

THE Oracle

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JIIM-WHAT IS IT? WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO ME?

by Patsy Campbell

“There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”

*President George Washington
December 3, 1793*



Patsy Campbell
FA 50 Program Manager

Jiim is an environment, not a thing or program or a certificate. The Army has been working in a “Jiim environment” since the very beginning, when GEN Washington and his quartermasters had to coordinate for supplies and food directly with the several states (intergovernmental) and numerous committees and agencies of the Continental Congress (interagency), right up to the final combined (multinational) operations at Yorktown that essentially ended the American Revolution. (We just didn’t have an acronym until recently.)

World Wars I and II were also joint and combined efforts on the largest scales ever known. On the other hand, the US Army has not been infallible. One of the classic texts on the Korean War, included in almost all professional reading lists for military officers, is *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness*, by Texas historian T.R. Fehrenbach.

The recent emphasis on Jiim and “Joint-ness” traces directly to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which reorganized the Defense Department, redefined the relationships between the Services, DoD and the National Command Authority, and also changed the way we educate and manage our officers. After years of resistance by the Services, the Act finally codified what President Eisenhower had learned years earlier from his WWII experience—

Read About It In

THE Oracle

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Jiim-Is It Important?

by Patsy Campbell

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says farewell; we will miss him!

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:

Huge Fan of FA 50s



BG Tom Spoehr, Director
FA 50 Executive Agent

Teamates, I am very pleased to be the new Executive Agent for FA50. As I assume these duties from MG Dave Halverson, I want to thank him for his contributions to our Functional Area. As he assumes command of the Fires Center at Fort Sill, the best wishes of the Force Management Community go with him.

As a former Branch Proponent and School Commandant, I think I have a good handle on what it means to have responsibility for the career development of a group of professionals. I intend to take an active role in the management of the functional area. We have a very capable team, in our Personnel Development Office as well as at OCAR and NGB, to support me in that effort.

They will continue to keep me up to date on issues related to the functional area as well as concerns from you, but don't hesitate to contact me directly. I want you to add me to your address book, SpoehrTW@conus.army.mil, and contact me on issues that concern the FA50 field. Of course, cc: LTC Karen Eggert, our new PDO Chief, too.

I am a huge fan of the FA50 Functional Area, having witnessed firsthand the great contributions FA50 officers provide the Army. I am greatly impressed with the FA50s whom I encounter both at the Pentagon and in the field. You play a pivotal role in the organization and equipping of the Army. There are many big things coming, initiatives that began under MG Halverson that should culminate in the next year or so. It's a great time to be a Force Manager, and I look forward representing you as the FA50 Executive Agent.

Sincerely,

BG Tom Spoehr

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“Separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever. . .strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands. . . .”


Goldwater-Nichols itself finally arose from the military and civilian experience in Vietnam, the failure of AirLand Battle doctrine, and the final humiliation of the Iranian hostage crisis. The JDAL, Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare*, with all its related doctrinal publications, and Army Field Manual 1, *The Army*, with their emphasis on JIIM experience for all military officers, are the result. If the proof is in fact in the pudding, the 1991 Gulf War was that proof. Today’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a hundred other places around the world and within the United States, and the simultaneous Modularization of our force, are further demonstrations of the need and efficacy of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational education, experience and capability.

Some definitions are in order at this point:

- Joint—Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 0-2)
- Interagency—Activities or operations conducted by or through coordination with two or more agencies or an agency and one or more services of the same nation. (FM 101-5-1)
- Intergovernmental—Officer works with officials at State, City, and local governments and members of Congress.
- Multinational—Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 5-0)

Why is this a big deal?

Officers are all, essentially, joint officers. As the operating environment becomes more complex, more and more



JFSC's JIMPC Seminar Structure

JIIM continued from page 3

actions have a JIIM flavor or impact—from joint and combined combat operations, clearance of fires or aircraft over or through populated areas, movement of units, logistical support, gathering and sharing of intelligence, the structure of our organizations, interface with State or Homeland Security or USAID or Agriculture Department; coordination with and assistance to state and county or municipal governments in the course of emergency or disaster relief operations.

Capturing JIIM experience, discussed in last quarter's ORACLE, will eventually feed TOPMIS and DIHMARS and be recorded on the ORB, to give the Army a ready database of Joint-experienced and qualified officers, including what type of experience they have. Based on duties of the JDAL position, or on the officer's joint credit self-nomination for non-JDAL experience, the ORB will be coded to reflect, for example, x months of interagency experience, or multinational exposure, or joint education.

The Joint Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, offers a number of classes to help prepare officers for duty in the JIIM world. The Joint, Interagency and Multinational Planner's Course (JIMPC) is a specialized 5 day course that addresses the challenges confronting mid-grade civilian and military planners in the conduct of interagency coordination for complex contingencies overseas, educates officers in the latest developments in interagency coordination and serves as a forum for an exchange of best practices. The Homeland Security Planner's Course (HLSPC), also at JFSC, educates military and interagency planners in homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support, as well as national and DOD level strategy, policy, plans, and joint and national planning processes. Both courses are available to officers, major and above, who have completed JPME1.

The legacy Joint Credit System, of course, still exists. The majority of officers will continue to complete a standard joint duty assignment along with the requisite JPME in order to earn joint qualification. It is important to note that while joint "credit" is still found in statute (10 U.S.C., Chapter 38), the Joint Qualification System provides a bridge between the time/billet-based legacy system and the experienced-based system so that officers ultimately achieve a common joint qualification designation. Officers who were designated as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) prior to 1 Oct 2007 will automatically be designated as Level III Joint Qualified Officers (JQO). No action is required by those individuals. ◉

The ORACLE is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army's FA 50 Proponency Office. Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.

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www.fa50.army.mil

Smart Quote:

"There is an unglamorous side of the Army too, which requires your personal attention—that of managing the Army." LTG G.H. Decker, Comptroller of the Army, 1953

FAREWELL STEPHEN M. SPEAKES



Team, since I joined the FA50 family, first as the FD Executive Agent and then as the G-8 Proponent, I have been impressed by the technical knowledge, abilities, and professionalism of our members. Our business of Force Management—balancing Total Army manpower and equipment requirements against available resources—is an extremely complex undertaking. You are the Army’s experts at executing change. Your job calls for professionals at all levels to understand as much about how the Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces as they do about how the Army fights.

