



THE Oracle



FA 50 Hall of Fame Issue

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HISTORIC FA 50 EVENT

Force Management Hall of Fame Inducts New Honorees

by Bob Fleitz

The Proponent Office's yearlong efforts finally culminated in a Force Managers Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony, held in the Pentagon Conference Center on 15 May 2008. The standing-room-only event, co-hosted by LTG Stephen Speakes, the Army G-8 and FA50 Proponent and MG Richard Formica, Director of Force Management, Army G-357, was a public recognition of the outstanding contributions to our Army by four distinguished Force Managers. A short video tribute recounted their careers, after which LTG Speakes and MG Formica presented each honoree a plaque and then unveiled the Hall of Fame display, which now hangs in the G-8 Hallway in the Pentagon.



Tiffany Eaton photo

Read About It In THE Oracle

COVER STORY

FA 50's Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony draws a huge audience

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Central Selection List Initiative from the Executive Agent

Let's Talk about Force Managers Hall of Fame and other Fronts from the PPO Chief

Changes in the Proponency Office: Inside scoop

From the Q Course Building the Iraqi Special Police Force by MAJ Christopher R. Reid

Reserve Component Corner: STAR (Stationing Tool Army Reserve) by MAJ Ron Frame

Find out about Force Management Development from LTC Brian Halloran

FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:

Central Selection List Initiative



BG Marvin K. McNamara Director,
FA 50 Force Development Executive Agent

Team, My turn as the FA50 Executive Agent has been all too short. BG Dave Halverson will soon be taking the reins at FD. As you know, however, this has been an exciting few months for Functional Area 50, and I'm glad to have had a small part in it.

The Central Selection List initiative, which you'll be hearing more about soon, is a big step toward tagging a number of our FA50 positions as "key billets," as important as battalion or brigade commands are for the trigger pullers. By trusting the Army to select the very best of our best Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels for these positions, we hope to ensure they are recognized for their hard

work and professionally rewarded for their excellence. Appropriately, few very of these positions will be on the Army Staff. Most are expected to be at the Corps and ASCCs, where Force Managers are really making Transformation happen.

I wish each of you the very best. In these days of completely restructuring and re-equipping virtually the entire force and fighting a war at the same time, you all have some of the most important jobs in the Army, and you are doing them magnificently.

Keep it up. ◦

A stylized, cursive signature of MKM in a gold color.

BG Marvin K. McNamara

The ORACLE is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army's FA 50 Proponency Office. Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.

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Mr. Louis Ray Lowery. Ray Lowery was exactly the kind of person the G-8 had in mind when the Hall of



Marla Hurtado photo

Mrs Lowery accepts her husband's plaque, marking his induction into the Force Managers Hall of Fame, from LTG Speakes in a Pentagon ceremony on 15 May 2008. MG Formica (l.) personally escorted Mrs Lowery and her family to the event

Fame was instituted two years ago. After a distinguished military career, he continued to serve the Army as a civilian. His efforts at USAFMSA to modernize the processes for documenting Army requirements and authorizations literally brought the force management community from computer punch cards to Global Force Management. His service to the Nation spanned nearly 49 years. Mr. Lowery passed away in November, 2007. His plaque was presented by LTG Speakes to his wife, Mrs. Mereldyn Lowery, and her family.

Colonel William "Al" Whittle (USA, Ret.). COL Al Whittle was a principal designer of what became the Organizational Integrator approach to Force Management, and the concept of centralized documentation of unit requirements and authorizations. He also oversaw the collocation of separate documentation agencies which eventually merged into USAFMSA. He served in key FM leadership positions in the US, Korea, and at the Pentagon, culminating in his assignment as DCS Force Development, US Army Reserve Command, where he established force management policies and procedures still in use today. COL Whittle retired in 1992. COL and Mrs. Whittle came up from their home in Florida for the ceremony, and several family members and friends also attended.



Marla Hurtado photo

COL Al Whittle, a distinguished Force Manager, was also inducted into the Hall of Fame on 15 May. Mrs Whittle and several family members also attended.

The Chief of the Army Reserve, LTG Jack C. Stultz, was also on hand to congratulate COL Whittle.

LTG Richard G. Trefry (USA, Ret.). General Trefry is a legend in the Army and in the Force Management community. He commanded Soldiers in two wars,



Marla Hurtado photo

LTG Trefry was actually inducted with the first class of the Force Managers Hall of Fame in 2005, however this was the G8's opportunity to recognize him publicly with the honor. As always, "Tref" had some valuable thoughts to share with all in attendance.

FROM THE PPO CHIEF:

Historic FA 50 Hall of Fame Event, and other Fronts



LTC Rob Waring, FA50 Personnel Proponent Office Chief

We kicked off the summer with a historic FA50 event recognizing a number of outstanding retired Army Force Managers. This was a rewarding opportunity not only to recognize but to meet some of these Soldiers who have paved the way for us. Be sure to read more about this in the article about the Force Managers Hall of Fame.

