

# THE Oracle

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## ITAM

### IRAQI TRAINING AND ADVISORY MISSION Army Benefits from FA50 Team Effort

*By COL Chuck Bush, LTC Tim Leitch and the ITAM-A FA50 staff*

Kicking in doors and demonstrating the finer points of kinetic options for insurgents is one aspect of the COIN fight. Developing a credible national self-sufficient Security Force capability of securing the general population is the other side of the coin so to speak. Functional Area 50s possess skills sets



First row from left to right: Mike Franks, Mark Bangsboll, LTC Tim Leitch, Jeff Lamb, LTC Dee Sawyers, MAJ Jason Ring, Bill Gallagher (Deputy), John Hutchings, LTC Larry Campbell. Second row from l to r: LTC Jim Stephenson, LTC Dean Rhine, COL Chuck Bush (Director, ITAM-Army, Plans and Ops), Ken Gordon, LTC Willie Roseman, LTC Jeff Abel, Coley McDevitt, LTC Matt Hoffman

uniquely tailored to this task. This fact is recognized by Commanders supporting Contingency Operations, and FA50s are in demand. Fulfilling this need, FA50s for

Read About It In

THE Oracle

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**Check out some FA50 snapshots; please send in more**

**FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:** .....

# Great Demand for FA 50s



MG Tom Spoehr, Director  
FA 50 Executive Agent

*Teamates,* Things have been incredibly busy in the world of Army equipping, as all of you know. Here in the Pentagon, our priorities right now are equipping the Afghanistan expansion, the Iraq drawdown, and ARFORGEN. At the same time, LTC Eggert and her team are doing a terrific job of ensuring that the FA50 community is kept up to date on what’s going on in the “parallel universe” of personnel and pronponency.

—Our first colonel-level CSL selections should be announced shortly. This is a major step forward for the professional development needs of our corps. In 2011 our LTCs will be eligible.

—Results of the Army’s first run-through of the “Officer Service Management Pilot Program” were just released, and FA50 picked up two new Force Management officers. Both come from combat arms branches, and should be great additions to our cadre. This quarterly program, which will be renamed the “Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP),” represents an opportunity for all of us to be recruiters for FA50.

—A long-planned project here has been to institute a training program for senior force managers. The original target audience was FA50s returning to the Pentagon after assignments in the operational Army, but we have expanded the scope to include all our senior Force Managers, primarily Colonels, moving into positions as division chiefs here in G-8 or G-3/5/7, chiefs of Force Management Divisions at the ASCCs, Joint Staff billets and so on. We think a seminar-type event best suits the needs of our senior officers, and plan to conduct a pilot session this Fall.

—Finally, most of you are probably aware of the great demand for FA50s in the CENTCOM AOR. LTC Gamble and I are working out a slate for filling the large number of taskers requesting Force Managers. I know what you’re thinking, but on the other hand this is a major vote of confidence in our abilities – commanders trying to move units and equipment into and around the theater recognize that FA50s are the Army’s consummate problem solvers, and they want more. A number of our colleagues are also helping the Afghanis and Iraqis to develop professional force management programs for their military and security forces.

As Brian Halloran recently told me via email, “It’s a great time to be an FA50.” Keep up the excellent work!

*MG Tom Spoehr*

*“The Spartans do not enquire how many the enemy are, but where they are.” —King Agis II, 427 BC*



FA50s take a photo immediately following LTC Deleon's promotion to Lieutenant Colonel

many years have deployed to build capability within both the Afghanistan and Iraqi Security Forces. As those who have gone before understand, the inherent challenges and ultimate rewards of assisting another nation in their historic task to rebuild and reinvent themselves are worth the personal sacrifice.

Today in Iraq, working from within the former World Ba'athist Headquarters, is a team focused on such a task. These men and women are assigned to Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission-Iraq (ITAM-A), Plans and Operations, whose mission it is to advise, train, and equip the Iraqi Army and build ministerial capability within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) supporting their efforts to develop a professional and competent ground defense force. Led by COL Chuck Bush and Mr. Bill Gallagher, ITAM-A Plans and Operations is a Joint team of Active and Reserve Component Force Management Professionals dedicated to the challenging task of building a credible Iraqi Security Force supporting the responsible drawdown of US forces by the close of December 2011.

