



The ORACLE

THE SUCCESS AND CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTING AGILE ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE PROCESSES

MAJ Jennifer D. St. Clair, FA50, DAMO-CIC

Lean and agile business principles and methods as we know them today present a relatively new paradigm for the Army in managing high-risk, time-sensitive, research and development-oriented acquisition of advanced technologies for the operational Soldier. The Army has achieved great success with Rapid Equipment Fielding (REF), the Agile Process and Network Integrated Evaluation (NIE) initiatives. It appears to be the ideal model for obtaining operational needs, gaining acquisition efficiency, customer satisfaction, continuous product improvement, reduction of fiscal waste, and the pursuit of Army modernization by responding to change using flexible technologies. As the Department of Defense (DOD) enters a period of severe budget constraints, “agile” methods more than ever will allow us to acquire needed operational capabilities with reduced resources. This discussion paper will provide an overview of how the Army is implementing agile methods to improve its business processes.



What is Agile Business Methodology?

The corporate arena has been using agile business practices for the past two decades, allowing them to be more effective and responsive to changing circumstances. Business agility is the power of an organization to find

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The ORACLE

COVER STORY

The Success and Challenge Of Implementing Agile Acquisition Life Cycle Processes
by MAJ Jennifer D. St. Clair

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WHATZIT?

Two Books



BG DYESS

From the **EXECUTIVE AGENT**



As many of you know, the Army is transforming its current acquisition methods through the “Agile” Process. The objective is to improve efficiency and effectiveness, reducing the amount of time and resources necessary to respond to rapid changes in Soldier requirements due to current operations, new information technology, and changes in force structure. A key component of the Agile Process is the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE), a semi-annual event conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, N.M., to assess potential network capabilities in a robust operational environment and determine whether they perform as needed, conform to the network architecture and are interoperable with existing systems. One of our newest FA50 officers, Major Jennifer St. Clair, has written a very good article for this issue about Agile Process and NIE. One of her comments is that we need to tie the Agile process more closely to JCIDS. Take a look.

As we get closer to ending operations in Afghanistan and drawing down the force, we also need to think hard about our long-range investments. What will our Army really need, in terms of people, equipment and systems, to make the transition to Army 2020? Many of you are intimately involved, and decisions over the next several months will guide those discussions.

LTC Keith Rivers is going to provide some “health of the functional area” information soon. Let me assure you that even though we will take our share of the coming reductions, Force Managers are still the go-to experts on building an Army and “taking one down,” as LTG Trefry used to say.

This business isn’t going to get easier, if anything it’s getting even more complex. But this is our job. I want to thank each of you and your families for your service and your efforts every day on our Army’s behalf. Keep it up.

- BG Bo Dyess



From the PDO CHIEF



LTC RIVERS

Teammates FY12 turned out to be a very good year for the Force Management community.

We were able to assess 16 new officers into the FA in September, and provided professional development opportunities to 51 officers, which includes 49 Q Course graduates and 4 officers in graduate school, as well as sending an officer to UNC for a 5 week broadening experience and a senior FA50 to the Kellogg Business School at Northwestern University. Thirty Force Managers attended the Senior Force Managers Seminar, and twenty-five FA50s were either promoted or are now promotable, which attests to their strengths during a time of reduced promotion rates. FY12 also brought some efforts that challenge and will continue to challenge the FA. The Officer Grade Plate Review targeted 18 LTC positions across the force for roll down to CPT and the elimination of one COL authorization. OGP final decisions are still pending, however there has been a team effort to minimize impacts to ensure we maintain a healthy career field.

As many of you know, we are updating DA PAM 600-3 to include details of our CSL program, better define FA50 key and key developmental billets, and to clarify the requirements for AGR officer Q Course attendance. A review of our FA50 POI and a Q-course analysis to gain college credit is planned

for next summer (we continue to work to pull this effort to the left). Related to that subject, this link (http://staging2.acenet.edu/programs/ccrs/adult_learners/#S) contains a list of colleges and universities that will give some post graduate credit for military schooling. This is done on a case by case basis, though; the key is taking your transcript to either the university representative or to the education center on post. The local education center representative can assist with any and all colleges and universities in the area.

You also need to know about the recent DA decisions on “competitive ILE” beginning with YG2004 officers. Optimizing Intermediate Level Education is an important component of Army efforts to strengthen Leader Development and the Army Profession as we move toward the Army of 2020. It will provide a tailored, high-quality education for all officers and maximize Army investment to achieve the highest quality, most professional officer corps. Projected average allocations for the entire active officer population (per year group) over the next 5 years are 56 percent residence at Leavenworth, 34 percent at the satellites and 10 percent by Distance Learning (DL). Most FA50 will attend at a satellite location. If not selected for a resident course, for whatever reasons, DL is your option.

In the coming weeks the FA50 PDO will provide the field an update on the current state of the functional area, which will include our goals and vision for FY13/14 and a tentative OPD/ PD schedule.

As always we welcome all comments and recommendations to improve and continue to have a viable career field. In that vein, I want to start a new feature in the newsletter called “Ask the Leadership.” Send me your questions or comments, I’ll get them to one of our FA50 GOs, and post the responses in the next *Oracle* or perhaps even on the Facebook page.

Thanks for all you do. Keep it up.

