



THE Oracle



Volume 5 • 2nd Quarter FY09

THE FUTURE OF FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

POINT . . . Counterpoint Why FCS?

POINT >

By James C. Dayhoff, FA, CGSC Class 09-01 — Class 09-01

As the Army continues to develop the Future Combat System (FCS), growing concern among members of Congress and high-ranking military officials about costs and capability continue to add pressure for substantive results. The greatest challenge for military leaders is convincing Congress the FCS family is more than just a new platform; it is a new way of conducting full spectrum operations.

The Army must continue development of the FCS to ensure its future dominance and overall capability during full spectrum operations.

Within the FCS program, an entirely new type of network is being conceptually designed which enables an unprecedented level of information flow to the Soldier who requires information immediately on today's battlefield. This network enables connectivity throughout the family of systems and across the spectrum of FCS sensors and platforms. More importantly, it gives the Army its own communications network; one

that the Army does not need to contract time and space commercially to use. According to GlobalSecurity.org, "the FCS (BCT) network possesses the adaptability and management functionality required to maintain pertinent services, while the FCS (BCT)

fighters on a rapidly shifting battlespace giving them the advantage to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively." So, this network gives the Army exactly what it needs to maintain dominance on the battlefield; a seamless,



Read About It In

THE Oracle

COVER STORY

FCS, What's The Point?

by James C. Dayhoff, MAJ Mike Titus and MAJ Philip Dawson

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

"FA 50 Qualification Focus"
from the Executive Agent

MAJ Paul Cole on RESET

Army Fellowship Program

Prerequisites & Selection Process

Professional Development and Fellowships

from the PPO Chief

Secretary of the Army Honors "Tref":

The LTG Richard G. Trefry Lifetime of Service Award established

FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:

Functional Area Qualification Focus



MG David D. Halverson Director,
FA 50 Executive Agent

Team, the FA50 community grows stronger and stronger daily. I am constantly impressed by the professionalism and capabilities of Force Management officers. You are recognized as the “go to” leaders by commanders and senior leaders who need important things done quickly and effectively, especially in the areas of force modernization, force integration, Modularity and readiness.

We, the functional area leadership, want to maintain the career field at this high-level of expertise. In order to grow stronger it requires a partnership between you and those with oversight of the career field.

With today’s obligations, we are all moving very fast and time is critical. Therefore, we are taking steps to make sure all FA50s move through the required qualification gates of Intermediate Level Education and the Functional Area Qualification Course by the required suspenses. It is

important for you to take responsibility and monitor your own professional development and dates for required education.

Your promotion potential and future value to the Army are influenced by the level of education and diversity of experiences that may come from outside the normal assignment process. Graduate school..., fellowships..., training with industry..., are some of the number of opportunities available. I encourage you to look into any and all of them. The FA50 office staff and FA50 HRC career manager are working to broaden your opportunities in the Advanced Civilian School program. If you don’t have a Masters degree, find a program which will enhance your force management skills. For those with a Masters degree consider enriching your experience through a fellowship. FA50s have participated in the RAND Arroyo Center program for a number of years. There are other Army endorsed programs. Contact Patsy Campbell or LTC Al Gamble for information.

I will be watching for more applications for these programs. “Broadening assignments” are those developmental positions that provide exposure to experiences outside an officer’s core branch or functional area competencies. They encourage development of a “wider range of knowledge and skills, augment understanding of the full spectrum of Army missions, promote practical application of language training or increase cross cultural exposure, and expand officer awareness of other governmental agencies, units or environments.” The number of FA50s deploying has increased so we are taking steps to make sure these officers are fully prepared for the challenges of those assignments.

As an FA50, we must balance your assignments between theater, ASCCs, joint and the ARSTAF. There are many opportunities out there, other branches and FAs are taking advantage of them, and I hope 50s will, too. ○

MG Dave Halverson

Future Combat Systems continued from cover

adaptable, high-flow, integrated communication system that keeps the soldier fully informed with the ability to make quick knowledgeable decisions even during an intense fire-fight.



simply getting it from the United States to a theater of operations. Most deployments of heavy forces require significant sea movement, which takes time and diminishes the surprise factor of the Army. The FCS system gives the Army a deployability that it has never had.

Commonality is a quality the current force seriously lacks. Very few (with a couple of exceptions, i.e. M2A2 Bradley and MLRS system), combat systems have interchangeable parts such as engines, road wheels and air filters. The FCS family is built on a common platform that seriously decreases the amount of part stockage requirements for an FCS BCT. One blindingly obvious benefit for commonality of platforms is the engine or “pack” that FCS sub-systems will share. Currently, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) must carry packs for M1A2 Abrams Tanks, M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles, M109A6 Paladin Howitzers and many other types of vehicles in its inventory, none of which share interchangeable parts. In the FCS system, the Non-Line of Sight – Cannon (NLOS-C), NLOS-M (mortar), Command and Control (C2) Vehicle, and Family of Recovery and Maintenance Vehicles (FRMV) all share the same platform. This means the hull, engine, road wheels, fuel filters and oil-pan gaskets are the same. Thus, the Army has significantly decreased the amount of Class II and Class IX components and parts that must be carried by the sustainment force at battalion and brigade level.