Your importance to the mission, and the Army’s recognition of same, are validated by the many advances our functional area has made in the past four and a half years. We have successfully implemented a functional qualification course, which to date, has graduated 156 Force Managers—officers and CP26 civilians from the Active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve. The demand for FA50s in Iraq and Afghanistan has grown so much that we are deploying Soldiers from the Pentagon to fill theater needs. Although we’re a relatively small functional area, promotion rates for FA50s compare very favorably to others in the Operational Support career field, and two of your colleagues have become General Officers. Our strategic communications effort has grown from a simple black and white newsletter to this quarterly Oracle, three Web sites and an on-line Deployers’ Smart Book and blog. Recently, the Army acknowledged your value to the force by designating a number of our Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel slots as “key billets,” to be board selected (starting in FY11) just like Brigade and Battalion Commanders in the basic branches.

Not to mention the ongoing business of Transforming and Modularizing, reorganizing and equipping the entire U.S. Army in the midst of major military operations overseas. Our FA50s have earned their reputation the hard way—by proving their worth, both in combat zones and the institutional Army. Commanders at all levels have told me how much they depend on the advice and expertise of their Force Managers; the men and women who know how to build and run the Army.

The future is bright for the Army’s “creative managers of change.” I thank each of you for your service to our country and dedication to our Army.

FROM THE PPO CHIEF:

The New Qualification Course POI et al...



LTC Karen Eggert, FA50 PPO Chief

On 3 August, I assumed duties as Chief, FA50 Personnel Development Office. It's a great honor to return to the Pentagon and the G-8 team.

Let me tell you a little about myself. As a Military Intelligence Officer I served in Korea and Hawaii at both the tactical and strategic levels. During a break in service I was a career tenured Federal employee, followed by AGR tours as a detailed IG and MI battalion commander in the California National Guard. After 9/11 I returned to active duty, and have served in the Pentagon at G-357 and G-8, and most recently as a Force Manager and Deputy SGS at Headquarters, USAREUR in Heidelberg, Germany.

The FA50 team—Patsy, Mike and Bob—are bringing me up to date on the many exciting actions we're working for you—the new Qualification Course POI, the Centralized Selection List initiative, the deployment handbook, Advanced Civil Schooling and Fellowship options and much more. I look forward to helping complete these actions and beginning new ones. We will be working even more closely with the USAR and ARNG, with CP26 and the other Proponencies in G-8 and G-37, and with the Army Force Management School to make our career field even more challenging and rewarding. And, with a new Executive Agent and very soon a new G-8/Proponent, the next few months and years will be exciting times for FA50 careerists.

This newsletter and our websites are the primary vehicles for us to communicate with you, but email and phones work great, too. Tell us what's on your mind regarding the future of the Functional Area, career opportunities, or how we may help you do your jobs better. Look at our websites and provide us suggestions for improvement to make them even more useful. And, if you have lessons learned or an experience of interest to your colleagues, provide it to us in writing and we'll publish it in the Oracle.

Thanks for all you do for our Army. I look forward to meeting and working with each of you.

LTC Karen Eggert

Karen M. Eggert
Chief, FA50 Personnel Development Office
Creative Managers of Change

Balancing Future Force Management Challenges of the United States Military During “Overseas Contingency Operations”


by MAJ Alexander Deraney, EN, CGSC

In offering this article for publication MAJ Deraney wrote: “As my year at the Command and General Staff College comes to a close, I will be taking with me the strong feelings of frustration expressed by my classmates concerning the future of our military, and the seemingly impossible priorities of our Army. At a time when the Army is overstretched, we must prioritize between the goals of distancing ourselves from our adversarial military competitors and national security. . . Secretary Gates seems to be fully cognizant of the immense strain on our forces as we attempt to fulfill all of the security imperatives required of the only superpower in the international system. I am fully aware that the attached essay is not breaking new ground, but I request that it be published in The Oracle as one more voice in the outcry for balance.”

The predictions of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates are not to be taken lightly. As Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy National Security Advisor and, currently, as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Gates has advised Democratic and Republican administrations for well over two decades. In the National Defense Strategy of June 2008, he asserts that though the president will change the complex issues that the United States faces will remain. He states that the best way to ensure American security is to foster an international system of well-governed democracies that meet the needs of their citizens. Though he cautions that the United States must hedge against the ascendant conventional military capabilities of powerful states, Secretary Gates contends that it is our conventional military might that forces U.S. adversaries to develop asymmetrical military approaches, the premise of the goal of U.S. irregular warfare mastery. This seemingly contradictory vision of U.S. military capability will likely force the new administration in 2009 to tackle a profound question: What is the most important future force management challenge, and what should we do about it? This essay recommends that the new administration pay particularly strong attention to balance, and provide clear priorities that guide the U.S. military’s force management process. The defense calculus is simple: either reduce demands on the military, or increase its capabilities.

The new administration must allow the SECDEF to prioritize the urgency of the challenges it faces. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the SECDEF’s strategic guidance to the military and shapes Army actions over the next 20 years. The QDR presents four strategic challenges facing the U.S. military. These are catastrophic, irregular, disruptive and traditional challenges. Catastrophic challenges require the military to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to defend the homeland in depth. Irregular challenges involve defeating terrorist networks. Disruptive challenges are addressed by military intervention to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads. Finally, traditional challenges are those met by conventional military capability. At the heart of the problem is the conundrum of increasing military capability to offset the catastrophic, irregular and disruptive challenges, while sustaining military ability to address traditional challenges. Or, the military will need to increase capability in three areas, without giving up capability in the fourth.

Without clear guidance from the new administration, the U.S. military will continue to adhere to the historical tradition of shaping its own destiny. As stated in the Army Game Plan, “We will stick with the priorities we’ve established and adhere to the concept and outline of our plan.” This resolve, though, can result in the expenditure of energy and resources which are disconnected from the intent of civilian superiors within the Department of



Defense. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) stands out as an example of this phenomenon. Does FCS offer enhancement of military capability in dealing with all four challenges mentioned above? The Army Game Plan described FCS as "...modern equipment for the Army to remain the preeminent landpower on earth." It is designed to "...pioneer the next generation of warfighting capabilities..." This system seems ill-suited to address catastrophic, irregular or disruptive challenges; challenges that require the military to prevent the acquisition of WMD, defend the homeland and defeat terrorist networks. The deterrent effect of FCS to coercively shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads also seems limited. Unless regime change continues to be a prominent U.S. policy, the case for FCS withers when one is reminded of the SECDEF's premise that American security is strengthened by fostering strong democracies in the world.

