all medical Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units in the Continental United States and Puerto Rico.

THE MEDICAL COMMANDS (DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT)

True to LTG Helmly's directive, AR Army Medical Department (AMEDD) transformation embraces the fact that every Soldier, active and reserve, is deployable, and blurs the historical distinction between the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) unit functions. The MDSCs were established as a result of the Army Campaign Plan and as a part of the overall AMEDD transformation of its existing Regional Medical Commands into multi-component, multi-focused, modular, medical headquarters.

The functions of the MDSC will be to manage regional healthcare facilities, provide uninterrupted healthcare, integrate active component (AC) and AR units and individuals, respond to homeland defense and other contingencies, and provide medical support to mobilizing and deploying units. The AR added a significant C2 role in garrison. This C2 mission is outside the force design for these commands and presented a significant structuring challenge for AR medical Force Development Officers (FDO).

ARMY RESERVE MEDICAL FORCE MANAGEMENT

There is a saying, the AMEDD is not special it's specialized. This specialization provides the AMEDD its own technical experts in the development, integration and management of force structure. Unlike FA 50s, AMEDD officers obtain and/or maintain their area of concentration (AOC), 70H67, while filling force management positions, acquiring a 3R additional skill identifier as a force development officer. The transformation of AR medical C2 structure increased the number of AR AMEDD FDOs by 100%. The integration of the MDSCs into the AR as a C2 element required both FDO expertise and a historical knowledge of functions and roles of AMEDD units and AOCs in the order to build the appropriate augmentation organization and develop full time support requirements needed by the MDSC to complete their C2 mission.

The Evolution of Army Reserve continued on page 9


THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION

As a result of FFRI, a number of AR MTOE commands were given new C2 responsibilities. To assist these units with their new command and Title X functions Army Reserve Force Program personnel developed a manning template for augmentation TDAs, entitled the Mission Support Element (MSE). The challenge of integrating the MDSCs into the AR force with a mission for which they were not intended required designing MSE troop program unit (TPU) and full time support (FTS) authorizations with these criteria in mind; balancing the need for AMEDD specialties positions typically found on Army staffs and balancing career progression opportunities for both active guard and reserve (AGR) and TPU Soldiers.

The generic MSEs template designed for non-AMEDD

units was developed prior to the publishing of the MDSC documents. The template was modified for AMEDD C2 units to account for AMEDD specialization. For instance, within the AMEDD personnel structure, there exists medical Comptrollers 70C67, Logistics Officers 70K67, Intelligence/Operations Officers 70H67, Personnel Officers 70F67, Automation Officers 70D67 and AOC medical immaterial positions coded 05A0. These AMEDD specialists were dovetailed with typical staff authorizations such as Logistics Officers (90A) and Personnel Officers (42B) to take advantage of the unique medical skill set these Soldiers possess and thereby complement normal staff authorizations.

Additional factors in the determination of AMEDD authorizations utilized in the MSE involved training and experience. Many AMEDD specialists will not acquire the training and experience for their specialty



until reaching a certain point in their careers. For example, a medical Comptroller must be at minimum a mid to senior Captain before being selected for the Army's long term education program for medical comptrollers at Syracuse University. Upon graduation they must work a year in the field before acquiring the 70C designator. Many officers would not be fully qualified until becoming a senior Major or LTC. Understanding these circumstances, Finance Officers 36A were authorized on the MSE TDA at junior grades with an LTC 70C67 as a supervisor. The balance between AGR and TPU authorizations was of particular concern when developing the MSE with a finite number of authorizations with which to work.

How do you provide career progression opportunities for Soldiers attending battle assemblies and the same opportunity for Soldiers in the AGR program? Some of the positions would be AGR but would allow the CDR the flexibility to select a TPU Soldier to come on tour and fill that position. In addition, avenues for career progression were identified and held for TPU Soldiers by location and mission.

In Process Reviews (IPR) and other coordination with the affected medical commands and staffs were conducted during development of these requirements and authorizations to ensure the CMDs understood and supported the force structure templates that they would utilize to execute their C2 mission.

CONCLUSION

The AR AMEDD has many force structure actions programmed for execution over the next five years. Development of medical C2 structure is just one example of how AR medical FDOs are ensuring that the medical force is and remains a synchronous, responsive force in line with LTG Helmly's directive to ensure AR medical structure is ready to accept challenges today and in the future.

MAJ Brian K. Jones is an AGR officer serving his first tour as a Force Development Officer for the United States Army Reserve Command. His 17 years of active federal service include previous assignments as a Medical Logistics Officer, AMEDD Personnel Officer and Patient Administration Officer. ◉

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FROM THE COLONELS MANAGER, SENIOR LEADERS DEVELOPMENT

Ladies and Gentlemen,

My name is Ben Henderson and I am the new FA50 Colonel Human Resource Manager for the Senior Leaders Development (SLD) Office. I recently arrived at SLD from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where I served as the Chief, Force Management for United States Army North. In addition to FA50, I also manage Functional Areas 47 (USMA Professors), 49 (ORSA), 52 (Nuclear Operations), and FA57 (Simulation Operations). I would like to present a brief overview of how Colonel Assignments work and some background on FA50 Colonel authorizations.