The dust is starting to settle in the Proponency Office. Ms. Patsy Campbell is on board as our new civilian Program Manager. As such she will manage the day-to-day operations and activities of the office. Patsy brings a tremendous wealth of experience from her last job with the Functional Area 40 (Space Operations) PPO, and will be a valuable asset to FA50. Welcome, Patsy.

Also, the PPO has completed its move from Crystal City into the Pentagon. Patsy and Bob are now located in Room 3E379, adjacent to the G-8 Conference Room. I am in 3D353 where I can exercise control over both the Proponency Office and my additional duty as Chief of FDQ, the FD's Strategic Communications division. Stop by and see us anytime.

We are working on a couple of major initiatives that you might be interested in. With support of our Proponent, LTC Speakes, MG Formica, Director of Force Management in the G-357, and several of the ACOM and ASCC Commanders, we are looking into nominating a number of FA50 LTC and COL positions as Central Selection List/Key Billets. Identifying a subset of our senior positions as important enough that the officers who fill them should be board selected is one way of ensuring the Army recognizes and rewards experienced, talented Functional Area specialists like Force Managers, ORSAs and others—the officers who know how the “corporate Army” runs at the highest levels.

On another front, we have just begun discussions with several Commands on expanding opportunities for Force Managers. This could be a win-win for all involved: more opportunities for FA50 officers and more organizations have access to a pool of highly trained Functional Area officers who also have extensive operational experience. We'll keep you informed as both of these actions progress.

In an effort to support development of your personnel file, we are composing a paper with suggestions of areas for potential note on OERs along with phrases and terms which identify some key skills such as “works effectively across cultural communities” or “prudent risk taker.” This will be distributed as soon as we have it finalized.

Last month I went out to CAC for the Division/Corps Design Review and, with some outstanding help for our Corps FA50s, was able to successfully defend our existing structure. Another validation of the value of FA50s! Patsy and I will also be participating in the TRADOC/CAC review of the ASCC organizational design and the update of the DA PAM 600-3, so this promises to be a busy summer in the Proponency business. Meanwhile, the next class of the FA50 Qualification Course has started training, other officers are at GMU and RAND, a number of our fellow Force Managers are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, and life goes on here in the Pentagon. Thanks for all you do for our Soldiers and our Army. ◉

*LTC Rob Waring,
PPO Chief*

was Inspector General of the Army for six years; Defense Attaché to Laos; Ass't Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; and Director of Management, Office of the CSA. Since "retirement" in 1993, has also served as the Military Assistant to the President and Director of the White House Military Office. He is currently serving as Program Director of the Army Force Management School. LTG Trefry, by his contributions as leader, analyst, mentor and teacher, has been the Army's principal advocate for and champion for the formalization and professionalization of the Army Force Management process.

General Frederick J. Kroesen (USA, Ret.). General Kroesen has been a longtime leader and mentor, Combat Infantryman and Force Manager. He commanded troops in three wars—World War II, Korea and Vietnam—and was instrumental in designing, equipping and organizing the Light Infantry Brigade. He served as Director of Manpower and Forces in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, as Vice Chief of Staff, Army, and as CINCUSAREUR. He is probably most familiar to this generation of Force



General Frederick J. Kroesen

Managers, though, for his regular articles in *Army Magazine* on contemporary force management issues, educating and inspiring Soldiers for more than two decades. GEN Kroesen was unable to attend the ceremony on 15 May. His plaque will be presented at a date and venue TBD.

The Force Managers Hall of Fame display case, newly updated with the latest honorees, hangs in the G-8 Hallway in the Pentagon close by the new home of the FA50 Personnel Proponency Office.

The staff of the Oracle and the FA50 Personnel Proponent Office extend their warmest congratulations to this year's inductees, and our thanks to the many people who helped to make the event a success. ●

PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE PPO

LTC Rob Waring, having returned to the Pentagon from a six-month deployment as the G-8 LNO to the CFLCC in Kuwait, has taken the helm as the Chief of the FA50



LTC Rob Waring

Personnel Proponent Office. In the short two months he's been on the job, LTC Waring has already successfully defended FA50's force structure in the TRADOC relook at modular divisional and corps headquarters, MC'd the Force Management Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony described earlier in this issue, and begun several initiatives that will eventually result in significant growth of our Functional Area and expanded professional and leadership opportunities for our officers. LTC Waring is

also dual-hatted as the Chief of FDQ, the FD's Strategic Communication Division. As such he is responsible for publishing the annual Army Modernization Strategy.

Ms. Patsy Campbell has also recently joined the FA50 PPO. She will be responsible for the day-to-day operation



Ms. Patsy Campbell

of the office, serving in effect as the Acting Chief for LTC Waring. Immediately prior to joining the FA50 PPO, Ms Campbell was assigned to US Army Space and Missile Defense Command here in Arlington, where she was the Program Manager for Functional Area 40 (Space Operations). Patsy brings a wealth of proponent experience and expertise. ◉

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FROM THE Q-COURSE

Building the Iraqi Special Police Force

By MAJ Christopher R. Reid

Students attending the FA50 Qualification Course at AFMS prepare and submit a research paper as part of their studies. The best written or most interesting papers are selected for publication in the Oracle. MAJ Reid's paper presents his experiences in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 with the nascent Iraqi police and security forces. E-mail MAJ Reid at christopher.r.reid@us.army.mil. (Opinions presented are the author's.)