The directorate is organized along functional lines of Requirements Determination / Documentation, Force Generation, Resourcing, and Plans. The directorate also has a special office established to manage the Iraqi Army fielding of the M1A1 main battle tank and Iraqi Army Force Modernizations programs.



Plans and Ops crew at the Hands of Victory (crossed swords) commemorating the 1988 Victory of Iraq over Iran

The requirements/documentation team consists of LTC Tim Leitch, LTC Jeff Abel, and Mr. Coley McDevitt. Their task is to determine the materiel solutions required to generate core capabilities within Iraqi Army formations. The task requires cross referencing current Iraqi unit MTOEs against approved materiel solutions, then working with Iraqi Joint Headquarters M9 (Documentation) for updated documentation. There is nothing that gives you a better appreciation for what our documentation provides us in the way of requirements and asset visibility than seeing the chaos that comes from doing without.

The Force Generation Team is comprised of LTC James Stephenson, LTC Matt Hoffman, MAJ Jason Ring, and LTC Larry Campbell. The team's primary task is the integration of United States Forces-Iraq training and logistics functions supporting the Iraqi Joint Headquarters and Iraqi Ground Forces Command force generation priorities. Since June 2009, the team has generated 88 Iraqi Army Divisional Enabler (combat service and combat service support) units as part of the \$571 million Iraqi Security Force Funds (ISFF) supported program. An additional 27 units will be generated by July 2010. The team also has the mission, in coordination with the requirements team, to determine the requirements and execution plan for future force structure builds supporting the completion of the Iraqi foundational external defense capability.

## FROM THE PPO CHIEF:

### The “5 Ps”—plus some...



LTC Karen Eggert,  
FA50 PPO Chief

Earlier this month, the G8 hosted a symposium that featured Ms. Kathryn A. Condon, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army, as keynote speaker. The symposium honored the many contributions made by women within G8, but her message was valid for all of us, whether in uniform or as DA civilians or support contractors. She crafted her presentation—“the 5 P’s”—around her top five priorities, which I’m reiterating with some elaboration of my own...

—*Public Service.* We serve for and on behalf of our fellow American citizens, who demand the highest ethical, moral and professional standards from us. In return, we earn a measure of respect, a modest paycheck, and perhaps a hearty handshake upon retirement. We serve because it is worthwhile, it is an honorable way to give of ourselves, it is a noble profession (It’s certainly not for the money!)

—*Passion.* “You gotta love what you do.” The best officers and employees are those who care the most about their mission, their Soldiers, and their units. A lack of passion not only shows, but can be detrimental to the entire organization.

—*People.* “We [the Army] are a people business, . . .take an interest in people.” Closely related, I think, to the next P.

—*Patience.* In my short 28 years’ experience, this is often difficult. Army officers are largely Type A personalities, eager to grab a mission or a tasker, develop a plan and execute it NOW. But the corporate Army runs on processes, particularly true in the Force Management business. Patience can be a virtue in that, by helping and enabling your colleagues, peers and subordinates to grow their skills and abilities within their own defined lanes of responsibility, rather than doing things yourself because it’s faster, more convenient, etc., the entire organization benefits. Ten majors who learn how to write a proper information paper are more valuable to the Army than one LTC attempting to write ten at once. Patience, then, is part of leadership.

—*Prioritize.* “If everything is important, then nothing is important.” In fact, everything in this business really is important, but professional survival depends on an ability to identify which fires must be put out today and which can smolder until tomorrow or next week. The old “plate spinner” metaphor may be catchy, but eventually the plates all crash! Those were Ms Condon’s top five. She also shared the following, which I’m sure each of us emphatically agrees with.

—*Preparation.* It’s amazing what you can accomplish when you go into a situation prepared, especially in the Pentagon. Understand your action, anticipate questions and have answers ready, and know what you want your boss to do with the information you’re giving him. Don’t waste time—his or your own.

—*Professionalism.* Most Americans are not part of our military family, so much of what they know about “the Army” is learned from Hollywood, the evening news, and from us. We represent the real Army, though, and it is part of our mission to look and act like professionals.

—*Pride.* The US Army has served our Nation for 235 years, and we have not failed them yet. We can all be proud of our service, our institution, our Army.