The need for clear defense priorities is highlighted by the admission of the Army that one of its critical challenges is to restore balance. The 2008 Army Posture Statement flatly states, "...current demand for our forces... exceeds our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies." The goal of restoring balance contends that the supply of Army capability is inadequate to meet the current and future demands of the nation. Based on the assumption that Army capability is Soldier

capability, the logical implication is that either the Army substantially increase the number of Soldiers, or its civilian leaders reduce Army requirements. Without prioritization of national security objectives, the Army Posture Statement's attempt to demonstrate how it will restore balance resembles the alchemist's endeavor to turn lead into gold. The 21 proposed goals for restoring balance address Soldier shortcomings in only two ways: "Offer dynamic incentives" that attract and retain Soldiers, and "Improve expeditionary contracting..." To the Army's credit, it has also increased its capability by replacing Soldiers in nonessential military jobs with civilians. Based on statistics from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the Army has met its recruiting mission three of the last six years. Even if one were to assume that the Army recruiting goals were in line with the requirement to meet the nation's challenges, this achievement hardly inspires confidence that the Army will restore balance through growing the force. Though capacity-building through military contracting is outside the scope of this essay, the legitimacy, legal status, professionalism and mission alignment of a force made up of a "coalition of the billing" presents complex challenges of its own.

Restoring balance is the most important force management challenge facing the next administration. It must choose what the military's most fundamental challenge is and charge the military with meeting that challenge. If the new administration intends to pursue a defense strategy which meets all four of the challenges outlined in the QDR, it must seriously consider expanding military (read service member) capacity—perhaps giving thought to a limited conscription policy. More fundamentally, the next administration must choose between global military primacy and national security. In line with Gates' thinking, national security dictates the pursuit of meeting catastrophic, irregular and disruptive challenges. Assured global military primacy requires meeting traditional challenges, involving the continual modernization of conventional military capability. Without substantial military expansion, one objective must give out to the other.

MAJ Deraney is now in the Division Engineer's Office, 1st Armored Division, Wiesbaden. Contact him at alexander.deraney@us.army.mil ◉

FYI

How the Army Runs, a text published by the Army War College with major assistance by the Army Force Management School, is the source to go to for a general overview of how the Army defines requirements, manages its resources and distributes people and materiel. It and a number of other documents—primers, information papers, etc.—are at <http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil>, and the FA50 BCKS Knowledge Center, <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=760078>.

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AKO: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/194547>

BCKS: <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/>

[CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=760078](https://forums.bcks.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=760078)

FA 50 ALUMNI NEWS:

Army Reserve FA 50 Promoted to Brigadier General



On 24 July 2009, LTG Jack C. Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General of the US Army Reserve Command, promoted James H. Doty Jr. to the rank of Brigadier General at a ceremony at the Woodlawn Chapel, Ft. Belvoir, in front of a crowd of about 200 distinguished visitors, family and well wishers. BG Doty currently commands the 420th Engineer Brigade, an Army Reserve command of 5,000 Soldiers in 19 states, with headquarters in Bryan, Texas. BG Doty is also the Chief of Initiatives and Doctrine with the Army Installation Management Command in his civilian capacity and a Career Program 26 Army Enterprise Employee.

Prior to assuming command, BG Doty served as the Director of Force Management and the senior Functional Area 50 AGR officer for the United States Army Reserve from 2005-2009. He has served as a force manager in various AGR assignments world-wide for over a decade, culminating his 20 year active duty career as the Director. LTG Stultz also presented BG Doty with the Legion of Merit, citing him as a transformational leader and the architect of the Army Reserve's greatest transformation in its 100 year history.

BG Doty thanked those who had helped him achieve this important step in his military career, to include the Noncommissioned officers, family and mentors. He was humbled and left nearly speechless as the crowd gave him a standing ovation. BG Doty becomes the second FA50 officer to attain General Officer rank, following BG Ed Donnelly who serves as the Deputy Director of Strategy in the Army's G3/5/7. ◉

WELCOME BACK TO OCAR, COL ROSADO



Colonel Eddie Rosado

Colonel Eddie Rosado was born in Bronx, New York. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from William Paterson State College (Wayne, NJ) in December 1985; Master of Science in Adult and Continuing Education from Kansas State University in June 2000, and an MS in Strategic Studies from the Army War College in July 2009. Colonel Rosado was commissioned a Regular Army Second Lieutenant (DMG) from Seton Hall University in December 1985 and began his career as an Air Defense Artillery Officer.

Colonel Rosado's military education includes the ADA Basic Officer Course, Airborne School, Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, Petroleum Officer Course, the Logistics Executive Development Course, Army Command and General Staff College, the Advanced Force Management Course, and the Army War College.

Colonel Rosado was a Chaparral/Vulcan Platoon Leader at Ft. Carson; Petroleum Liaison Officer for the 240th QM Battalion at Ft. Lee, Virginia; and Commander of the 16th Field Service Company which deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Colonel Rosado served as the Chief of the Airborne Division at the Aerial Delivery School in Ft. Lee, Virginia. He went on to serve as the Battalion S4 for the Air Base Ground Defense Command, Ft. Dix, NJ and HHC Company Commander. In 1995 he was S1/Adjutant for the 98th Area Support Group in Wurzburg, Germany.

In 1996 Colonel Rosado transferred into the Active Guard and Reserve program. After assignments in San Jose, California and at the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) at Ft. McPherson, Georgia, he joined the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR)-Force Programs as the Quartermaster Force Integrator. Colonel Rosado also served with the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, Virginia as a Force Developer. Colonel Rosado deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan to the Office of Military Cooperation and served as the military advisor to the Director of Force Management of the Afghanistan National Army. Upon his return he was assigned to USARC Force Programs as the Division Chief of the Force Management Division. He returned to OCAR as the Chief, Force Integration Division. Upon promotion to Colonel in June 2008, he assumed duties as the Director OCAR Full-Time Support. He is currently assigned as the G3/5/7 Force Management Division Chief, Arlington, Virginia.

Colonel Rosado's awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal; Meritorious Service Medal with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Achievement Medal with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster; the National Defense Service Medal with Bronze Star; Southwest Asia Service Medal with Bronze Star; Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary; Medal Global War on Terrorism Service Medal; Armed Forces Reserve Medal with M device; Army Service Ribbon; Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia); Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait); Airborne Badge, Aerial Delivery Badge and Army Staff Identification Badge. Colonel Rosado resides at Fort Belvoir, Virginia with his wife and two sons. Another son resides in Atlanta, GA." ◉

milWiki

is Another Tool for Your FA 50 Toolkit



If you are a frequent user of AKO/DKO, or have even visited the on-line FA50

What's a wiki??