In 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior Special Police consisted of the Special Police Commando Division, the Public Order Division, the 8th Mechanized Police Brigade and the Emergency Response Unit. The Special Police were formed to assume responsibility for the maintenance of safety and public order as well as carrying out other duties assigned by laws and

regulation, as an armed security and law enforcement force, to include conducting counterinsurgency operations within the borders of Iraq. They are organized along military lines with police ranks and police career paths. Typically, they are used when the local security situation is beyond the ability of the Iraqi Police Service to contain or where there is no police organization in place.

The Special Police Commandos were the first special police unit formed, with one battalion, in August of 2004. They were initially formed without coalition assistance, with the first unit deployment to Mosul in November of 2004 followed by subsequent missions to Samarra, Ramadi, Salman Pak and Tal Afar, throughout March 2006.



2/1 Special Police Transition Team in Fallujah, Iraq in Summer, 2005. MAJ Reid is at bottom right. (Photos courtesy of the author)

The first Public Order Brigade (POB) was formed in November 2004 upon completion of a six-week training course and shortly thereafter deployed to Fallujah, where it assisted in the final clearing of the city and reestablishment of law and order with Multinational Forces West. Successive public order brigades completed training between late December 2004 and mid-May 2005. A division headquarters was formed in July of 2005 with mission to conduct counterinsurgency and security operations, to defeat enemy forces, and restore and maintain public law and order. The Public

Iraqi Special Police continued from page 7

Order Division typically accomplished its mission by conducting raids, cordon-and-search operations, providing area and fixed-site security, and reinforcing local police. Public Order forces have had long-term deployments to Fallujah, Samarra, Ramadi and Salman Pak as well as throughout Baghdad.

In March 2005, the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) deployed the first Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) with each Iraqi Special Police brigade and battalion to serve as advisors to provide training, assessment and access to coalition effects. The author served in Iraq from March 2005 to March 2006 as a battalion team chief for a Special Police Transition Team (SPTT) assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 1st Public Order Brigade (2/1 POB) in Fallujah and Baghdad.

Because these units were formed without coalition assistance, typical U.S. force development was retrofitted to the Special Police units throughout 2005-2007 in order to develop a stable, professional and sustainable force. Hindsight being 20/20, we can examine the evolution of the Special Police, specifically the Iraqi Public Order forces with which the author is most familiar, into the Iraqi National Police (INP) through each of the DOTMLPF domains.

DOCTRINE:

The Iraqi government did not use the U.S. military's Capabilities Integration and Development System in the development of the Iraqi Special Police, and no effort was made to secure U.S. assistance from the beginning. The Coalition was thus presented with a fait accompli and had to quickly react to gain visibility on this very large paramilitary force operating within its battlespace. The Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) charged the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) with the mission of establishing liaison with and advisory oversight of the MOI Special Police.

General Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I and the NATO Training Mission–Iraq stated:

“We initially focused primarily on developing combat units—Army and Police battalions and

brigade headquarters—as well as individual police. While those are what Iraq desperately needed to help in the achievement of security, for the long term there was also a critical need to help rebuild the institutions that support the units and police in the field—the ministries, the admin and logistical support units, the professional military education systems, admin policies and procedures, and the training organizations.”

Higher level doctrine based on warfighting concepts did not exist. The Special Police received individual, leader and collective training using British Commonwealth small unit tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). While this made them fairly effective at executing point cordon and search operations or squad sized patrols, operations above company level lacked the timing, coordination and cohesion American officers are accustomed to. Additionally, the TTPs were almost always PowerPoint slides in English delivered through an Iraqi interpreter. Very few training packages existed in Arabic and there were no field manuals.

As of November 2007, the NATO Training Mission–Iraq has created the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC), which controls all training of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). Among the units of ITDC is the Tactical Doctrine Center, which is developing the new doctrine for the IAF and has already produced both a Soldiers' Manual and a Counter Insurgency Doctrine approved by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. While this organization is primarily focused on the Iraqi military forces, its doctrine can be applied to the National Police when used in their counterinsurgency role.

ORGANIZATION:

The Public Order Division initially consisted of three brigades, with a fourth added in August 2005. Each brigade consisted of three battalions and a combat support company. While the Public Order forces were technically policemen, their primary role was counterinsurgency. Accordingly, they were organized as a Light Infantry Division. Initial MTOEs for the Public Order forces were attempts to capture the

Iraqi Special Police continued on page 9

existing structure created by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and provide justification for procuring equipment and hiring policemen within the MOI's 2005 budget. The MOI, lacking personnel trained in force management or assistance from U.S. force managers, did not use a formal organization design process with Unit Reference Sheets (URS) nor did they conduct a Force Design Update (FDU). As can be expected, numerous problems and discrepancies exist when organizations are created "on the fly." The initial attempts to create an MTOE received little assistance from FA50 officers in the MNSTC-I J5, who were already severely overworked in their attempts to build an Iraqi Army. The MTOEs were created by SPTT officers as an additional duty. Comments were solicited from the field and ultimately resulted in the creation of the aforementioned Light Infantry Division MTOE, closely resembling the Iraqi Army design.