*LTC Karen Eggert*

Karen M. Eggert  
Chief, FA50 Personnel Development Office  
*Creative Managers of Change*

The M1A1/Iraqi Army Modernization team manages the acquisition and fielding of approximately \$900 million of equipment sourced through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program the Government of Iraq (GoI). The team is composed of LTC Willie Roseman, Mr. Al Borgardts, Mr John Hutchings, Mr. Mark Bangsboll and Mr. Jeff Lamb. The team's efforts are focused on the total package fielding of equipment such as M1A1 tanks, M113 ACPs, M198 and M109A5 Howitzers, M88s, Heavy Equipment Trailers and other associated equipment required for the modernization of the Iraqi Army. Furthermore, the team manages the acquisition and fielding of associated support equipment such as the Palletized Loading System, Special Tool and Test Equipment, fuel tankers, and maintenance and support vehicles necessary for the modernization of the 9th Division (Mech). The team coordinates the funding, fielding, training and sustainment of this equipment with the senior leadership of the Iraqi Army.

Managing the processes associated with capturing and allocating the billions in Iraqi Security Force Funding necessary to support the Iraqi Force Generation and Modernization plans is our budget team. The team is LTC Dean Rhine and Mr. Mike Franks. Specifically, they manage the Justification Book (J-Book); it's formulation, maintenance and submission representing billions of dollars of Iraqi Security Force Funding. Additionally, they support the overall effort through the Advising the Iraqi Ministry of Defense office called the Budget Acquisition, Execution, and Requirements (BEAR) Operations Center. The BEAR tracks and reports the funding source, quantity, dollar value, and delivery status to Iraq of FMS and ISFF equipment purchases.

Synchronizing our force generation efforts with the United States Forces-Iraq Commander's priorities, objectives and end-states is our plans section composed of LTC Dee Sawyers and Mr. Ken Gordon. They represent ITAM-Army interests with all United States Forces-Iraq Headquarters planning efforts and ensure our actions are nested in higher headquarters strategic goals.

Conditions in Iraq present many challenges. One of the biggest is the near-constant turnover of Plans & Operations personnel. Case in point, LTC Cesar Deleon and LTC Jay Bienlien are two of our FA50s who recently redeployed. Their hard work in setting up these systems (Force Gen and Modernization) paved the way for their successors to implement the plan.

Daily we witness the improving security situation in Iraq and see the positive impact on the everyday lives of the Iraqi people. These changes are a direct result of the Iraqi Security Forces capabilities that have been generated with the assistance and efforts of the FA50s working at UNION III in the International Zone. The upcoming General Elections and drawdown of US Forces clearly stand as a testament to the contribution and value that FA50s provide and the skills they bring to the fight. Supporting the USF-I team and making a difference from the front, we are proud to represent the FA50 branch while doing a great mission here in Iraq. ◉

**The ORACLE is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army's FA 50 Proponency Office. Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.**

Headquarters Department of the Army  
Office of the Director, Force Development DAPR-FDZ  
FA 50 (Force Management) Proponency Office  
700 Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310-0700

**Please submit all material for publication and comment to Mr. Bob Fleitz at 703-602-7605 or email [robert.fleitz@conus.army.mil](mailto:robert.fleitz@conus.army.mil)**

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[www.fa50.army.mil](http://www.fa50.army.mil)

# A STRATEGY FOR THE RAPID INTEGRATION OF LESSONS LEARNED INTO TRAINING FOR THE **ASYMMETRIC BATTLEFIELD**

## **LESSONS LEARNED MANAGEMENT AND DISSEMINATION AS PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FROM THE DYNAMIC COIN ENVIRONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

by MAJ Jim Glover

Systems Integration Officer (FA50), Asymmetric Warfare Group–Afghanistan

*Not all FA50 officers are fielding equipment. Major Glover recently returned from a deployment to Afghanistan in support of his duties at ASW. – Ed.*

### **Asymmetric Warfare Group and Information Management**

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) has the unique mission to provide operational advisory assistance in support of Army and Joint Force Commanders to enhance the combat effectiveness of the operating



force and enable the defeat of asymmetric threats. The AWG is designed to improve the asymmetric warfare capabilities of the U. S. Army at the operational and tactical levels throughout the full spectrum of conflict. AWG enhances the capabilities of U.S. Army units by making them faster and more adept at identifying and attacking enemy vulnerabilities, and by preparing them for a broader spectrum of threats. Within the AWG, it is the responsibility of the Systems Integration Officer (FA50) to develop networks for information dissemination of battlefield observations and lessons learned. The following observations are the result of the AWG's System Integration Officer deploying to OEF to develop the AWG's nodes for theater information dissemination.