"Wiki," we are told, comes from the Hawaiian word for "fast." A wiki is a Web site that is editable by anyone who can access it. Subject matter experts—Force Managers for example—are encouraged to contribute and update information as it happens. milWiki's mission is to capture

Smartbook website on BCKS, you should already know about this "milWiki" thing. It is one of the newest


Knowledge Management tools used by the AKO/DKO community. Originally called KC Wiki, then Green Force Wiki, milWiki is very similar to Wikipedia in that it allows users to easily create, edit, integrate and interlink articles and collaborate on issues up to and including


UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO documentation. Contributors to milWiki—essentially anyone with an AKO account and CAC card—are called, naturally, "milWikians." milWiki is also actively partnering with *Intellipedia* to allow users to search across both wikis and share tips and knowledge across the greater Government community.

the knowledge and information of the AKO/DKO community and allow users to easily locate and impact that knowledge through community updates.

milWiki can help you easily find mission-related information about organizations, systems, processes, procedures, tech smarts, artifacts, expertise and tacit knowledge. Your contributions and edits will help make the

information on the wiki accurate and up-to-date, so please take the time to look through, contribute where topics of your particular expertise or interest do not exist, and edit where changes on existing pages are necessary.





History

milWiki began as a small wiki developed by PEO C3T for Army Team C4ISR users but available through AKO/DKO authentication. It was originally known as the KC Wiki, or Knowledge Center Wiki, based on the Army Team C4ISR Knowledge Center. The Knowledge Center wiki supported five major Army organizations or components that make up Army Team C4ISR. Since its beginning in June 2008 the wiki expanded through an existing partnership with PM Acquisition Business within PEO EIS. KC Wiki then became Green Force Wiki based on an Instant Messaging/Web

History (continued)

Conferencing tool for the Army Acquisition community called Green Force Tracker. In less than a year's time the wiki grew to over 20,000 users with hundreds of Army and sister service organizations building articles. With its latest transformation into milWiki, PEO C3T has partnered with AKO/DKO to expand the focus from Army to an overall Defense Knowledge Online capability through existing AKO/DKO authentication. PEO C3T has acted as an incubator in this community experiment and has met with numerous Department of Defense organizations to gain support in its effort to become a living encyclopedia for the Military.

How to Contribute to the Wiki ??

For help on creating and editing pages, there is a [Manual of Style](#) available with hints on writing style and guidelines for submissions, an [Editing Cheatsheet](#) for formatting, and a [Rich Text Editors](#) guide for users who prefer a simplified approach to wikis. The [KC Support Team](#) is also available for further assistance.

So what ??

The doctrine writers, for example, are finding ways to use milWiki. As the Director of the Army's Battle Command Knowledge System told the New York Times, "For a couple hundred years, the Army has been writing doctrine in a particular way, and for a couple months, we have been doing it online in this wiki. The only ones who could write doctrine were the select few. Now, imagine the challenge in accepting that anybody can go on the wiki and make a change—that is a big challenge, culturally."

milWiki, therefore, is another option for Army Force Managers to develop, update and share unclass information. For example, I edited the article "Army G-8" to include his FA50 Proponent role. Since the G-8 is also the Proponent for two other Functional Areas, someone who knows the details could easily add that info, too. Anyone can create or edit an article, much like Wikipedia. There are existing articles on Army Materiel Fielding, ARFORGEN, Army Modernization Strategy, DASC, FCS, Lean Six Sigma, MRAP, Rapid Equipping Force, the How the Army Runs manual, and several weapons and other systems. There could easily be articles on AR2B, AEERC, the Army Force Management School, G-357, Modularity and Transformation, Theater Army conversion, Transparency, CP26 or any of the six million other things going on in the world of Force Management. This could be a useful tool for dissemination of unclass information from staff to the rest of the Army, or between Force Managers. ○

WHAT IS THIS?

*Let us know, and win a subscription to the
ORACLE!*



HISTORY OF FORCE MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS COURSE

By LTC Eric Hollister
Department of Logistics and Resource Operations, CGSC



undergone many changes since its inception in 1881, and its curriculum has changed to reflect the evolving Army. While tactics, logistics, and history have been mainstay subjects since the beginning, the study of the field of force management did not really start to appear until almost 50 years after the college opened and has waxed and waned based on DoD and Fort Leavenworth leaders' priorities. A search of Fort Leavenworth's Combined Arms Research Library shows its susceptibility to the views and personalities of CGSOC and Army leaders.

Force Management (FM) is the business of running and managing change in the Army, from developing forces to programming, resourcing,

One of the many things the FA50 leadership have been working to fix over the past several years is the long-standing dearth of formal instruction available to the officers who will be responsible for implementing the far-reaching changes our Army is calling for. LTC Hollister has uncovered the history of changes in teaching officers how to manage change. The full text of his paper, with charts, can be accessed on the FA50 Force ManagementNet webpage.

The Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) has

building, and deploying those forces, and everything in between. Nine basic FM topics may be used to simplify a discussion of curriculum focus areas: General Force Management; Force Development (FD); Materiel Development; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE); Force Generation; Manning; Total Army Analysis (TAA); Force Integration; and Case Study. Some of these topics did not previously exist in their current state, but similar subjects were covered in past curriculum. For example, PPBE began in the 1960s, but the Army Command Management System of the 1950s was a precursor. Additionally, from roughly 1970 to 1990, FM topics were combined with those concerning Operations Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA). Where this occurred, the FM portions of the lessons were counted while the ORSA-related material was not.

Finally, although the school itself has undergone numerous name changes, it will be referred to as CGSOC regardless of the time period.

Not surprisingly, FM-related instruction at CGSOC in the years prior to World War I was non-existent. Although the need

for a properly manned and equipped military was stressed at the school in the 1880s, and the German General Staff was used as an instructional example in the 1890s, there were no American FM procedures to be taught. Even the painful troop



Elihu Root
Secretary of War

Force Management (FM) is the business of running and managing change in the Army, from developing forces to programming, resourcing, building, and deploying those forces...

mobilization, equipping, and deployment lessons of the Spanish-American War, along with the subsequent reforms enacted by Secretary of War Elihu Root, were not enough to spur the Army to develop a centralized resource management process. CGSOC did, however, develop an exercise with an FM-like flavor in 1909.