A significant issue for U.S. officers in creating any Iraqi organization is the lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps. Duties that can be handled at the lowest NCO level in a U.S. organization require officer oversight in Iraqi units. This lack stems from the Saddam-era army's relationship with the Soviets, resulting in a centralized command structure that focused decision making at the top and discouraged initiative and independent thought in the lower ranks. NCOs in the Saddam army tended to be clerks or soldiers who were promoted as a reward for longevity of service or patronage rather than for their leadership potential. To fill NCO positions, Public Order units routinely promoted policemen to corporal, sergeant, first sergeant and sergeant major using "local rank," which is recognized at the battalion and brigade level but carries no increase in pay or official MOI recognition. In February 2006, the entire Public Order Division (4 brigades/12 battalions) had only 8% of its NCO positions filled, approximately 150 NCOs in an organization of over 9,000 policemen.

TRAINING:

Initial training for the Public Order forces consisted of six weeks of individual basic combat training and collective training centered on squad and platoon battle

drills, conducted by contractors at the Iraqi training base at An Numaniya. The contractors were primarily from British Commonwealth nations and the training was based on Commonwealth tactics, with which the pre-invasion Iraqi forces were familiar. Subsequent training occurred with the Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) according to individual battalion and brigade needs jointly identified by the SPTTs and the Iraqi commanders. Public Order forces were in particular need of staff training, detainee operations, additional human rights training, combat lifesaver training and advanced combat skills, to include close quarter battle and land navigation. In the author's battalion, 2/1 POB, this training was conducted using a variety of approaches. The staff training and combat lifesaver training was conducted by the SPTT with the Iraqi battalion staff. While SPTT medics taught CLS, the primary staff was taught how to do a five paragraph operations order and conduct TOC operations. While this is Army 101 for a U.S. battalion, it required a significant effort by the SPTT to convince the Iraqi staff to conduct a formal planning and orders process. Detainee and human rights training was provided by the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) mobile training teams (MTTs). 2/1 POB partnered with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines in Fallujah for advanced combat skills training.

Throughout 2006, numerous problems in the Iraqi Special Police forces became apparent, including infiltration by Shia militias, lack of professionalism and leadership and poor training. These problems prompted the Ministry of Interior and MNSTC-I to make changes to the force. The Special Police forces (Commando and Public Order Divisions, 8th Mechanized Brigade and Emergency Response Unit) were merged into the Iraqi National Police (INP) in May 2006 and redesignated the 1st National Police Division, the 2nd National Police Division, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade and the Emergency Response Unit. Each unit was then relieved, in brigade increments, from their duties and sent to three weeks of training at Numaniya. This training, dubbed "Re-Bluing" consisted of leadership, civil policing skills and small unit collective training.

Iraqi Special Police continued from page 9

Included was a re-vetting of all policemen and a house-cleaning of ineffective and corrupt senior leaders. The final installment of changes to the Special Police forces, now the Iraqi National Police (INP), is training by the Italian Carabinieri, which began in November 2007. Specially trained members of Italy's Carabinieri will train 450 INP. Those policemen trained will then export the training to their parent organizations. The eight-week training course covers a wide range of policing areas from counter-insurgency to basic police procedure. The training will assist eight battalions and it will run for two years.

MATERIEL:

As we have already seen, the U.S. Military's Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System had no analog in the Iraqi MOI to facilitate the development of the Special Police. This was particularly evident in the materiel development realm. Although the Special Police were loosely organized around the Iraqi Army Light Infantry Division design, they lacked the equipment, beyond small arms, necessary to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. Initial equipment issue from the MOI was based on the meager stocks remaining from the Saddam-era police, foreign donations and handouts from the Coalition. Public Order forces were armed with AK-47s, Glock 9mm pistols, and a few PKC 7.62mm machine guns and RPGs per battalion. Their primary mode of transportation was an unarmed Chevrolet Luv 4x4 pickup. Communication was by personal cell phone as the few radios available were extremely short range and capable of little more than use in base administration and defense. Each policeman received one uniform, a Kevlar vest and helmet and a pair of boots. Significant equipment shortages existed across the force and replacement and repair of equipment was completely neglected. The MOI was unable to provide sustainment in all classes of supply



2/1 Public Order Battalion policemen on patrol in Fallujah in Summer, 2005. Sharing water with local school children.

and no logistical sustainment systems or structure was added to the Public Order forces until well after all four brigades were conducting combat operations.