### **Why Lessons Learned Dissemination?**

Prior to 11 September 2001, U.S. Army lessons learned were fragmented and compartmentalized. These reports were often a function of unit debriefs by the Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) following contingency operations such as Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm and rotations to Combat Training Centers (CTC). Unit debriefs and observations were analyzed for trends and published by CALL in handbooks and CTC periodical publications as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) which enhanced the force's capability to fight the most dangerous conflict scenario for the U.S., a high intensity war with a peer competitor. As these lessons learned are a product of observations collected from repetitive high intensity warfare scenarios, they had a direct impact on Army doctrine and TTPs in that spectrum of warfare, often to the detriment of military operations other than war (MOOTW) at the low intensity end of the spectrum.

Currently, Army and Joint organizations do not formally coordinate their collection of lessons learned and observations from the battlefields of the GWOT and the CTC rotations. These lessons learned range from observations and strategic analysis by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) and RAND Corporation to tactical lessons learned observed by operational advisors from the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), Joint Expeditionary Team (JET), or Counterinsurgency Advisory Assistance Team (CAAT) embedded in combat formations. As an Army entity, the CALL is very active in collecting these post-operation observations in theater and during unit post-deployment debriefs. Currently,

*Asymmetric Battlefield continued on page 7*

the battlefield observations made by these Army units and Joint organizations are submitted through their organizational stovepipes and fed into various databases and websites, but usually these domains are compartmentalized and classified. The result is limited access for Soldiers since many of the users don't have the requisite clearance, and units have limited IT connectivity to these sites.

In addition to the challenges associated with classification, there are simply too many databases populated with raw data that has not been analyzed and translated into usable training recommendations for a BCT Commander to use in identifying critical tasks for predeployment training. As Commanders highlighted at the Heavy BCT Warfighters' Forum in August 2009, in the absence of a standard by which to conduct a METL assessment of subordinate units, they must look at TRADOC and CAC to train their units.



To be effective, Lessons Learned from Afghanistan must provide insight into predeployment training considerations and support the

development of TTPs that are derivative of an adaptive operating environment against a continuously evolving adversary. Army and Joint Forces must rapidly collect training recommendations and adversary information to subsequently disseminate lessons learned as considerations for predeployment and "best practice" sustainment theater combat training to achieve success in the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.

### **The Lessons Learned Community of Interest**

Establishing an integrated community in which each organization contributes lessons learned and battlefield observations is critical to any effort to diminish/curtail the operational information gaps between training requirements specific to Afghanistan and the training conducted in CONUS-based predeployment venues such as home station training (HST) and combined-arms training centers (CTCs). Several of these Joint

and Army organizations that collect battlefield observations and submit them as lessons learned are beginning to collaborate around the efforts of JFCOM JCOA's forward element frequently located at the International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul. The organizations currently involved include ISAF Lessons Learned, CALL, AWG, COIN Advisory Assistance Team (CAAT), Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force Lessons Learned (CJSOTF), Marine Corps Center for Lessons



Learned (MCCLL), JFCOM JCOA, Joint Task Force Paladin Lessons Learned, Joint Training Fusion Center (JFCOM/KNIFE), Center for Army Analysis (CAA), Afghanistan Lessons Learned Center, and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) (NATO).

To capitalize on reachback analytical capability, organizations in the community of interest first submit the raw observations and lessons learned to their parent organizations. To assist in the identification of trends critical to lessons learned for COIN operations in Afghanistan, the refined lessons learned are then uploaded to the ISAF CENTRIX database for dissemination across the Afghanistan Theater. A critical element of this process is the declassification of lessons learned that can be distributed on unclassified sites like CALL, AWG, MCCLL and Army Training Network (ATN). Each of these organizations also possesses the capability to produce unclassified TTP handbooks and tactical pocket references derived from these lessons learned. Consolidation of lessons learned

on the ISAF CENTRIX site gives all of the NATO and Coalition partners the ability to access and provide insightful contributions to these lessons learned.

Additionally, to facilitate effective dissemination, these analyzed lessons learned have to be placed on a fewer number of websites such as the JFCOM KNIFE, CALL and MCCLL, populated in the same format for both classified and unclassified, continuously updated, and metatagged by three distinct ways to facilitate data mining: subject, geographical location and organization submitting the data. For example, the subject search reference could be organized along COIN lines of operations like security where TTPs and “best practices” about focused targeting (FT) and fusion cells would be populated, or along the line of governance referencing the many different civilian organizations which BCTs should incorporate into planning and operations (ref. FM

3-24 Counterinsurgency.) BCT staffs can also search the secure data by the unit or organization which submitted the original information.