The incredible difficulties of mobilizing, organizing, and equipping the massive Army required for World War I prompted extensive changes in how Army resources were managed. Thus FM-related curriculum crept into the coursework, focused on mobilization and the organization of the War Department and the Army. In Academic Year (AY) 1928-29, CGSOC once again became a two-year course, allowing for a more in-depth study of Army operations and an increase in FM-related courses. Courses such as "Organization of an Army," "Economic Preparedness for War,"

"Consumption and Waste in Production," and "Supply System of the AEF" show a clear desire to educate majors on the larger operating principles of their Army. The second-year course of 1933

contained "Mobilization," "Necessity for Planned War Economy," "Procurement Plans," and "Industrial Mobilization Plans" for a total of seven FM hours. The course was similar in 1935, with an additional six hours of mobilization instruction and a fifteen hour mobilization exercise. This year is the high point for FM in the pre-World War II era, as the two-year course ended in 1937, leading to the reduction of FM hours to seven in 1938 and five in 1939, all mobilization related.

World War II caused drastic changes for CGSOC, the primary one being that the course was shortened to eight weeks long. FM topics focused primarily in the areas of Manning (personnel procurement and replacements) and Materiel



Attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941

Development (procurement and planning). A War Department circular from 1946 directed the college to “prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the Division and higher levels.” This directive, along with the decision not to reopen the Army War College after the war, helped to refocus CGSOC from Division and below to higher level units and headquarters. Specialized instruction continued post-WWII, as a 10-week phase of a year-long CGSOC was focused on the likely future staff assignment of the officer: Personnel, Operations and Training, Intelligence, or Logistics. All of these specializations, except Intelligence, included numerous FM classes. Even though FM was well-represented in the specialization phase, the Core curriculum (that which every student was required to complete) still contained 14 hours of FM topics covering General FM, Materiel Development, Force Generation, and Manning.



LTG Manton S. Eddy

This trend towards specialization did not sit well with the Eddy Board of 1949. The board, named after its chair LTG Manton Eddy, was chartered to study the educational system of Army Officers. The board stated that

“in the change-over following the

war, a very important aspect of military training, i.e. the duties of the...general staff officers of the... Department of the Army, was eliminated.” The board also frequently talked about the “new field” of business management and comptrollership: “... the field of business management is somewhat of a specialty, but instruction on this subject should be integrated into all schools in the Army system” and “To achieve the utmost in efficiency in the

discharge of the Army’s responsibilities requires continuous study of methods to apply throughout the service the most modern and scientific business methods of administration...” Additionally, the board felt that officers needed an understanding of the big picture: “At no place in the Army school system has [the officer] been given an objective view of the entire vast and complex machinery which makes up the Department of the Army.” The board recommended that these subjects should receive the “greatest attention in advanced Army schools,” primarily at what they called the “Advanced Course,” or the Army War College (AWC), which reopened in 1950.

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 and its subsequent 1956 amendment were the impetus for the Army Command Management System (ACMS), which took the separate of Programming, Budgeting, Accounting, Supply, and Management systems and put them under one management structure. In a 1953 CGSOC lecture by LTG G.H. Decker, Comptroller of the Army, he quoted Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr. as saying: “There is an unglamorous side of the Army too, which requires your personal attention—that of managing the Army.”

The reopening of AWC caused a migration of FM-related courseware from the CGSOC. The 1951 curriculum was completely rewritten, removing the specialized instruction, leaving at least seven hours of FM classes (or 16—some are not available for study), focused mainly on General FM and PPBE topics. In 1953 that total dropped to four hours, a level that held steady until 1957, when the implementation of a Future Warfare block devoted 42 hours to FM-related topics. The specific impetus for this is unclear, but the block grew to 67 hours in the major 1957-58 curriculum rewrite. One possibility for this new block was the philosophy of two commandants during the 1950s, MG Garrison Davidson and MG Lionel McGarr. Davidson felt the college should play a major role in the development

of new doctrine. McGarr didn't think Davidson's changes were enough, concluding that the college suffered from "conservatism," and directed the previously mentioned curriculum rewrite. The 1958-59 Catalog of Courses for CGSOC reflects his philosophy:

While the Army prepares for a fighting war, its cold war commitments in the defense of the Free World call upon its officers for an increasing variety of critical tasks, ranging from...research and development work, to key positions in the "business management" of the immense Army establishment. The Army System of Military Education must contribute to professional qualifications of its officers for such duty...the advent of more complex and costly organizations and equipment has necessitated increased emphasis on educating our leaders in their responsibilities in the "peacetime" management of men and materiel.

Whatever the reason, the result was a dramatic increase in FM-related topics. This increase would be short-lived, however. The Williams Board (the 1958 Officer Education and Training Review Board) felt that officer instruction should have a single objective, that of preparing officers to "perform those duties which they may be called upon to perform in war," and that CGSOC should focus on division, corps, army, and theater level logistical command, while the AWC would focus on "army group, theater army headquarters, continental United States agencies, and the Department of the Army, with emphasis on the latter." The AWC focus areas contained the vast majority of organizations responsible for the "business" side of the Army, so these recommendations, combined with the emphasis on wartime duties, all but relieved CGSOC from covering FM material. FM courses plummeted by 1962 to a mere ten hours, two of which featured a research and development guest speaker. This same year, PPBE was introduced by Secretary of Defense McNamara. This system, derived from the ACMS, was a monumental step in the "business management" process of our military.

Its immediate impact at CGSOC was an increase of 14 FM-related hours in 1963, over half of which involved PPBE. The total returned to ten in 1965.

In 1966, the Report of the Board to Review Army Officer Schools, the Haines Board, would once again change the focus of CGSOC. The board recommended that CGSOC prepare officers "primarily for duty with the Army in the field, and secondarily for duty with Headquarters, Department of the Army, combined and joint staffs, and staffs of major Army commands." There was a clear emphasis from the board on the need for business management-type training, and where this training needed to be conducted (CGSOC). The board recommended a ten-hour increase of resource utilization topics in the 1967 curriculum, and electives to introduce specialized instruction to those requiring it for follow-on duties. Additionally, the Haines board reversed course on the CGSOC mission outlined by the Williams board:

Traditionally, the C&GSC [CGSOC] mission has focused on preparing officers for duty with the Army in the field. In examining the appropriateness of the mission, the Board has considered the changing military environment in which the graduates will serve and the fact that the C&GSC is the final stage of professional military schooling for over two-thirds of its graduates. The current military environment includes a wide range of high level commands and organizations that are outside the structure of the Army in the field and that impose growing demands for C&GSC graduates. Many graduates will spend much of the remainder of their careers serving primarily in non-tactical organizations, i.e.: the Department of the Army, combined and joint staffs, the Continental United States (CONUS) operating base, and a multitude of new commands and agencies... Graduates, therefore, must be versatile and knowledgeable in procedures and concepts that go far beyond the operation of the Army in the field.