The final and probably most significant aspect of the FCS system is the fact that it is a lighter, more mobile and easier to deploy combat platform that maintains the Army’s lethal combat effectiveness that makes it such a formidable force. Boeing describes the need for a formidable “lighter” armored force as “a combination of both heavy and light forces – combining the strength, lethality and survivability of the heavy forces and their on-the-ground mobility with the speed and agility of the light forces – a capability that FCS will provide.” The FCS system maintains similar firepower and capability of the current HBCT, only in a lighter, more mobile package. Each platform is C-17 compatible, which means it is air liftable to anywhere the Air Force can deliver it. The greatest challenge in the Army’s current heavy force is

The FCS system is a necessary part of the Army’s transformation into a lighter more lethal and deployable force. FCS provides the Army a new adaptable communications network that transforms the way the Army communicates in the future. Each platform is interconnected and interchangeable in the network. The FCS system offers far better sustainability because the systems are mechanically interchangeable; platforms share parts and components, which greatly decrease the requirements for logistic support for the FCS BCT. The deployability of the FCS BCT gives the Army a much needed advantage to force project quickly in future conflicts. Each platform is air transportable, which gives light forces much needed back up during emergency or contingency deployments. Overall, the continuance of the FCS program will ensure effective modernization of the force.



What Should the Army do with the Future Combat System? The billions of dollars slated for FCS can be better spent elsewhere.

by MAJ Michael S. Titus, CGSC

The advocates of the Future Combat System (FCS) would say the path to a stronger defense is through the application of technology. However, as our enemies

Future Combat Systems continued on page 4

Future Combat Systems continued from page 3


have recently demonstrated, there are ways to reduce our technological advantage, primarily through unconventional or insurgent tactics. FM 3-0 states that the environment will be "complex, multidimensional, and increasingly fought among the people" (FM 3-0, 2008). In other words, the threats we face will continue to be unconventional and insurgent in nature. As we get entangled in more of these episodes, stretching available combat forces, we continue to appear weaker to more conventional threats. We already possess the most technologically advanced equipment in the world. What we need for the future is not more technology, but more boots - boots filled with intelligent, educated and adaptive Soldiers capable of operating amongst civilian populations in complex environments.

I believe we must discontinue the majority of the FCS program and utilize that money to grow the Army for the complex and challenging nature of counter insurgency and unconventional operations. While there are aspects of the FCS that have great merit, namely the

networking capability, many of the proposed systems are not necessary because (1) the environment where we will continue to operate reduces or negates our technological advantage, (2) we already possess weapon systems which are unmatched around the world and (3) the more stretched our forces are, the older conventional threats become.

According to FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, few states have the ability to attack the US directly and therefore potential adversaries will resort to asymmetric means to circumvent our strengths. Realizing that our potential enemies will circumvent our technology and that their unconventional tactics will require numerous deployments around the globe with large numbers of "boots on the ground," why would we advocate wasting \$160 billion which could be better spent growing our Army and training it to operate in this complex environment?

Secondly, our military already has the most technologically advanced and superior weapon systems on earth. Of the fourteen FCS systems proposed, we already have eleven systems which perform basically the same functions and are technologically superior to anything our competitors possess. These systems include two unmanned aerial vehicles, a small unmanned ground vehicle, a mounted combat system, infantry carrier vehicle, non-line of sight cannon, non line of sight mortar, a recon and surveillance vehicle, command and control vehicle, medical treatment and evacuation vehicle and a recovery and maintenance vehicle. The M1A2 Abrams, the Bradley and the Stryker systems currently in our arsenal remain technologically unmatched. Our unmanned technologies are also first rate. We have all



Future Combat Systems continued from page 4

seen the impressive displays of the Predator UAV, and our Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel have an equally impressive small unmanned ground vehicle. Finally, we remain unmatched in indirect fire support with the Paladin and MLRS.

Lastly, the danger of appearing weak due to a lack of deployable forces is greater than a lack of highly sophisticated technology. Strength comes with forces, not technology.

We have already seen the results of what happens when our forces get stretched. Examples include the brazen actions of Iran and North Korea in their continued pursuit of nuclear research. In March 2007, the Iranians took fifteen British sailors in Iraqi waters in the Persian Gulf. In January 2008, five Iranian patrol boats made several passes at US warships in the Straits of Hormuz. Some would argue that our enemies have been emboldened by the feeling that we will not or cannot react militarily because of our preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan and numerous other obligations around the globe. One could also make the argument that Russia would not have been nearly as comfortable invading our ally, Georgia this past summer if the US were not so heavily engaged elsewhere. Who else will test our resolve and ability to respond in the future: perhaps China, Cuba or maybe Venezuela?

Future Combat System is the modern equivalent of the Maginot Line. When confronted with the great French defenses, the Germans simply went around them. Likewise, our enemies have demonstrated the ability to negate our technological advantage by resorting to unconventional insurgent tactics like IED attacks and suicide bombings. We already possess the most technologically advanced conventional combat systems on the planet. We are most vulnerable at the very complex and challenging stability and support operations end of the spectrum where operations require much greater numbers of personnel with specific training and education. This is the environment that will characterize warfare for the foreseeable future. It is imperative that we stop the wasteful expenditure of \$160 billion dollars and use that money where it really counts. We must eliminate the FCS program, freeing up the money for more important and urgent needs.



and another view from the field...

Army Future Combat System

by MAJ Philip Dawson, SC, CGSC Class 09-01

Technology continues to advance at an incredible rate. Moore's law effectively states that the capability, and in many cases the usefulness, of computer technology will double approximately every two years. These huge leaps in technology in a very short time have solved thousands of problems soldiers, and especially leaders of Soldiers, face in war. The world has seen technological leaps not only in computer technology but in almost all areas of warfare.

At a minimum the Army must continue to develop, fund, and field the Network portion of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. The United States is currently the world's only super power. This honor is not likely to be ours alone forever. Nations like China, India, Russia and others continue to expand their influence in the world. Various smaller nations also vie for international dominance in military and economic means. Our military is the paradigm military, that is, the rest of the world looks at us, want to emulate our capabilities and success, and ultimately supplant us. Unless we want to end up like the Prussians, Napoleon's army, or the Romans we must continue to innovate and improve our capabilities. We must be capable of dealing with all the threats of today as well as those of the foreseeable future.