Once officers are selected for Colonel, they move from being managed by HRC to SLD. Colonel assignments are managed differently than LTC assignments. All Colonel assignments are nominative and require Senior Leader and unit approval. Once we receive Senior Leader and unit approval we then cut the RFO for the officer.

How are assignment decisions made? SLD follows a framework which seeks to leverage prior experiences and continues to develop officers professionally. Using this framework we continue to develop a bench of Force Management Colonels who have deployment, enterprise (Army Staff), and joint experiences. In addition, officers may have the opportunity to serve professionally broadening assignments. Other factors impacting assignments are Senior Leader guidance, special circumstances, and officer preferences.

Currently, there are 24 FA50 Colonel authorizations on the Army/Joint Staff and the Army Commands. In addition to these authorizations we have two deployment opportunities to MNI-F and CSTC-A.

I look forward to serving you as the FA50 Colonel Human Resource Manager. If ever I can be of assistance please drop me an email or call.

Sincerely,
Ben

Benjamin E. Henderson
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RESERVE COMPONENT CORNER

MAKING THE CASE FOR 50A/FORCE MANAGEMENT

by LTC Fletcher V. Washington

Functional area (FA) 50A, Force Management, is one of the more rewarding FAs of all Career Field Designations (CFD), for both basic branches as well as FAs for a number of reasons. FA50 offers the most appealing “Inverse Pyramid” from O-4 to O-5. 50As do not operate within a stovepipe only focused on their lane—they understand the larger picture of “How the Army Runs”. Additionally, the Army is undergoing a unique period of modernization and transformation, and a 50A is in the driver’s seat directing these actions to “affect change” in our Army.

INVERSE PYRAMID:

Obviously no one basic branch or FA alone will guarantee a successful career. Success will be achieved after the culmination of several factors to include the proper military and civilian education and training, the proper developmental assignments (i.e. platoon leader, battalion staff, command, primary staff, etc.), among other factors.

However, the attached chart clearly shows that some CFDs offer a higher opportunity for success than others. DA Pam 600-3, paragraph 3-7, states “attaining the grade of lieutenant colonel is often considered to be the hallmark of a successful career, although each officer defines success differently” (based on prior service and other considerations). Therefore, I am focusing on the opportunities at the O-4 and O-5 ranks primarily. Study the attached chart depicting all Army Reserve (only) O-4, O-5 and O-6 authorizations—extracted from the Leader Development Guides shown on the U.S. Army Human Resources Command Army Reserve website.

		O-4 Auth	O-5 Auth	O-6 Auth
Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE)				
Maneuver	Infantry (11)	-	-	-
	Aviation (15)	15	6	0
	Armor (19)	-	-	-
Maneuver Support	Engineer (21)	67	41	10
	Military Police (31)	48	10	2
	Chemical (74)	13	13	1
Fires	Field Artillery (13)	2	0	1
	Air Def Artillery (14)	-	-	-
Special Ops Forces (SOF)	Special Forces (18)	-	-	-
	PSYOPS (37)	22	19	3
	Civil Affairs (38)	78	36	17
Effects	FA30-Info Ops	5	12	1
	FA46-Public Affairs	29	15	5
Operations Support (OS)				
Key Leader Branch	Signal (25)	30	27	4
	Military Intel (35)	71	30	11
	FA24-Sys Engr	3	4	0
	FA34-Strat Intel	2	3	0
	FA40-Space Ops	-	-	-
	FA47-Acad Professor	-	-	-
	FA48-FAO	-	-	-
	FA49-ORSA	25	31	4
	FA50-Force Mgmt	38	52	9
	FA52-Nucler Res/Ops	1	0	0
	FA53-Sys Automation	56	23	2
	FA57-Simulations Ops	26	4	0
	FA59-Strat Plans	6	24	13
Force Sustainment (FS)				
Logistics	Transportation (88)	61	19	3
	Ordnance (91)	20	5	1
	Quartermaster (92)	54	15	2
	FA90-Logistician	164	64	27
Soldier Support	Adjutant Gen (42) & FA-43Human Res	151	91	14
	Finance (44) & FA45-Comptroller	50	27	7
Acquisition	FA51-Acquisition	44	45	6
AMEDD & Other Special Branches				
AMEDD	Medical Service (70)	117	82	16
	Army Nurse (66)	77	42	11
Chaplain	Chaplain (56)	14	22	6
JAG	JAG (27)	44	35	4

Blue Font = Inverse Pyramid From O-4 to O-5

<https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Reserve/SoldierServices/guidance/devguides.asp>

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Highlighted in blue font are all the CFDs with inverted pyramids from O-4 to O-5. The FA50 clearly boasts one of the more appealing inverted pyramids progressing from a healthy 38 O-4 authorizations to an even larger 52 O-5 authorizations. The only CFD with a higher increase than the 14 additional authorizations shown in FA50 is FA59-Strategic Plans and Policy with an increase of 18 additional O-5s than O-4s. However, you will notice that FA59 only has a mere six authorizations for O-4 where FA50 offers a plentiful 38 O-4 authorizations which translates into many more opportunities for locations, job assignments, etc. Also notice that the only other CFD that has a higher number of O-5 authorizations is the FA90-Logistician with 64 (not including the Adjutant General and FA43 as both are combined to show a total of 91). However, the FA90 has the standard pyramid design of 164 O-4 authorizations but decreases by 100 down to only 64 O-5 authorizations.