The recommendations of the Haines Board resulted in 22 hours of FM-related topics in the 1968-69 curriculum. The introduction of electives, combined with the initiation of the Officer Personnel

Management System (OPMS), began an era of FM specialization in the 1970s.

During the 1970-71 Academic Year (AY) students were allowed to take two electives, a number that would soon dramatically increase. OPMS, instituted in the Army in 1971, gave each officer a primary and secondary specialization, with the expectation of maintaining proficiency in both. The primary specialization was almost always the officer's basic branch (i.e., Infantry), so his normal schooling and career progression would ensure he remained proficient. The secondary specialization was normally not a concern for the officer until after his company command, around the time of promotion to major and subsequent attendance at CGSOC. Electives were seen as a way for officers to gain this secondary

skill. However, from 184 total hours in AY73-74, FM-related hours fell back to ten in AY 1979-80.

The 1978 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study did little to increase the FM-related Core curriculum, although it did stress the importance of officers knowing how to "manage military forces in peacetime." The principle outcome of this study was the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), which began in 1981 and continued until 2004. Although there were FM topics covered at CAS3 (PPBE, ARFORGEN, and Force Integration), it had little effect on FM-related topics at CGSOC. Apparently the college felt the FM topics were sufficiently covered in the electives.

This viewpoint seems to have changed (briefly) in the mid-1980s. In 1983 the college began requiring its students to arrive with a base level of knowledge on various subjects. It did this through the Combat Skills Comprehensive Program, or COMPS requirement, which included non-

resident study and resident examinations upon arrival. Part of the COMPS study were modules on DOD, DA, and Major Command Resource Management (PPBE and related material), and Force Development. (COMPS continued, under the name Fundamental Studies, until AY 1996-97.) The CGSC 1984/85 Institutional Self-Study stated that the Resource Management Committee (part of the Department for Combat Support) was the proponent for Force Integration doctrine and training, and that "this instruction serves as the capstone for all CGSC instruction and helps the student grasp the Army's overall operation and management." The catalyst for this new emphasis on FM is unclear, but the increase in hours proved again to be short-lived. By 1988, FM-related instruction hours had decreased to nine.

By 1988, FM-related instruction hours had decreased to nine. This decline is simultaneously perplexing and understandable.

This decline is simultaneously perplexing and understandable. The 1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) repeatedly stressed that officers must be educated on "How the Army Runs." This did not necessarily translate to FM instruction during the CGSOC Core curriculum, however, as the continued evolution of OPMS (to include the establishment of Force Development as a separate Functional Area in 1986) led to more officer specialization. For officers requiring FM-related skills for their secondary specialties, this led to the development of specialized CGSOC electives as well as stand-alone Force Integration Courses of one to three weeks, that would qualify the officer as a Force Developer. These courses, plus the ability of Fort Leavenworth to award the Force Developer skill identifier, impacted the number of Core FM hours until their end in 1996.

In 1993, Vice Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer commissioned a FM Functional Area Assessment. This assessment, along with a Force Management Study of the same year, recommended the establishment of the Army Force Management School (AFMS), which held its first class in October 1994. AFMS targeted those who needed FM skills for their current (or next) assignment, including DA civilians. It was certainly no cure-all for the Army's need to have officers who understood the business of running the Army. In February 1996, GEN Reimer directed the college to add more Force Management topics to the curriculum, and to base the instruction on AFMS. Local legend holds that Reimer was unhappy with the lack of FM-related knowledge of a PCC class he had visited. If true, one could estimate that the members of that PCC class were attendees of CGSOC in the early and late 1980s, when FM-related courseware was at its lowest. Whatever the case, Reimer's directive led to a stand-alone Resource Planning and Management course containing 25 hours of FM topics in AY 1996-97 (a level that would remain fairly steady through 2005).

Reimer's feelings on the importance of Force Management education were reflected in 1997's OPMS XXI Report:

... while warfighting must remain the paramount skill of the officer corps, the Army should begin to foster officers who thoroughly understand how the Army works as an institution.



GEN Dennis J. Reimer

...the Army must develop officers who can prepare and build the Army of tomorrow by orchestrating complex systems within the Service and across DoD and also by procuring and building future Army systems...

The second component—building the Army for the future—is important. The Army is a complex system of systems providing the institutional base from which the operational force is supported, both today and tomorrow. As such, it requires officers able to perform essential functions that fall outside of the Army's warfighting role but are absolutely necessary to field an Army that can fight and win. Officers engaged in these functions must anticipate the doctrinal, training, and organizational requirements of future operations and prepare the Army to meet them. In addition to being grounded in the operational Army, they must have specialty or technical skills that support the Army's larger systemic needs.

OPMS XXI divided officers into Career Fields (CF) known as Operations, Operational Support, Information Operations, and Institutional Support, further specializing the educational requirements for these officers. An additional recommendation that was eventually enacted was for CGSOC to "retool" to enable all Majors to attend a resident Core curriculum portion prior to attending an additional phase of instruction tailored to their particular career field. The Core curriculum portion came to be known as Intermediate Level Education (ILE).

ILE was implemented in AY 2003-04. An attempt was made to implement a "COMPS-like" distance learning pre-requisite for the Force Management Course (renamed from the Resource Planning and Management course) containing lessons on Reserve Mobilization, Organizational Force Development, DOD and DA Resource Management, Equipment Distribution, and Installation and Tactical Financial Management. This was dropped after the initial year. In AY 2005-06, competition for Core hours, a desire to include Middle-Eastern studies and cultural awareness into ILE, and differing viewpoints on what every major in the Army needed to know about FM caused then-CGSOC Commandant BG Volney Warner to direct a 1/3 reduction in hours of

the Force Management Course to 16, the same level it currently holds in AY 2008-09.

This final reduction in FM hours confirms that FM education at CGSOC has been incredibly inconsistent. Coverage of FM-related topics since 1949 has been wholly subject to the focus of the college's leadership and directives from the numerous officer educational studies. As the hours of FM courseware fluctuated, so did the topics that were covered.