Continued improvements in our network capability are needed whether we are fighting a high intensity conflict, a counterinsurgency, or conducting stability operations, and network systems are equally useful in all three scenarios. Currently there are dozens of different computer systems available to the American Soldier. A great number of these systems were developed in a stovepipe in that they were designed for a specific warfighting function, be it artillery, air defense, intelligence or logistics without concern for any other systems. Most of these systems did not interface or share information well and as a result other systems had to be developed to force them to work together. The end result is a host of dissimilar computer systems, each requiring different training, different

Future Combat Systems continued on page 5

Future Combat Systems continued on page 7

The ORACLE is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army's FA 50 Proponency Office. Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.

Headquarters Department of the Army
Office of the Director, Force Development DAPR-FDZ
FA 50 (Force Management) Proponency Office
700 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0700

Please submit all material for publication and comment to Mr. Bob Fleitz at 703-602-7605 or email robert.fleitz@us.army.mil

Disclaimer: The information in The ORACLE represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not reflect official Army position, nor does it change or supersede any official Army publications or policy. Questions and comments are welcomed and encouraged. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to The ORACLE and to the author, except where copyright is included.

ARMY STRONG.

www.fa50.army.mil

FROM THE PPO CHIEF:

FA50 Focus on Professional Development and Fellowship



LTC Rob Waring, FA50 Personnel Proponent Office Chief

“Training and Education” have been the major topics of discussion around here lately. Congratulations to MAJ Robert L. Jones and MAJ Albert L. Benson who were selected for the FY10 RAND/Arroyo Center Fellowship; and MAJ James Blain and MAJ Michael Hall, selected for Advanced Civil Schooling. Congratulations also to MAJ Brian Robinson who graduated from George Mason University in December 2007. This year there were few applications for these programs. We are working hard to get the word out early for FY11. The FA50 Executive Agent wants to see many more applications. You are encouraged to include a Masters degree in your professional development plan and possibly other opportunities such as fellowships.

Patsy and Mike are working closely with the Army Force Management School on a detailed review of the FA50 Q Course Program of Instruction. AFMS has been conducting the course for five years now. Many tweaks and small changes are made every year. Whenever there is an update to Part 1, the Advanced Force Management Course-4 weeks, automatic updates are made to Part 2, the ten week portion. This year, before the next course starts in June, we want to identify any major adjustments and change the POI accordingly. Many returning FA50s report there are ways in which they might have been better prepared for duties in the theater, for example regarding Operational Needs Statement (ONS) and Joint Urgent Needs Statement (JUONS) procedures, rapid equipping procedures, handling of requests for forces (RFF), and other theater-unique demands on Force Managers. Similarly, a FA50 Council of Colonels gave us feedback on how well their action officers are prepared for ARSTAF duties in the G-37 or G-8. While our emphasis has been to determine what might be missing from the course, we are comparing the 10-week, Part 2, course curriculum to the 4-week phase (also undergoing revision) and to ILE to avoid duplicating training that students get elsewhere. All of this information is being discussed with the instructors at AFMS to work out what's appropriate to add or subtract and what's actually feasible for the school to execute. In preparation for duties on ARSTAF we will be adding hands-on software instruction. For operational assignments, we anticipate adding modules as previously indicated. We are possibly adding some deployment preparation and perhaps a course end “capstone exercise.” Any of you who have suggestions, please contact me or Patsy, or send an email to FA50PP@conus.army.mil. We want to ensure this effort considers as many good ideas as possible.

Speaking of ILE, FA50 officers will normally attend the resident ILE at Ft Belvoir. The FA50 office is reviewing records to make sure our officers are completing this requirement in a timely manner. Currently officers must completely ILE by their 12th year. You definitely need to complete both ILE and the qualification course prior to consideration for promotion to LTC. I suggest you do so before your YG is in the below-the-zone. Ask your command's training officer to enroll you. If you have any problems contact LTC Gamble or Patsy.

Each one of you is making a tremendous contribution to our Army. I really appreciate your taking the time to email or call with your ideas and suggestions on how to make our training and education program better and more relevant. Whatever you are doing, keep it up.

Rob Waring
Rob

*LTC Rob Waring,
PPO Chief*


Future Combat Systems continued from page 5

hardware, different contractors to support, and often limited or non-existent information sharing.

The Network component of FCS addresses the issues mentioned above as well as issues related to how the information that feeds all these systems. American technological superiority is one of our greatest strengths but it can also be an Achilles heel if we are too dependent on it and the enemy is able to exploit technological weaknesses, especially any single points of failure. One of the most dangerous single points of failure in US technology is our reliance on satellite communications, from the President to the individual Soldier. While we do use several different types of satellites including both military and civilian constellations, this pseudo-variety hardly provides a truly redundant communications backbone. All satellite communications are vulnerable, to varying degrees, to terrestrial and space weather phenomenon that are uncontrollable and often unpredictable. Satellite communication is also highly vulnerable to high-altitude electromagnetic pulse effects, likely the result of a nuclear detonation.

Another weakness of satellite communication is the limit of available resources. Satellites are expensive to launch, have finite onboard capability which only degrades over time, and require expensive ground based control stations. The Department of Defense communication demands far exceed the capability of US government owned and operated satellite constellations. As a result we are forced to lease satellite time from foreign and domestic satellite providers. This puts us at the mercy of entities that do not have our missions' success as their top priorities.


To overcome the numerous disadvantages of such heavy reliance on satellite based communication the Network component of the FCS contains several alternate means of transmitting critical data across the battlefield. Rather than solely rely on satellites, FCS would “integrate ground based, near-ground, airborne, and space-borne assets for constant connectivity and layered redundancy.”