## RECOMENDATIONS

### ARFORGEN Training Recommendations & COIN Centers of Excellence

Training a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in accordance with the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle in preparation for a deployment to OEF is challenging due to time and resource constraints. A Brigade Commander and his staff are challenged with balancing and prioritizing training requirements IAW full spectrum doctrine presented in FM 3-07 Stability Operations and FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, against the ever changing threats and dynamics of the battlefields in the GWOT.




Figure 1. Flow of information from lesson learned to trained and ready COIN ground force.



Consolidation of analyzed lessons learned can assist LTG Rodriguez, Commanding General, USFOR-A, in issuing clear and concise monthly or quarterly training guidance for U.S. Army units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. Recently, USFOR-A made a decision to push all COIN training requirements from theater to CONUS and predeployment to ensure units arrive in theater prepared to rapidly assume responsibility for their areas of operations. A BCT commander's ability to plan a focused unit predeployment training timeline must include realistic CTC scenarios developed from the current operating environment, quarterly training guidance issued by USFOR-A J7 Training, and focused and coordinated pre-deployment advisory support (PDAS) from AWG, CAAT, JET, COIN Academy MTTs and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF). These are important enablers of the future success of the BCTs conducting COIN operations in Afghanistan. CAC and CALL must continue the development of dynamic, adaptive and innovative home station and CTC training opportunities that replicate the modern

battlefield. Linking battlefield observations and HST and CTC training through a process of disseminating real time, relevant, analyzed lessons learned via a user friendly web based tool is critical to reducing the workload of a BCT commander and staff during predeployment training.

The COIN Centers of Excellence, Fort Leavenworth and Afghanistan, are important aspects of integrating lessons learned into the institutional Army, i.e., TRADOC and CAC. CTC scenarios from the 1980s and 90s show that the Army failed to institutionalize lessons learned from past counterinsurgency wars, to translate these lessons learned into training requirements, and to disseminate them to successor Soldiers and force generators. To preclude each generation of fighting forces having to relearn these COIN lessons, the COIN Academies must have officers, non-commissioned officers and contractors who can present current COIN concepts in static classrooms and mobile training teams, as well as assist the operational research analysts in a fused analysis cell. The Army will be able to rapidly identify and integrate new lessons learned, TTPs or observations (see Fig. 1) into preparation and training by the generating force throughout the predeployment training cycle.

*MAJ Jim Glover is currently the Systems Integration Officer (FA50) at the Asymmetric Warfare Group, Fort Meade, Maryland. Prior to volunteering to serve the Army as a member of the AWG, he held a variety of assignments throughout the Field Artillery community. He can be reached at [jim.glover@us.army.mil](mailto:jim.glover@us.army.mil). ◉*

### ***On COIN and Asymmetric Warfare:***

*"The Army's experience at the height of the Indian wars is illustrative. The plains Indians were nomadic tribes who employed guerrilla tactics against Army units. The Indians' skill and mobility allowed them to strike swiftly and elude pursuit. Army units lacked the mobility and intelligence to force the Indians into a set-piece engagement where Federal forces could apply superior firepower. . . By substituting hardier mules for horses, [BG George Crook] could operate over extended distances in winter and, thus, was able to attack the Indians in their remote winter camps. With their camps destroyed, the warrior bands had little choice but to move to the reservations or starve." —MR, July-August 2003, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare*

## Contact Info



### FA 50 Personnel Development Office

Taylor Building

Chief, LTC Karen Eggert

703-602-7673

[karen.eggert@conus.army.mil](mailto:karen.eggert@conus.army.mil)

### Program Manager/Deputy Chief

Ms. Patsy Campbell

703-604-3146

[campbellpd@conus.army.mil](mailto:campbellpd@conus.army.mil)

### Program Manager/Training and Structure

Mike McDaniel

703-602-7230

[mike.mcdaniel1@us.army.mil](mailto:mike.mcdaniel1@us.army.mil)

### Strategic Comms

Mr. Bob Fleitz (MPRI)

703-602-7605

[robert.fleitz@conus.army.mil](mailto:robert.fleitz@conus.army.mil)