In spite of the emphasis of numerous officer education studies on the importance of the study of business management, the level of FM education at CGSOC has fluctuated dramatically since the 1930s. Changes in leadership, focus, priorities, and programs have all contributed to the incredible inconsistency in the coverage of this topic since the college's inception, and will no doubt continue for years to come. It is somewhat ironic that so much change has surrounded a topic that is itself about managing change. ◦

FA50 Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) & Army Fellowship opportunities:

The FA50 career field highly recommends that all officers obtain an advanced academic degree in a field related to the force management mission. In support of this goal each year FA50 gets a limited number of allocations to send officers to graduate school full-time. Additionally functional area experienced officers are encouraged to expand their professional development by participation in an Army fellowship program. Historically FA50 has selected one officer annually to work at the RAND Arroyo Center and is exploring other fellowship opportunities. These are very important elements of professional development, and officers are encouraged to pursue this educational objective for personal as well as professional reasons.

The HRC career manager has sent out a request for applications from interested officers. Due to the limited allocations the FA50 proponent office conducts a selection board to review applications and choose recipients.

To be eligible for attendance at any of the programs, interested officers must be on active duty and serving in Regular Army or in Voluntary Indefinite status at the time of application and selection, and have appropriate prior civilian education. Typically, to allow fair participation for limited opportunities, an officer will be selected for only one of the two programs.

Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS): to prepare selected FA50 officers with proven business practices that will enhance the skills, knowledge, tools and attributes to successfully and immediately articulate, manage and lead change.

Army Fellowship Program: to provide FA50 officers the opportunity to conduct in-depth research and analysis on critical force management issues at the departmental and DoD levels and to provide an avenue for becoming a published author.

Applications must be submitted to LTC Al Gamble, Alphonso.Gamble@conus.army.mil, no later than **18 November 2009**. More info can be gotten from LTC Gamble, the FA50 BCKS website, and ARs 5-21, 621-1 and 621-7.

“Coming Next Issue: What CSL Means to FA50s”

❖ ❖ ❖ AEERC 11.0 17-21 AUGUST 09 ❖ ❖ ❖



The latest Army Enterprise Equipping and Reuse Conference 11.0, convened in the Pentagon Conference Center 17-21 August. FA50 participants included COL Billy Laster, FDU with COL Roberts, the DOI and Sandy Newtown, OIF/OEF, G-8; COL Dave Komar, FDP with Ms Carrie Brunson and Lane Van de Steeg, both G-8; LTC Pamela Wright and MAJ Tamika Bailey, both G-8, and Rita Dean.



FA 50s IN THE FIELD



LTC Jimmy Barnett



LTC Dave Exton in the cockpit



MAJ Duffy at Baghram Airfield



Major (P) Temaki Carr, now at USAFMSA

FA 50s IN THE FIELD



A G-8 Alumni Reunion in Kabul. Pictured are FA50s LTC Dave Exton, MAJ Chip Horn, and Major Bob Duffy, with Mr. John Alvey [DA G8 LNO] and MAJ Paul Hopkins of JPO MRAP



MAJ Jim Garrett (USAR), MNSTC-I J35 Plans, LTC Debra Sinnott (USAR), MNSTC-I J35 Plans, FA50 LTC Jimmy Barnett, MNSTC-I Deputy J3/5, and LtCdr (USN) Ray Kimmel, Surface Warfare Officer

FA50 WEBPAGES UPDATE

Log on and take a look at the FA50 websites, then let the PPO know what you think—Are they useful? Is there something missing that would be of value in a venue such as this? How can we as a community use these sites to exchange data, documents and other information between Force Managers in the field, and between you and HQDA? In particular, how can we use the BCKS site? You'll see that many other FAs and branches are making extensive use of the forums functionality—you can join most of them yourself. COIN, Army Training Net, MI Space and S1Net are all very active. On the Force Management Net, we've tried to upload a number of reference documents, URLs and a Q&A/blog capability. Please check it out and send some feedback. Thanks!



<http://www.fa50.army.mil/>

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/194547>



<https://forums.bcks.army.mil>

(Log on and select Force Management Net)

RESERVE COMPONENT CORNER

ARMY RESERVE USE OF AUTOMATION SYSTEMS TO MANAGE THE FORCE

by Cindy S. Marshall
Chief, Force Accounting and Analysis
USARC, G-3/5/7 FM



Automation systems can provide many capabilities for force managers. If it has access to authoritative data bases and can link data elements to support multiple management activities, an automation system can support accurate analysis and be an effective decision support system.

Over a decade ago the US Congress authorized the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) to support the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The intent of this legislation was to establish applications to support various readiness-related functions such as mobilization, training, personnel management, safety programs, full-time support and force management.

From its inception, RCAS was truly a “blank sheet” exercise which solicited government subject matter experts (GSMEs) from each functional area to work with RCAS in building the system they needed. Army Reserve Force Management was quick to take advantage of what RCAS was offering and worked aggressively through the mid-1990s to develop the Force Authorization Application in RCAS. The result is on the ground today and in daily use, providing the Army Reserve FA50 Force Management Officers and CP26 Management Analysts an authoritative, automated force management system.

The Army Reserve Force Authorization Application is a comprehensive, integrated set of subsystems providing the management controls to let us be good stewards of the Army’s force structure resources. The application is linked to and updated in real-time by HQDA-managed data bases of record ensuring accuracy and validity of the reference data. Within the application, force managers manipulate subsystems such as the force file,

authorization documents and permanent orders with the goal of executing all required force structure actions on EDATE at a C3 or better readiness level.

The FMHQ subsystem is the tool used by our force managers to track and manage the programmed force and lock down critical management decisions (stationing, manning and equipping) into a validated authorized force as displayed in the force file. The force file obtains its base data from HQDA upon registration of the UIC and in a download from USAFMSA to provide authorization documents. These data fields are locked to prevent data entry errors, but management fields are open for the force managers to manipulate. When the programmed force moves to the authorized force, force file data fields lock in the correct MTOE and populate critical fields in creation of the Permanent Orders issued by this Headquarters. Publication of the Permanent Orders completes the cycle and authorizes the expenditure of resources to re-station, convert or to stand units up. RCAS then informs Army Reserve manpower, equipment, automation and resource management that ensures commanders have the tools necessary to implement our force structure directives.

Though “write” capability is restricted, “read” capability of the RCAS Force Authorization application is available to all Army Reserve users on an as requested basis. This access keeps the force managers and commanders in the field current on the Army Reserve’s force structure program and allows them to start planning for upcoming structure actions.

For more information on the Army Reserve’s Force Authorization application in RCAS, please contact Ms. Cindy Marshall, Force Accounting and Analysis Chief, US Army Reserve Command, G-3/5/7 Force Management at 404-464-8685, cindy.s.marshall@usar.army.mil. ◉

INTERESTED IN A MANPOWER AND FORCE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION?