This type of redundancy would provide a robust communication backbone with the capability to continue to function even if an adversary were to deny our use of space assets.

The American military's ability to use technology, especially computer and communications technology to defeat a wide range of threats to our nation and the world continues to put us ahead of every other nation's military. However, in many of today's conflicts we are not fighting another nation's military, at least not directly. We are fighting insurgents and terrorists or we are combating humanitarian crises in unstable nations. Even supporting US citizens in a domestic, natural, or man-made disaster would benefit greatly from an improved network capability. A modern, dynamic, robust, and survivable computer and communications network will allow US commanders to have all the information they need to command and control their forces no matter what the mission is.

It can be argued that many aspects of the FCS don't support a broad range of combat and non-combat environments that today's and tomorrow's Soldier will likely face. The Network component however, will provide dramatic improvements to the Soldier whether he or she is facing a near-peer enemy force in full strength, small bands of counterinsurgents, or helping prevent the collapse of an unstable nation during a humanitarian crisis. ○



PDO AND CAREER MANAGER'S UPDATE:

In response to concerns raised about the adequacy of training, we are actively reviewing the Q Course POI. We'll let you know of any major changes as they develop. Meanwhile, suggestions and comments are always welcome.

In that vein, we have added a blog channel to our FA50 AKO KC. Anyone who's a subscriber to the site, and that is almost all of us, is welcome and encouraged to use the blog to post comments and lessons learned for the use of all other members. Meanwhile, we are also working to develop some other tools for use by deployed and deploying FA50s, including smartbooks, NIPR and SIPR sites on BCKS, and a list of other available training and

education opportunities such as the Joint Staff Officers Course, JOPES training courses, on-line training, etc.

Finally, in order to maintain contact and stay up-to-date on all of the FA50 and Force Management issues, personnel, news and announcements please frequently check your AKO email account. The Personnel Proponency Office and the EA/Proponent's Offices will use this common address as the primary means to provide you useful and pertinent information. If for some reason an alternate duty email address is more appropriate, please let us know.

Thanks, Patsy



Contact Info

FA 50 Proponency Office
Chief, LTC Rob Waring
(Pentagon 3d353)
703-692-6487
robert.waring@us.army.mil

Program Manager/Acting Chief
Ms. Patsy Campbell
703-604-3146
campbellpd@conus.army.mil

Program Manager/Training and Structure
Mike McDaniel
703-602-7230
mike.mcdaniel1@us.army.mil

Strategic Comms
Mr. Bob Fleitz (MPRI)
703-602-7605
robert.fleitz@us.army.mil

HRC FA 50 Career Manager
LTC Al Gamble
703-325-8647
alfonso.gamble@us.army.mil

Army Reserve Officers
Division Chief, Force Integration
MAJ Charlotta Wells (OCAR)
703-601-0608
charlotta.wells@us.army.mil

National Guard Officers
Deputy, Force Management
LTC Brian Rice
703-607-7827
edwin.rice@us.army.mil

CP 26 Civilians
Ms. Barbara Guy
703-695-5437
barbara.c.guy@conus.army.mil

FROM THE Q-COURSE

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN: A Company Level Perspective On Organizational Change Absent A Change Manager by CPT Doug Graham

Students attending the FA 50 Qualification Course submit a research paper as part of their studies. Like last year, the best papers will be acknowledged in The Oracle over the course of the coming year. Below is CPT Doug Graham's paper on Patriot maintenance transformation. CPT Graham is now at Army G-8, DAPR-FDE, serving as the Patriot SSO. Contact him at douglas.graham1@us.army.mil.—Editor

When the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the collapse of the four level maintenance structure into the two level configuration, adjustments of MTOEs were conducted in many units Army wide. For some, the changes came without guidance; Battalion and Company level Commanders were given an MTOE and an "E" date and most simply executed to the best of their ability. This article will attempt to capture the challenges of one unit's attempts to collapse, restructure, reorganize and go to war. It will highlight how these challenges could have been offset by a Force Management officer, someone knowledgeable in change management and system synchronization.



CPT Douglas Graham

Several years ago, the Army embarked on one of the most rapid and large scale changes in its history, moving away from divisional formations and transforming into the modularity of brigade combat teams (BCT). Alongside the combat force, a logistics transformation process has also taken place. The Army has shifted from four levels of maintenance (unit, direct, general and depot) to two levels (field and sustainment). Gone are the days of supporting from large scale logistics hubs, dispersed sequentially along the battlefield behind clear echelon lines. Today's logistician is built into the combat unit, with the ability to sustain far forward on the battlefield. For most units, there exists a standard model of a forward support company (FSC) within a brigade support battalion (BSB). However, transformation is also occurring in units that don't fit the FSC mold.

In July of 2005, E Company, part of the 3-43 Air Defense Artillery Battalion at Ft. Bliss, Texas, was the first air defense maintenance company in the Army to begin reorganization into the two tier structure. The Battalion itself was converting from a Patriot-pure battalion into an Air Missile Defense Composite Battalion. This transition required several changes, including the addition of an Avenger firing battery, but the first incremental change was to be a maintenance company consolidation.

It's important to understand that the Patriot battalion's relationship with its maintenance company is much different than a combined arms battalion and its FSC. Because a Patriot system's downtime is tracked in hours, the battalion has a maintenance company organically assigned with no parent BSB. There is a small support operations section at the brigade level, but no associated external support element. The maintenance company houses its own maintenance support as well as the low density maintainers typically associated with direct

support units. Additionally, this company is home to a supply support activity with roughly 1800 lines of authorized stock. Each of the firing batteries within the battalion has a maintenance element assigned to it, with no affiliation to the maintenance company. In the context of a four level system, the organizational level maintenance was conducted by the mechanics assigned to the firing batteries while direct support was provided by the maintenance company. This structure ensured an easily accessible pool of quick reaction maintainers with a back-up unit and kept the majority of demanded parts on-hand.