The Public Order forces' initial MTOE was an attempt to capture the organization fielded by the MOI. Subsequent MTOEs increased the size of the POB Battalions to 750 personnel with the resultant increase in equipment and materiel. The larger organizations increased the capabilities of the Public Order forces and necessitated the issue of more and better equipment. By August 2005 an improved MTOE standardized vehicle and weapons requirements and introduced extended range communication equipment. At the same time, procedures were introduced to provide basic logistical sustainment, including logistical personnel, down to battalion level. Many of these procedures involved local contracting by SPTT personnel in conjunction with Public Order logistics officers to provide Class I, III and VI as well as force protection material and construction for vehicles and facilities. Overall, the MOI's materiel acquisition,

Iraqi Special Police continued on page 11

Iraqi Special Police continued from page 10

distribution and sustainment, while falling short of U.S. expectations, were vastly improved throughout 2005-2007.

LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION:

Professional development in the Iraqi Public Order forces was strictly limited to the officers. NCOs and policemen received little training beyond basic combat skills and functional job training. Officers come from a variety of backgrounds to include the Saddam-era army and police forces and from civilian life. They must have received a university degree or have graduated from one of Iraq's military academies. From 2004 to 2006 the only higher level training available to POB officers was out-of-country training coordinated by the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). In 2004 the NTM-I began development of the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC) to oversee all Iraqi national defense related education and military doctrine development. ITDC is divided into two main branches: the Tactical Training Command and the National Defense University. The Tactical Training Command (TTC) controls all of the Iraqi Armed Forces

branch and specialist schools as well as the main doctrine centers.

The four Iraqi Military Academies are located in Ar Rustamiyah, Qualachulon, Zakho and Tallil. The academies' graduate cadre will provide the future leaders of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Since August 2007, NTM-I has dedicated resources to the establishment of a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) Academy and the development of training plans for Iraqi NCOs.

While officers in the National Police are not members of the Iraqi Armed Forces, they are permitted to attend Ministry of Defense schools and training based on position, merit and course availability.

PERSONNEL:

Iraqi recruiting is accomplished through local recruiting stations set up on a short term basis throughout the country. Recruits receive initial medical screening and are questioned regarding their background and skills, then are inducted into the MOI as either policemen or officers. They attend basic combat training at Numaniya after which they are assigned to an operational unit. National Policemen are paid at the same rate as the Iraqi Army and receive the same benefits, such as a death benefit and retirement pension, and officer promotion opportunities. NCO promotions are still a work in progress for MNSTC-I and the MOI. The National Police are accorded a liberal leave policy as there is no central banking system and their pay must be hand-carried to their home-of-record to pay for household expenditures once a month.

FACILITIES:

Iraqi facilities are a mixed bag of Saddam-era military bases, palaces, government complexes and civilian structures confiscated by Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. Major installations for the Public Order forces included the training base at Numaniya and Camp Justice in Baghdad, which served as the headquarters for both the Public Order



2/1 Public Order Battalion operations room in Fallujah, Summer 2005. 1LT Nabil (center), has just finished briefing an OPOD to 2/1 POB and C/2-6 Marines on an upcoming joint mission to capture suspected terrorists. The mission was Iraqi-led with the Marines in support.

Iraqi Special Police continued on page 12

Division (now the 2nd National Police Division) and the Iraqi 6th Army Division. Smaller brigade and battalion forward operating bases exist wherever the INP operates. 2/1 POB occupied four FOBs throughout 2005-2006, two in Fallujah and two in Baghdad. After receiving basic training in Numaniya the battalion was deployed to Fallujah in December 2004 and set up operations in an abandoned girl's school in the market district. Force protection and quality of life improvements were minimal. The entire facility was maintained on one generator augmenting the sporadic national power grid. The Marine logistics battalion provided Class I and III to the base, but little else. Upon arrival in April 2005, the SPTT began immediate improvements to the base defenses, sanitation and water distribution through a combination of local contracts using Transition Team Integration Funds (TTIF) and force protection projects with Marine engineer units. TTIF was limited to \$2500 per month and could only be used for one-time, small needs for ISF units. Large scale projects could be accomplished through Quick Response Fund (QRF) projects. Quick Response Funds provide the Commander, MNSTC-I, the ability to respond rapidly to provide critical, time sensitive funding to projects supporting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Throughout 2005-2006, 2/1 POB and the SPTT used these procedures to provide over \$200,000 in force protection and quality of life improvements at the four FOBs.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940 presents lessons learned and TTPs for how the U.S. military fought limited conflicts in third world nations in the early part of the 20th Century. Those observations are, surprisingly, still relevant and applicable to the conflict in Iraq. The following excerpts highlight the lessons experienced by Coalition Transition Teams in the creation and development of the Iraqi National Police.

The mission of our forces usually involves the training of native officers and men in the art of war, assisting in offensive operations against organized banditry and in such defensive measures against threatened raids of large organized bandit groups as are essential to the protection

of lives and property. When the civil police functions are vested in the native military forces of the country, these forces are charged with the performance of two definite tasks—a military task involving the matters outlined above and a police task involving in general the enforcement of the civil and criminal laws. It follows, therefore, that by cooperating to the fullest extent of his authority with the native forces in the performance of civil police functions, the military commander will, without actually participating in this phase of the picture, be rendering valuable assistance towards the accomplishment of the ultimate mission assigned to the combined military forces.