### HRC FA 50 Career Manager

LTC Al Gamble

703-325-8647

[alfonso.gamble@conus.army.mil](mailto:alfonso.gamble@conus.army.mil)

### Army Reserve Officers

OCAR, Chief, Force Programs

COL Eddie Rosado

703-601-0652

[eddie.rosado@ocar.army.pentagon.mil](mailto:eddie.rosado@ocar.army.pentagon.mil)

### National Guard Officers

Chief, Force Management

COL Mark Strong

703-607-7801

[mark.strong1@us.army.mil](mailto:mark.strong1@us.army.mil)

### CP 26 Careerists

Ms. Barbara Guy

703-695-5437

[barbara.guy@hqda.army.mil](mailto:barbara.guy@hqda.army.mil)

[www.fa50.army.mil](http://www.fa50.army.mil)


AKO: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/194547>

BCKS: <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/>

[CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=760078](http://CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=760078)

## WHAT IS IT?

*There were two correct responses to the last What Is It: Major Mike Gossett (FA50 at MANSCEN) and Mr. Mike Thyrring (DAPR-FDD) correctly identified the M1903 Springfield Rifle combination tool. MAJ Dan Curtis (FORSCOM) recognized September's picture of a "P-38" can opener. (There used to be six of these included in a case of C-Rations, along with the cigarettes.) This one should be pretty easy. Do the books lend a clue? Let us know, and win a subscription to the ORACLE!*





## FA 50 MILESTONES



### 2 NEW FA 50S

Welcome to MAJ Joshua Parrish and MAJ Michael Sturdivant, who were accessed into the FA by the recent Officer Service Management Pilot Program.

### FA 50 MAJOR MILESTONES

CONGRATULATIONS to following officers who were recently selected for promotion to Major. Well Done!

CPT(P) Jason L. Bartlett

CPT(P) Steven M. Kendall

CPT(P) Jerry D. McCulley

CPT(P) James R. Mijares

CPT(P) Peter K. Nunn

CPT(P) Kurt A. Pressell

CPT(P) Daniel J. Rogne

CPT(P) Robert J. Woodruff

And congratulations also to BG Robert ("Bo") Dyess on his selection and promotion.

### SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE (SSC)

Four FA50 officers were recently selected for Senior Service College (SSC) attendance in Academic Year 11-12. Congrats to:

LTC Sherry Berryhodne

LTC Phil Stanley (Army War College)

LTC Mike Musso (ICAF)

LTC James Bienlien (NWC)

### ★ FA 50 BULLETIN BOARD ★

**Summer 2010 PCS Slate**—LTC Gamble has completed the initial slate for Summer 2010 moves and will be contacting both Active Component and USAR-AGR officers over the upcoming weeks. (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/branches/officer/os/forcemngt/index.htm>)

**Class dates:**

**FA50 Qualification Course** dates for the next session are 13 September to 17 December 2010. Contact LTC Gamble (AC and AGR officers), COL Rosado (USAR), COL Strong (ARNG) or Ms Barbara Guy (CP26) about attendance.

**Advance Force Management Course (AFMC):**

*Class 10-04 8 Mar-3 Apr*

*Class 10-55-30 Apr*

*Class 10-06 3-28 May*

*Class 10-07 7 Jun - 2 Jul*

**Contact:** [alphonso.gamble@us.army.mil](mailto:alphonso.gamble@us.army.mil)

Phone: 703.325.8647; DSN 312.221.8647; Fax: x5668

Address: Commander, U.S. Army HR Command

AHRC-OPB-E (Attn: FA50)

Rm. 4N29, Hoffman II, 200 Stoval Street

Alexandria, VA 22332

## FA 50s Snapshots



*MG Tom Spoehr, the Director Force Development, is promoted by Mrs. Spoehr and their daughter, assisted by the G-8, LTG Bob Lennox.*



*A number of FA50s were awarded their Army Staff Badges at the March FD Town Hall meeting.*



*COL Sean Tuomey, near Bagram Airfield, in northern Afghanistan, standing next to a minefield left by the soviet army. The beautiful Hindu Kush mountains are in the far background.*



*Welcome Home to COL Sean Tuomey (FA50 PDO alumnus) and the 1398th Deployment Support Brigade (USAR).*



*Ray Diaz, FA50, is promoted to LTC at Bagram AB by COL Bert Gess, Commander CJTF Paladin*



*LTC Dee Sawyers meets one of her Iraqi counterparts."*