WHAT HAPPENED

In May of 2005 the battalion began preparing for the reorganization. There was a relatively short “flash-to-bang” time. For 3-43, the initial guidance coincided with a field training exercise, a new battalion commander and a new maintenance company commander. The reorganization was to occur over a four month time-frame from July to October 2005. The timeframe seemed short but feasible, and the planning process began immediately.

The 11th ADA Brigade Support Operations Officer (SPO) drafted an outline of how the changes would occur at the brigade level, with 3-43 transitioning first and sister battalions shortly thereafter. The external guidance was minimal - units had their MTOEs and the brigade created the order of march. This left the battalion and maintenance company the tasks of crafting the timeline and the logistics to support the transformation, including personnel moves, property transfers, concept of support briefings, internal timelines, reallocation of shared resources and identification of critical shortages, both in personnel and equipment.

During this time, other units throughout the Army had begun or completed the collapse of the maintenance echelons. The process coincided neatly with the BCT hierarchy and there were some “lessons learned” in existence. However, this was the first time an air defense maintenance company was to convert. There was no clear model unit, no organizational example on which to build. The only clear and concise picture that the unit had was the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) itself and Department of the

Army level guidance. Due to the nature of air defense maintenance, many senior maintainers within the brigade lacked experience in anything else. Those who did have experience with other types of units were raised in the old four level divisional concept of support. All of this resulted in several challenges for the unit.

REORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES ACROSS THE DOTMLPF SPECTRUM

As with any large scale change, challenges formed across the DOTMLPF spectrum. Doctrinally, a major concern for 3-43 and its maintenance company was how to employ its Field Maintenance Teams (FMT’s). The FMT’s were to be aligned with the firing battery, providing sustainment as far forward possible. They were to be self supportive logistically speaking, relying on the battery for administrative and life support while taking care of the battery as well as their own equipment. Missile system maintenance fell first to the battery system technician (warrant officer) and, upon fault identification, passed to the Intermediate Support Element (ISE), the DS level system repairers. This support would come via contact team, just as in the past. What this created was two types of doctrinally different support structures. Conventionally, the battalion now operated under the two level structure, with FMT’s serving as miniature FSC’s. Simultaneously, Patriot system maintenance continued under the organizational to direct support evacuation structure.

Organizationally, the new MTOE involved consolidating the conventional maintainers into the maintenance company, leaving each firing battery its unit level system maintainers. In essence, all of the wheeled vehicle and generator mechanics would now be assigned to the maintenance company along with all of their associated tools and equipment. The firing battery would maintain its system technician warrant (140E), its two petroleum specialists (92F), and one automated logistical specialist (92A), but would transfer the remainder of its maintenance section to the maintenance company. The maintenance company would still house the ISE which was responsible for DS level maintenance on the Patriot system.

Internally, the maintenance company also faced

some reorganization. There would no longer be any differentiation between a motor pool and a “third shop.” The 63Bs and 63Ws were compressed into the MOS 63B, resulting in multi-capable maintainers able to do field level maintenance tasks. The maintenance company also lost its Battalion Motor Sergeant position when the 63Z was moved to the battalion S-4 section to become a senior maintenance supervisor. The influx of equipment also required a change in supply specialist from 92Y20 to 92Y30 and the addition of a 92Y10.

The most formidable challenge was consolidation of the 63 series organizational and direct support level MOS’s. The organizational level mechanics (63B) were trained to troubleshoot, diagnose, isolate faults and perform quick repair and scheduled maintenance tasks. The direct support mechanics (63W) performed primarily remove and replace tasks. Under the new structure, all mechanics would now perform both tasks. On a large scale, the Army remedied the problem by training incoming mechanics on field level tasks. For the unit, however, the challenge was to get its junior leaders (motor sergeants in particular) proficient in field level maintenance tasks over a six month time period in addition to conducting daily operations, mission requirements, and performing necessary tasks associated with the reorganization.

In the materiel arena, the mechanics were unable to perform all their required maintenance functions due to a lack of a field level maintenance tool set. The old MTOE authorized six Common #1 tool sets - one for each firing battery, the Headquarters Battery and the Maintenance Company. The maintenance company was also authorized an A31 tool set for performing direct support level tasks. Under the two level maintenance system, with all the #1 Commons at the Maintenance Company, the FMTs lacked the equipment they needed to perform most of the field maintenance tasks formerly associated with direct support, including tasks such as removing and replacing engines and transmissions. There was a new tool set in existence, known as the Standard Automotive Tool Set (SATS), but 3-43 was low on the fielding list.

A second capability gap was the unit’s inability to manage logistics activities with its current Standard

Army Management Information System (STAMIS), the system used to order and track parts, report deadlined equipment, record man hours, create work orders, and manage services, bench stock and prescribed load lists. The unit was authorized the Unit Level Logistics System-Ground (ULLS-G) as its STAMIS. Each battery/company had two ULLS-G boxes, one as a primary system and one for a back-up. These were configured to support one level of maintenance, either organizational or direct. If the ULLS-G was configured to open organizational level work tasks or requisition organizational level parts, it could not be used to open DS level jobs or requisition DS level parts. The short term solution was ULLS Systems Change Package (SCP) 10. This allowed units to perform both levels of maintenance in a traceable manner, but a larger problem now existed. The new MTOE allocated the Maintenance Company six of the battalion’s twelve ULLS-G systems. The software would not allow two systems with the same DODAAC to be on the network at any given time without the possibility of a permanent loss of data. This meant that the back-up ULLS-G system was left in the battery for PLL management, while the primary box went to the Maintenance Company for daily operations and no back-up existed. Per the MTOE, the gap was to be remedied by the fielding of the Standard Army Maintenance System-Electronic (SAMS-E), but again, 3-43 was not a priority for fielding.