The confidence and loyalty of the native troops is promoted by careful supervision of their material needs. More often than not, they will have been accustomed to meager salaries irregularly paid, scant food carelessly provided, as well as indifferent shelter, clothing, and equipment. When they are regularly paid in full on the date due, when fed adequately as provided by the allowance, and when good shelter, clothing, and equipment are provided, native troops will usually respond in the quality of service rendered.

The second paragraph is embodied by the G8 motto "Let's Give Him Enough, and On Time!" Although they were unable to devote significant attention to MOI forces initially, FA50 officers in the MNSTC-I J5 are dedicated to the development and success of Iraqi Security Forces, including the National Police. Their charter states:

J5 (Plans): Develops policy, plans, and programs in support of Iraqi Armed Forces and Police to create self-reliant Iraqi Security Forces capable of maintaining security and stability. In coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, Joint Headquarters and Ministry of Interior, build force development and doctrine, force generation, installation planning, and institutional training capabilities. Advise Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, on resource priorities to develop self-reliant Iraqi Security Forces.

By partnering with Transition Teams and Iraqi force planners, FA50s can ensure the success of the Iraqi Security Forces and help Iraq realize its goal of a free, peaceful and prosperous future.◉

RESERVE COMPONENT CORNER

STAR (STATIONING TOOL ARMY RESERVE)

by MAJ Ron Frame, Army Reserve Force Programs Force Development Officer

The Army Reserve has a great new tool for stationing. The Stationing Tool Army Reserve (STAR) was developed to take the subjective process of stationing Army Reserve units and make it objective. Army Transformation brought about the concept that the Army Reserve needed to better analyze its stationing processes and procedures. STAR uses objective analysis to improve the effectiveness of the AR stationing process while meeting the needs of the AR as it transforms to an operational force. Star is a web-based tool that captures the ability of the local area to recruit and maintain unit personnel. It provides career progression opportunities for AR Soldiers and identifies locations and capacities of existing AR facilities.

The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) was given the task to develop a stationing methodology and model that analyzes data from numerous and unconnected sources. Demographics, unit data, and facilities were the three sources of data used during the development phase. The demographic data came from Accessions Command, USAREC, Department of Labor, and Medical Command, unit data came from ARFP, G3, G7, and RTD, and facility data came from ACSIM, OASD/RA (M&F), Environmental Command, and the Census Bureau.

Once CAA completed the analysis, the model and data were provided to a contractor who developed a user-friendly, web-based program named STAR. The application provides AR leaders with the ability to assess one or more Standard Requirements Codes (SRCs) and rapidly produce detailed Excel based reports. STAR reports provide the user with a ranking of geographical areas and facilities available for stationing AR units and assesses and scores stationing sites through a globally accessible Web interface. Star uses government owned software and is globally accessible. The Engineering and Base Operations Support System (ENBOSS) PM allowed ARFP to place the program on their server. This provided considerable cost savings to the government.

Although the program resides on the ENBOSS server, it functions separately and its association with ENBOSS is transparent to the user.




The output from STAR is an Excel spreadsheet with eight individual worksheets. Report #1 displays the top urban areas for the SRC selected. These are displayed 1 thru XX after the model criteria has been calculated. Report #2 displays all of the raw data used in creating report #1. Report #3 is a graphic display of the top 25 urban areas in a full color bar chart. Report #4 is the USAR top facilities (by FACID) in rank order. Report #5 is the raw data used in creating report #4. Report #6 is a graphic display of the top USAR facilities in a full color bar chart. Report #7 is a list of all cities and towns, even though there may be no facility there. This report identifies potential markets for the AR to consider. Finally, Report #8 is a color coded map of CONUS, showing both the top urban area concentrations as well as the top AR facilities.

The way ahead... The STAR team continues to solicit feedback from users. We are using the feedback to prioritize changes and enhancements to the program.