...let us in the PPO know...

We are still investigating the possibility of establishing a “regimental association” for Force Managers. Please take a look at this survey, prepared by LTC Kat Walker, and let us know either by email or via the websites if you are interested in participating in such an organization. Thanks!

Are you interested in the establishment of a Force Management (FM) Association? A FM Association is being considered as a vehicle for the “voice” of the FM community to provide as established channel for communications among force management professionals; to assist with the recognition of exceptional Force Managers; assist with recommending professional education to enhance community knowledge and experience; and assist with other activities/issues members deem necessary.

Please Note: *The FM Association cannot be officially Army sponsored. It would be a private “Not-for Profit” association whose members would volunteer service time in its establishment and operations.*

-
- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1. Would you be interested in a Force Management Association for FA50s/CP26s? | YES/NO |
| 2. Would you become a member? | YES/NO |
| 3. Would you volunteer your time to help with the establishment of a FM Association? | YES/NO |
| 4. Would you be interested in holding an office within the FM Association? | YES/NO |
| 5. Is there any other type of organization that you would prefer be established that would involve FA50s/CP26s?
If yes, what type? | YES/NO |
| 6. Other thoughts/information you would like to provide? | YES/NO |

MAY SOMEONE CONTACT YOU REGARDING YOUR INTEREST? YES/NO

NAME: _____

EMAIL ADDRESS: _____

PHONE# _____

FA 50 CAREER MILESTONES

Congratulations to the newest graduates of the FA50 Qualification Course, who completed their studies on 3 September 2009. Certificates were presented by the Executive Agent for FA50, BG Tom Spoehr. Captain Astin, Major Rudder and Major Spinney were also awarded FD coins in recognition of their outstanding efforts.



Members of Class 02-09 were:

Front Row: MAJ Melissa Espina, LTC Ambro Martin, BG Spoehr, MAJ Robert A. Erickson, MAJ J.C. Spinney

Second Row: CPT Michael E. Astin, MAJ Carlos A. Rivera, LTC Timothy J. Leitch (Class Leader), MAJ Bradley S. Rudder, MAJ Barbara J. Mason, CPT Robert J. Woodruff

Top Row: CPT Daniel J. Rogne, LTC Morant Pittman, MAJ Louis A. Morris, MAJ Carlos R. Sepulveda, MAJ Casey D. Coyle, LTC Ricky V. Kyles, LTC Kenneth B. Pittman, MAJ Stephen S. Brown, CPT Jason L. Bartlett

The Greater Force Management Community has three newly-selected RC COLs. Congratulations to LTC(P) Ron Dix, Army Reserve Force Management Directorate (FWD); LTC(P) Manuel DeGuzman HQDA G3/5/7; and LTC(P) Allan Fey, Army Reserve Force Management Directorate (Main).

FA 50 CAREER MILESTONES (CONT)



Promotions in the recent past quarter include: Colonel Robert Hughes (ARCENT) and Gregg Skibiki (Army G-3/7); Lieutenant Colonels Eric Hollister (CGSC); Ambro Martin (1st TSC, Ft Bragg) (see photo above); Tim Mertsock (Army G-3/7), and John Nolden (USSOCOM), and Majors Robert Erickson (ARCENT) (see photo above); JC Spinney (Army G-8), Daniel Poole (Army G-8) (see photo above); and Casey Coyle (Army G-8) (see photo above).

FORCE DEVELOPMENT FOR NON-FA50S

Force Management includes a wide range of functions including Strategy, Capabilities Development, Material Development, Force Structure and Force Development. I would like to expand on just one of these and tell you a little about “Force Development.” I believe most of my fellow officers have experienced not having enough equipment on-hand and wanted to know why they couldn’t get more. In the following two pages, I hope to shed some light on how the Army fields equipment and what you might do to influence your organization’s equipment distribution.

Military equipment is handled very much like personnel, it’s a zero-sum game. The Army strictly approves the number of people and the amount and type of equipment you can have, as well as the aggregate total for the entire Army. So, if one person or piece of equipment is added to your organization, then one has to be taken away from someone else. In the Force Development process, the Army G-8 budgets for equipment six years out. The G-8 will buy as much equipment as the budget will allow meeting those authorized requirements and within G-37’s priorities. We all should know there is never enough money to meet all the demands, and that the Army is constantly reprioritizing equipment.

I often hear fellow officers say “I need more equipment; my unit’s mission set is different from all other like units.” Then they attempt to change the MTOE [the Modification Table of Organization and Equipment, the document that authorizes what your particular unit gets and how many]. But in general, the Army looks at all like units within brigades to do the same type of mission—a tank battalion is a tank battalion—although granted, each unit may have a particular specialty or mission that they train for. I bring this up because the Army generally assigns personnel and distributes enough equipment to fill to the same percentage for all like units across the board.

What’s deceiving to some is when you may see a like battalion successfully getting a plus-up from requesting

more equipment. These assets are most likely coming from their Brigade, Division or Corps asset allocation. The Army always lets the field commander deviate from his units’ MTOEs by way of lateral transfers, but the Army fields new equipment based on MTOE shortages and Operational Needs Statement (ONS). Of course, there is always an exception, but what’s been discussed is our standard procedure.

One common practice I see is units using to try to show a shortage of equipment by moving their equipment to the X (excess) on-hand column vs. in the ERC A or B on-hand column of their property books. Or they will substitute one piece of equipment on the property books for another piece of equipment to show a shortage. Either way, when they report their unit status readiness (USR) it shows an equipment shortage in hopes of getting fielded more equipment. However, at the G-8, when we do our equipment data pulls we can see the total picture and only buy/field true equipment shortages.

Your best bet on receiving equipment besides doing lateral transfer within your Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) is to have the MSC (the FA50 at HQ USARPAC or USAREUR, for example) call the G-8’s Systems Synchronization Officers (SSO) to see if they have any equipment that is not already planned out on a fielding schedule. If the SSO has it and you are short, he will probably field it to you.

In summary, I have described in some aspects how Force Management Officers can help your organizations equipment shortages and how SSOs can assist in filling your shortages.

Major Chad Furne is the Light Tactical Vehicles SSO in the Army G-8’s Force Development Directorate (DAPR-FDL). He is a 2008 graduate of the FA50 Qualification Course. MAJ Furne can be reached at 703-604-2998, chad.furne@us.army.mil. ◉