Leadership challenges stemmed from a lack of clear understanding of why the change was occurring and this created an aversion to the change itself. To implement successful organizational change, key leaders must not only be involved but they must believe in the change and the steps undertaken to achieve the desired end state. But in this case many leaders simply felt blindsided by the new system, and as detailed plans were constructed, the initial “push-back” began. Many of the senior maintenance leaders did not agree with the changes, and an equal amount believed the MTOE was just a formality that would simply be shelved. Commanders opposed a perceived “loss of control” of their units’ maintenance programs. Warrant officers, who were charged with the overall responsibility of managing unit maintenance, were the toughest opponents of the change. Many felt relegated to a position of much lesser

responsibility, forced to hand off their primary duties. Additionally, some felt that their technical expertise was being ignored, or at least unsolicited, and this caused an entrenchment of sorts. The environment proved to be less than harmonic.

Other challenges arose in personnel administration areas. Where would the newly formed Field Maintenance Team (FMT) take the Army Physical Fitness Test? Which unit would be responsible for weapons qualification? The Soldiers assigned to the FMT are reported against the Maintenance Company, but the supported battery commander must be able to assess a Soldier's physical fitness and basic Soldier skills when that Soldier will be a vital member of his or her battery in combat. One of the advantages was supposed to be the overall ability to plug-and-play mechanics throughout the battalion. If one battery was short personnel, the Maintenance Company was capable of moving Soldiers to fill gaps. But what about team building and developing cohesiveness within the battery? Shifting Soldiers from one battery to another may fill holes, but in the long term it may also affect unit readiness.

Finally, limited space existed in garrison for the performance of the former DS level tasks. Overhead cranes, vehicle lifts, and overall bay space were inadequate. There were additional gaps in single Soldier housing space. The additional troops in the maintenance company made it impossible to maintain unit integrity within the existing facilities. This made recalls, inspections, and duty rosters difficult.

REORGANIZATION SOLUTIONS

The many challenges that stem from organizational change serve to highlight the importance of a "change manager." Army Functional Area 50 Officers, Force Managers, handle just such changes. It is important to recognize how an FA50 could have averted some of the confusion and gaps created in this scenario.

For example, organizational changes could have been better phased, directed and defined. A force manager, perhaps at Brigade level, would have provided a clear understanding of new roles and emerging requirements. Additionally, an FA50 would have given key leaders a sound appreciation of their changing function in

the new organization. They would then have an understanding of their new requirements as well as the ability to develop requirements for subordinate leaders, providing for a seamless transition while avoiding unclear job descriptions and confusion about changing responsibilities.

The force manager would have greatly decreased the burden on the unit from a training aspect. The FA50 is paramount in bridging the timing of the change with the required training requirements, coordinating for key personnel to get essential education. This could have been done by arranging for a training team to come to the unit, coordinating for classroom space and assembling required resources. This takes the pressure off of the unit leadership allowing them to focus on planning and changing vice researching requirements and scheduling for training. The force manager also serves as a link between the unit and the trainers, knowing who to contact to ensure requirements are met.

The key to closing the materiel capability gap should be the synchronization of fielding mandatory equipment in conjunction with the organizational change. In this case, a force manager would have been able to coordinate the dates for the fielding and assisted the commander in structuring a reorganization timeline that coincided with anticipated fielding dates. The shift would occur in conjunction with the fielding of the SATS and the SAMS-E, both of which were critical components of the new organization and both of which were necessary for mission accomplishment. Additionally, the force manager would have the ability and contacts to expedite the fielding process for units slated to deploy. In a fast change environment, deployment orders can appear long after fielding plans are constructed. The FA50 provides that link back to "big Army" and can contact the proponent responsible for accelerating the fielding process. Again, this allows commanders the freedom to focus on unit operations and provides them an invaluable tool in their decision making process.

Leaders play the key role in organizational change. Force managers are able to explain how the pieces fit together to form a larger picture and understand the importance of having essential personnel on board.

In this example, the FA50 could have provided much needed insight into why the change was occurring, assisted in redefining roles (both individually and collectively), and researched and answered questions about issues where there was a lack of clear guidance. The FA50 could have also provided a link back to the developers, soliciting advice from the operational leaders and subject matter experts and reporting it back for future changes. Many MTOE changes are incremental in nature, reaching for an objective TOE. This input could have directly affected the next increment of change and provided the development team an understanding of some of the challenges and questions that arose during implementation.

Facilities must be accounted for early in the transformation process since they typically take the longest to develop. A force manager could have helped the commander identify facility shortfalls and how they might affect the unit mission. Through diligent analysis of operations and workload, the FA50 would have been able to determine and prioritize key facility gaps. While

this may not be the "silver bullet" for solving a lack of adequate infrastructure, it does give the commander the ability to predict and plan for the obstruction.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This case highlights the Army's need for change managers, positioned at lower echelons and especially within those units that fall outside of a divisional type structure where no clear model exists. Many commanders do not realize the advantage a force manager can provide by researching, analyzing, planning and advising. They perform those critical and necessary functions that provide commanders access to as much information as possible in planning and analyzing risk. Force management officers serve as a link between the operational and the institutional Army, closing the understanding gap that often develops during times of change. Risk and turmoil will always exist with large scale change, and while there is no cure, force managers can provide mitigation and control. ◦

JOINT QUALIFICATION:

The new Joint Qualification System is designed to capture joint experiences and award levels of Joint Qualification. The previous system of Standard-Joint Duty Assignment List (S-JDAL) billets continues to be the primary avenue for Joint Qualification; however, the new JQS seeks to give officers credit for joint experiences in non-JDAL assignments. Award of qualification points by is to be based on an evaluation of an officer's joint training or joint exercise experience, joint duty experience in "experience-based Joint Duty Assignments (E-JDA)," or other education or experience. This is important because award of ASI 3A or sufficient E-JDA points, plus JPME I and II are required for award of ASI 3L (Joint Qualified Officer). And Joint Qualification is required, of course, for appointment to BG. By the way, FA50 presently has fourteen 3A-producing slots and four 3L slots. Details are published in Chapter 3 of DA Pam 600-3.