Understanding “How the Army Runs”:

“How the Army Runs” is a snazzy catch-phrase for

many, but for FA50s it is the basis of their functional area training. Becoming the expert in one specialized area, while oblivious to the rest of the Army, is not the focus of an FA50. They learn an array of high-level concepts that stretches across many different CFDs. The chart below is perplexing to most and down-right scary to others. Although the average FA50 may not be able to recite and brief this chart as well as LTG (Ret) Richard Trefry, the Program Manager of the Army Force Management School, or his staff, a 50A however would be in familiar territory and has the necessary training to understand and operate effectively within this chart—which speaks for itself.

Affecting Change:

DA Pam 600-3, paragraph 31-1. c., states “Force management is demanding, challenging, and rewarding, providing officers the opportunity to directly affect development of the Army of the future.” FA50s are not merely involved in the process; they are the key subject matter experts in the process of change. They design



IN MEMORY OF MR. RAY LOWERY



Mr. Ray Lowery

Mr. Ray Lowery, a well known and respected Army Force Manager and Chief, CSS Division, US Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Lee, passed away on November 18, 2007. Mr. Lowery's distinguished career in service

to his country covered a period of nearly 49 years. He retired as a CW4 in May 1981, after 23 years as an Enlisted Soldier and a Warrant Officer in a variety of Air Defense and Field Artillery assignments, specializing in the Pershing missile system. He joined the Army civil service in June 1982. Accepting a position in the TRADOC DCS for Training, Mr Lowery was instrumental in establishing the initial program for the Warrant Officer Education System that is in effect today. He served on the Career Program 26 (Manpower and Force Management) board, establishing training and development opportunities for aspiring force development civilian personnel.

Mr. Lowery's most important contributions to Army force management began in April 1984 when he joined the TRADOC Organization Division, which at that time managed all TOE, BOIP, and MARC actions for the Army. Mr. Lowery performed the analysis that led to the reorganization of the Army's force development community in the early 1990s that resulted in the closure of the TRADOC Organization Division and consolidation of work centers that ultimately led to the 1994 Army reorganization that transferred force development and documentation from TRADOC to USAFMSA, a field operating agency of the DA G-3/5/7. His prodigious knowledge and unparalleled technical skill made him a sought after individual

for consultation, advice, and direction on force management issues by Army senior leaders.

Mr. Lowery was an expert in managing change. While the force development community changed operating systems six times since the 1980s, his leadership and positive outlook ensured smooth transitions from the use of IBM punch cards in the TOE Documentation System (TDS) and its offspring, TDS Junior, to the Requirements Documentation System (RDS) and its successor, the RDS Client Server, and onto the Force Management System (FMS) and FMS/Global Force Management (GFM). At each strategic "tipping point", Mr. Lowery was instrumental in applying the latest automation technology to facilitate the most efficient processing and production of force documentation.

Most recently, he led a VCSA-directed Equipment Readiness Code (ERC) Task Force that reviewed over 2,200 pieces of equipment, resulting in an approved recommendation to change end item ERCs to simplify documentation and development and unit readiness reporting. He also directed the Minimum Mission Essential Wartime Requirement (MMEWR) validation project that resulted in million of dollars of cost savings/avoidance though the elimination of 387 pieces of equipment from TOEs/MTOEs.

The Army force development and documentation functionality is far better today because of the efforts and contributions of Mr. Louis Ray Lowery. His premature death leaves a significant void in force management that will be felt for many years.

In recognition of his long career and lasting contributions to Army Force Management, Mr. Louis Ray Lowery has been nominated and approved by the G-8 for induction into the Force Management Hall of Fame.◉

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organizations; develop tables of organization and equipment; determine the structure and composition of Army requirements in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) Process; determine manpower and equipment allocations within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System; coordinate activation, inactivations and reorganization of units; among numerous other important change-affecting actions across the full spectrum of the Army on its personnel, equipment and organizational structure.

Closing:

As stated, FA50, Force Management, is one of the more rewarding FAs of all Career Field Designations (CFD). Its "Inverse Pyramid" from O-4 to O-5, with

14 additional authorizations at the O-5 level provides a greater opportunity for success than the other CFDs, both basic branches and FAs, of comparable size. FA50s have a thorough understanding of "How the Army Runs" from the cradle to the grave and have a broad understanding of not only the FA50 but many other FAs as well. Additionally, the FA50 is the subject matter expert charged with modernizing and transforming our Army.

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