STAR continued from page 13

Selected SRC: 14425L000										WEIGHTS-->	
										13%	6%
RANK	FAC ID	Facility Name	Value Score	City/Urban Area Name	City/Urban Area State	Urban Area Rank	QMA	Local Support			
1	NY023	ERNIE PYLE USARC/AMSA #12	6.60	BAYSIDE	NY	119	9.801	6.153			
2	IL131	PHILIP H SHERIDAN RESERVE CTR.	6.59	FORT SHERIDAN	IL	7	8.755	5.448			
3	IL002	COL P. SCHULSTAD USARC	6.53	ARLINGTON HEIGHTS	IL	7	8.732	5.445			
4	CA039	PARKS CSTC	6.44	DUBLIN	CA		8.644	5.755			
5	NY033	2LT THOMAS J. MCDONALD USARC	6.37	JAMAICA	NY	119	10.000	6.171			
6	TX151	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.28	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
7	TXD40	HOUSTON USARC #3	6.27	HOUSTON	TX	25	10.000	5.144			
8	TXD41	HOUSTON USARC #3	6.24	HOUSTON	TX	25	10.000	5.144			
9	TX217	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
10	TX159	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
11	TX165	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
12	TX180	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
13	TX214	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
14	TXD85	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
15	TXD86	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
16	TXD88	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
17	TX137	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
18	TX142	CAMP BULLIS	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.531			
19	TXD63	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.16	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.505			
20	TXD64	CALLAGHAN ROAD USARC	6.15	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.546			
21	TXD62	BOSWELL STREET USARC	6.14	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.558			
22	NY024	STATEN ISLAND USARC	6.10	STATEN ISLAND	NY	119	10.000	5.828			
23	FL127	C. W. BILL YOUNG AFRC	6.07	PINELLAS PARK	FL	31	10.000	5.277			
24	FL115	TAFT USARC	6.06	ORLANDO	FL	12	10.000	5.694			
25	TXD16	CAMP BULLIS	6.06	SAN ANTONIO	TX		9.944	5.986			
26	TX124	CAMP BULLIS	6.06	SAN ANTONIO	TX		9.944	5.986			
27	TX135	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.06	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.505			
28	TX117	FORT SAM HOUSTON	6.05	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.505			
29	CO128	WILLIAM T. FITZSIMONS USARC	6.03	AURORA	CO	33	9.311	4.781			
30	MD008	FORT MEADE	6.02	FORT GEORGE G MEADE	MD	8	7.459	5.238			
31	WA090	FORT LEWIS	6.01	TACOMA	WA	27	5.228	5.222			
32	MD040	FORT MEADE	6.00	FORT GEORGE G MEADE	MD	8	7.459	5.238			
33	FL023	TAFT USARC	6.00	ORLANDO	FL	12	10.000	5.694			
34	WA030	FORT LAWTON USAR COMPLEX	6.00	SEATTLE	WA	27	6.426	5.157			
35	MD021	MAUS-WARFIELD USARC	5.99	ROCKVILLE	MD	5	7.453	5.207			
36	IL011	SGT JAMES W. ROBINSON JR USARC	5.98	CHICAGO	IL	7	8.916	5.480			
37	MD003	PFC CARL VERNON SHERIDAN USARC	5.98	GWYNN OAK	MD	8	7.062	5.295			
38	TXD42	SGM MACARIO GARCIA USARC	5.98	HOUSTON	TX	25	8.367	5.100			
39	NY006	SGT JOSEPH E. MULLER USARC	5.98	BRONX	NY	119	7.885	6.026			
40	MD020	PRINCE GEORGES CTY MEM USARC	5.97	RIVERDALE	MD	5	7.614	5.206			
41	CA071	TUSTIN USARC	5.97	IRVINE	CA	10	8.898	5.232			
42	TXD25	WILLIAM HERZOG MEMORIAL USARC	5.97	DALLAS	TX	83	8.003	4.604			
43	IL001	PARKHURST USARC/OMS/DS	5.97	DARIEN	IL	7	8.934	5.456			
44	TX220	JOINT RESERVE INFO OPS CENTER	5.95	SAN ANTONIO	TX	2	10.000	5.550			

Navigation bar: About the STAR SRC Report / 1. Top Urban Areas-Value Scores / 2. Top Urban Areas-Raw Data / 3. Chart - Top 25 Urban Areas / 4. Top Facilities-Value Scores / 5. Top Facilities-Raw Data / 6



CAA is continuing to develop and improve the model to include most SRCs. STAR also has the potential to replace the Market Supportability Study. To request access go to <https://STAR.ocar.army.pentagon.mil/>, enter your AKO login and password and you will be directed to a request access screen. Fill out the request and justification for access and you will be on your way to a great tool to assist with AR stationing.

MAJ Ron Frame is a Force Development Officer, Army Reserve Force Programs (ARFP). His contact info is 404-464-8652 or ron.frame@us.army.mil

A MESSAGE FROM LTC BRIAN HALLORAN



LTC Brian Halloran

Sir, Ma'am and Teammates,

I hope all is well with you and your families as we head into the heart of the summer. I hope all of you get a chance to take some time off and spend some time away from the office with your families. I would ask, however, that while you are doing so, take a few

minutes to remember the members of the Force Management Team who are currently deployed.

We currently have 29 members of the Active Component and USAR AGR Force Management Team deployed in support of OIF and OEF. We have an FA 50 in each Division HQs, each Corps HQs, as well as 8 Worldwide Individual Augmentee System (WIAS) positions in the AOR. These WIAS positions (in both Iraq and Afghanistan) have FA 50s doing great FA 50 work building and equipping the Iraqi and Afghani security forces. The great work that all our FA 50s are doing are placing Force Managers in great demand. The rest of the force is really recognizing the skill set we bring to the fight and utilizing every FA 50 they can get in their organizations. The work you are doing now is having a great impact on our Army and greatly advancing the reputation of the branch.

The proper development of our FA 50 force is essential to the future of the branch. Sending new FA 50s to school (both ILE and the FA 50 Qualification course) and developing them at the HQDA, ASCC or ACOM level is ensuring that we develop our new FA 50s properly and making sure we don't 'eat our young'. Assigning new FA 50s to positions in the Pentagon to learn the Force Management trade, then

getting them back out to the Operational Force is paying huge dividends. Experienced FA 50s within our Division, Corps and WIAS positions are showing the rest of the Army what great work we can do to bring the weight of the institutional Army to bear in support of the deployed warfighter. Feedback from unit Commanders and results of promotion boards are verifying our career path decisions.