Until September 30, 2010, officers can self-nominate non-JDAL experiences since September 11, 2001. Your HRC Career Manager (LTC Gamble) will review the submissions and a Joint Staff Special Review Panel will validate and award points.

FA50s are encouraged to learn more about changes in the Joint Qualification System and apply for credit. For additional information, please visit the Human Resources Command Website at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opdistjp/index.htm>. The site explains the new system, the points accrual formulas, and the application process. Check the FA50 website, too, and we'll have more information in the next ORACLE.

“TREF”


HONORED BY SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, CSA



The Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry Lifetime of Service Award has been established as an honorary award of the U.S. Army. The award is named in honor of Lieutenant General Trefry, US Army (Ret), former Inspector General of the Army, Force Management Hall of Fame honoree, and first recipient of the new award. A Pentagon ceremony was held on 20 March, hosted by SA Geren and CSA General Casey.

The Trefry Award can be presented to former or present members of the Army, both Active and Reserve Components, and former or present Department of the Army Civilians who:

- ~ exemplify LTG Trefry’s ethos and lifetime of extraordinary and selfless service to the Army in a variety of capacities;
- ~ have consistently supported and promoted the professional advancement and development of military and civilian personnel;
- ~ broadly and significantly impacted the Army at large through a longstanding commitment to innovation and leadership.




RESET

RESET, one of the four Army Imperatives to restore balance to the Army, is a six-month process that systematically restores deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that permits resumption of training for future missions. RESET encompasses those tasks required to reintegrate Soldiers and Families, then organize, man, equip, and train a unit. RESET is predicated on the concept of allowing Soldiers and Families the opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of sustained operational tempo.

by MAJ Paul Cole

The Army must restore its strategic depth while preserving the All-Volunteer Force. Because of shortages in people, equipment and time to train, the non-deployable force does not meet readiness goals. Therefore, the Army must institutionalize the RESET process to ensure readiness of the future force, our



RESET continued on page 16

RESET continued from page 15

Soldiers, and their Families. The Army will act quickly to restore needed depth and breadth in the force, and build essential capacity for the future. In so doing, we must provide time and opportunity for Soldiers and Families to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of sustained operational tempo.

The RESET model, which



is based upon a 15-month (AC) and a five year (RC) dwell, consists of three phases: a six-month redeployment phase ("In Theater"), an initial reconstitution period (AC = 6 months; RC = 12 months) to allow for Soldier and Family reintegration ("RESET"), and a collective training and unit preparation phase leading up to deployment ("Train-Ready"). The model is brigade-centric and its focus is on unit, not individual, reconstitution. A unit's

return is based upon when 51% of the unit's personnel return to home station.

RESET continued from page 16

return is based upon when 51% of the unit's personnel return to home station.

Manning and equipping our formations in RESET are significant challenges.

The Army will "man" brigade-sized units through ARFORGEN Focused Manning. Unit returns will be based upon when 51% of the unit's personnel have returned to home station. The Army will man and prioritize units based on deployment, major training exercises and redeployment dates. Unit manning cycles begin at Return +91 days and continue through the next deployment and end at Return + 90 days.

Effective management of training to prepare for operations across the spectrum of conflict is challenging. For the present, unit commanders will strive for T1 readiness for their directed Mission Essential Task List (DMETL). Where time is available, the Army will conduct core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) training to reestablish our combined arms skills at appropriate levels as follows. Over the next three years, AC units redeployed for less than 18 months, and RC units redeployed for less than 36 months, will focus on training to achieve proficiency for their DMETL. They will not be required to conduct CMETL training unless specifically directed. Units redeployed for 18 months or more (36 months RC) will focus a portion of their time on CMETL training. AC units redeployed for 24 months or more (48 months RC) will achieve proficiency in both CMETL and DMETL.

HQDA is currently conducting a series of RESET Pilots. The test for FY 08 implements the RESET Model on 13 redeploying Army units: eight AC, two ARNG, and three USAR units. In FY 09, HQDA expanded the test to 19 units: 13 AC, three ARNG, and three USAR units. The RESET Pilot will be used to inform how Army institutional processes need to adjust to implement RESET.

The Army has already realized a number of significant lessons from execution of the FY 08 RESET Pilot. As a result, HQDA has directed that a number of "best business practices" be applied to all Army units that return 15 January 2009 and later. These best business practices follow.


In the In-Theater Phase (the 180 day period leading to the unit's return), all units will redeploy with (at a minimum) 100% of the equipment they took to theater unless otherwise directed by HQDA. All units will build Automated RESET Management Tool (ARMT) Field and Sustainment plans 120 days before return, and execute 90 days before return. All units will turn-in 100% of their Automatic RESET Induction (ARI) items prior to return. Commanders will ensure that hand receipt holders conduct 100% eyes on/hands on inventory of all equipment prior to return. All units will turn-in 100% of their battle-lost equipment prior to return. Commanders will develop/update unit training plans and Institutional Training (schools) Support Plans (ITSP) prior to return.

In the RESET Phase (the first 180 days for the Active Component (AC) or 365 days for the Reserve Component (RC) after the unit's return), RESET will be measured from unit return to deployment and tracked via the USR. Returning units may report C5 status for up to 180 days (365 for RC). HRC will fill AC returning unit FG, CG, and senior NCOs as high as possible - as soon as possible after return. Human Resources Command (HRC) will maintain enlisted skills 42A and 92Y as high as possible after return. HQDA will not direct any training above squad level during this phase. There will be no external (off installation) taskings for returning units; Senior Commanders, Mission Support Elements, and installations will be judicious with internal taskings. Units will receive, sign for and report program manager (PM) delivered equipment that does not require initial new equipment training (NET).

HQDA will continue to adjust the RESET model based on lessons learned.


(Please view the following corresponding graphics charts accompanying this article.)

Major Paul Cole is the RESET Force Integrator in HQDA G-37/Force Management. Please feel free to contact him for more information on the RESET imperative or the RESET pilot at (703) 693-2980 / DSN 312-223-2980, or paul.cole@us.army.mil.



RESET continued on page 17


RESET Charts continued on page 18



In Theater Phase: "Return minus 180 days" to "Return" (AC/RC).

The In-Theater Phase sets the conditions for achieving success in the RESET Phase. During this phase, units conduct combat operations. The focus of the In Theater Phase is on maintenance and property accountability. Key tasks occurring during this phase (primarily in the RIP/TOA window) include:


1. Schedule an initial planning conference (IPC) to be led by the regional Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) NLT Return - 120.
2. Develop a RESET Plan.
3. Inventory & turn-in theater-provided equipment (TPE).
4. Inventory and turn-in 100% of automated reset induction (ARI) items and battle-damaged/battle-lost items.
5. Conduct 100% inventories to identify shortages.
6. Load equipment.
7. Units develop training plans. Units complete Institutional Training Support (schools) Plans (ITSP) (Tab A to Appendix 7).
8. U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) identifies follow-on assignments and ensures that AC Soldiers have assignment instructions (AI) / requests for orders (RFO) for their next PCS assignment NLT Return - 30 days.
9. Units redeploy with 100% of the equipment they took to theater unless otherwise directed by HQDA.
10. MSEs and rear detachment commanders coordinate and synchronize unit, installation, and Army requirements for the SC. The SC will ensure staff integration with mission units, the unit in RESET, the garrison, and affected tenant units. For garrison and installation support, the Garrison Commander will coordinate with Mission Support Elements, rear detachments, and affected tenants to meet SC priorities.



RESET Phase: "Return" to "Return plus 180 days" (AC) / "Return" to "Return plus 365 days" (RC).

The primary purpose of this phase is Soldier-Family reintegration and unit reconstitution. During this phase, there is no initial readiness expectation. Units will report C5 status for 180 days (AC) or 365 days (RC). There is no HQDA-directed training above the squad level during this phase. Also, there are no external (off installation) taskings for Pilot units without Army Command (ACOM) / Army Service Component Command (ASCC) commander approval; Senior Commanders (SC), Mission Support Elements (MSE), and installations should be judicious with internal taskings of units in this phase. The intent is to set the conditions for a standard duty day. At the end of this reconstitution period, units will be manned, equipped, and rested; Soldiers will be intellectually prepared to begin focused training. Key tasks during this phase include:

1. Units arrive at home station and conduct 30 days of block leave.
2. Soldier Health Assessments, briefings, and counseling.
3. Reverse SRP.
4. Brigade and battalion changes of command.
5. HRC maintains "Personnel Key to Reset" (enlisted 42A/92Y) at ∴ 80% aggregate assigned through Return + 180 (AC) or 365 (RC) days to facilitate RESET Phase tasks. Through retention or replacement, HRC fills units with Field Grade and Company Grade officers and MSG/SFC to ∴ 70% aggregate assigned level as soon as possible after return, but NLT Return + 180 (AC) or 365 (RC) days. HRC fills units to a P-2 level of fill (∴ 80% aggregate fill and ∴ 75% aggregate assigned senior grade [E5 and above] fill) at Return + 180 (AC) or 365 (RC) days.
6. Equipment arrives at home station and the unit conducts preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).
7. Units receive equipment from depots and left-behind equipment (LBE).
8. Equipment is reset.
9. New equipment training begins by exception. Units sign for equipment upon receipt.
10. Units begin resourcing training plans, and Soldiers begin executing ITSPs, maximizing the use of mobile training teams (MTT) at home station to set conditions to begin collective training in the Train-Ready Phase.
11. At the conclusion of this phase, units achieve a P-2 level of fill, S-2, R-2, and T-3.



Train-Ready Phase: "Return plus 180 days" to "LAD" (AC) / "Return plus 365 days" to "LAD" (RC).

During this phase, units begin focused collective training, Family Team Building, deployment preparation, and writing standard operating procedures (SOP). At the end of this phase, units achieve C1, conduct block leave, and enter the Available Force Pool to deploy. RC units remain in Train-Ready for up to four years, given dwell. Key tasks in this phase include:

1. Resolve Personnel shortages.
2. Complete equipment Reset and begin NET.
3. Conduct theater specific/special training.
4. Conduct Squad/Platoon/Battalion/Brigade collective training.
5. Designate and train a rear detachment.
6. Turn in LBE.
7. Deploy to and conduct culminating training events (CTE).
8. Conduct post-CTE activities (Maintenance, weapons training).
9. Conduct post-CTE block leave.
10. Complete Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification (DMOSQ) ratings, percentages, or milestones as appropriate (RC).