As the role of transition teams and organizations such as CSTC-A and MNSTC-I continue to grow, the demand for FA 50s in the AOR grows. Commanders are quickly learning that when building and equipping an Army or police and security forces, and FA 50 is worth his or her weight in gold.

On the assignment front, Division, Corps and WIAS assignments remain our highest priority. By early July, I will contact officers who are eligible to serve in Division assignments with a report date of May – Sep 2009, and we will work those assignments as soon as possible. We want to give as much notice to Soldiers and their families of moves and deployments. Keep in mind that when going to a Division or Corps job, the cycle we are currently working with is that when the Division or Corps redeploys; the incoming FA 50 will be on the ground. The new 50 will work the reset, training and all other FA 50 actions working to the next deployment, deploy, and then hand their duties over to their replacement upon redeployment. With the current OPTEMPO of 12 month deployments, followed by a 12-15 month dwell time, expect Division assignments to be anywhere from 24-30 months. To reduce stress on the Soldiers and their families, the Army released ALARACT 021/2008. This message states in paragraph 4C, part 1 that if someone is on orders to a unit that is scheduled to deploy within 12 months of their arrival, they have the option to leave their family in place, and receive the BAH at the highest rate between the two locations. I sent this message to everyone in the population, and if you need a copy contact me and I'll resend.

On 1 July 2008, the results of the LTCs Board were released. Please join me in congratulating the following officers on their selection to LTC:

MAJ(P) Dave Bernard, G3-FM
MAJ(P) Steve Brewer, 10th MTN
MAJ (P) Rob Carr, G8-FD
MAJ(P) Dan Friend, 2ID
MAJ(P) Al Gamble, G8-FD
MAJ(P) Eric Hollister, CAC
MAJ(P) Todd Johnson, Corps of EN (enroute to 7th Army)

MAJ(P) Tim Mertsoc, G3-FM
MAJ(P)* John Nolden, SOCOM
MAJ(P) Virginia Reed, G3-CI
MAJ(P) Paul Saltysiak, G3-CI

** denotes BZ Selection*

Promotion rates were as follows:

FA 50 PZ Promotion Rate: 76.9% (10 of 13)

FA 50 BZ Promotion Rate: 16.7% (1 of 6)

FA 50 AZ Promotion Rate: 0% (0 of 1)

Operational Support Division (OS) PZ Promotion Rate: 80.8%

Operational Support Division (OS) BZ Promotion Rate: 13.4%

Operational Support Division (OS) AZ Promotion Rate: 13.7%

For FA 50s Selected in the PZ:

—9 of 10 in the PZ had ILE completed

—All had at least 33% Above Center of Mass (ACOM) reports in their file (most had 50% or greater); all but 2 had consecutive ACOM OERs as the last two OERs in their file (i.e. - trend showed ACOM).

—OS Promotion rate last year was approx 92% in the zone, so there was a drop of approx 12% from last year within the Operational Support Division (OS consists of Signal, MI, and FAs 24, 34, 40, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 57, and 59). The bottom line is that our promotion rates are right in line with our OSD peers, and the great work you are all doing is being recognized and rewarded.

Thanks for all you are doing, have a great summer, and as we all celebrate Independence Day, please remember the members of our FA 50 team that are currently deployed protecting all that our Independence Day represents:

COL Mike Glenn, CSTC-A
COL "Bo" Dyess, CSTC-A
COL Brian Eberle, MNF-I
LTC Dave Shugart, MNSTC-I
LTC John Jones, MNSTC-I
LTC Bill Stowman, CSTC-A
LTC Stephen Johnson, CSTC-A
MAJ Barbara Mason, CSTC-A
LTC Joe Sullivan, CSTC-A
MAJ Chris Teague, CSTC-A
LTC Darrell Wilson, MiTT Chief, Afghanistan
LTC Greg Rawlings, MNC-I
MAJ Temaki Carr, MNC-I
MAJ Steve Brewer, 10th MTN
MAJ Fred Corcoran, 101st AA Division
LTC Sam Lex, 1AD

LTC Jim Schapel, 4ID
LTC Jim Chapple, CFLCC
LTC Frank Arce, CFLCC
LTC Hal Knudsen, CFLCC
CPT Steve Brown, 25th ID
CPT Mike Massey, 25th ID
CPT Robert Erickson, 3-1 AV
MAJ Gus Tutu, MiTT, Iraq
CPT Tim Friedrich, MiTT, Iraq
CPT Brendan Taylor, 6-17 CAV
LTC Maria Quintanilla, Gulf Region Div. (COE), Iraq
LTC Ronnie Dix, CSTC-A
MAJ Kat Walker, 1st TSC
MAJ Eric Hoggard, 103d ESC
MAJ John Glover, 311th ESC