- LTC (P) Keith Rivers
Chief, PDO

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FA50



THE OPERATIONAL NEEDS STATEMENT: KEY LESSONS LEARNED

By: COL Robert Hughes, FA50

After more than a decade of continuous combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the Army's institutional processes have endured significant stresses and ultimately proven their value. The Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process is one such example. Although the ONS process has experienced some criticism along the way, it serves as a prime example of an institutional process that continues to support meeting the Warfighter's urgent operational needs while making in-stride changes to improve overall functionality and meet increased demand and utilization.

Used relatively infrequently prior to 9/11, the ONS has become the "tool of choice" to provide timely solutions for validated urgent operational needs requested by deployed or deploying forces. As Force Managers and experts on the ONS process, it is imperative for us to capture the key lessons learned about this important process so that we are better postured to respond to urgent Warfighter requests and more effectively manage the ONS process in the future. While there are numerous lessons learned, the following macro level lessons capture the overarching thoughts that must become institutional knowledge within our community of Force Management professionals.

Force Managers play a key role in educating the field and minimizing misguided ONS

Responsiveness and transparency are key attributes of the ONS process that provide operational commanders confidence in this tool. With in-depth knowledge of this process, Force Managers play a key role in minimizing misguided or errant ONS by educating commanders, staffs, and others about legitimate ONS submissions and ensuring proper review and validation. While the ONS has proven its worth as a versatile tool to provide needed capabilities to deployed and deploying forces, over time a loss of process rigor occurred allowing numerous ONS submissions into the system that were really standard requests for equipment, ammunition, or other routine supply actions. Timely solutions to many of these requests could have occurred had the request moved more appropriately through standard supply channels or other established processes. A major consequence of these errant ONS submissions is saturation of the ONS system at the higher echelons that review, validate, and approve operational needs. Saturation degrades the ONS process as significant time is spent on reviewing submissions that do not meet the intent, criteria, and standards of an ONS. Some of the most notable second- and third-order effects of "ONS Saturation" include more pressing ONS being lost in the system, units deploying without training on

ONS Definition: An ONS is a request for a timely solution, addressing an operational capability gap, required for accomplishment of urgent submissions that standard Army processes or procedures cannot provide.

requested capabilities, deployed units not receiving capabilities in time to support ongoing operations and commanders' overall loss of confidence in the ONS process. Recognizing that there are always exceptions and that "creative force management" is sometimes necessary, Force Managers must use their expertise to influence and educate the operational users and actively re-direct misguided ONS submissions to more appropriate established processes.

Force Managers must proactively facilitate rotational unit ONS coordination



The challenges associated with rotational equipping in dynamic operational environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan are numerous and often complex. One such challenge is the management of ONS between deploying and redeploying units. As units replace each other on the battlefield, exchanging current ONS information, including equipment received as a result of an approved ONS, between the incoming and outgoing unit and Force Managers at higher echelons is essential. Stovepiped and uncoordinated rotational unit ONS submissions further exacerbate the "ONS Saturation" mentioned previously. In many cases, deploying units tended to hedge against uncertainty by developing and submitting numerous ONS in anticipation of need and without knowledge of the capabilities provided once deployed. Collaborative reviews and information exchanges develop a common picture, reduce duplication of effort, and minimize unnecessary costs by identifying completed ONS transferring to the deploying unit, providing an updated status for ONS pending validation, as well as identifying

withdrawn or vetoed ONS. This practice will also inform incoming commanders of additional training requirements due to pending or completed ONS actions and enable new equipment training prior to deployment. A technique that worked well was the use of Pre-Deployment VTCs. Pre-Deployment VTC's with Force Provider, Army Forces (ARFOR), Army service Component Command (ASCC) and unit participation yielded positive results in terms of reducing unnecessary ONS submissions from units preparing to deploy and by establishing a collaborative forum for discussion and clarification of specific ONS. Many of these VTCs were held in conjunction with other established VTC forums to minimize the need for additional VTCs. Furthermore, Pre-Deployment VTCs improved overall transparency in the ONS process and facilitated the education of deploying units about legitimate ONS submissions. While pre-deployment collaboration should occur early and frequently throughout the preparation phase, the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) between the deploying and deployed unit is a key event which should serve as a focal point for coordination in many areas including ONS submissions. Participation in the PDSS outbrief by Force Managers from the Force Provider, ARFOR, and ASCC greatly facilitated the mitigation of ONS related issues prior to unit transition.

Force Managers must lead ONS Reconciliation

As the overall volume of ONS submissions significantly increased over time and the number of ONS with multiple Line Item Numbers (LINs) became more prevalent and increased complexity, the need for formal reconciliation, at multiple echelons, became necessary to manage the great volume of ONS submissions. More rigorous management was needed to review the status of newly submitted ONS routinely, provide updated information of pre-existing ONS, clarify partial sourcing solutions, and facilitate discussion about vetoed ONS or ONS requiring additional



specific dialogue. Participants in the reconciliation varied by echelon but always included as many stakeholders as possible. As an example, a collaborative reconciliation in Afghanistan by Regional Command (RC) facilitated by Force Managers at USFOR-A and ARCENT was instrumental in establishing a ground truth baseline of ONS requests that occurred after the surge of additional forces and significant changes in unit task organization and battlespace. Additionally, although property accountability is not specifically a Force Management function, reconciliation also serves as a means to update Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) property books, increasing equipment visibility for deploying units and further reducing unnecessary ONS submissions. Ultimately, the results of this comprehensive reconciliation effort enabled Force Managers to more effectively and efficiently manage deployed unit ONS submissions and further increased responsiveness and transparency in the ONS process.



Force Managers are critical to improving the ONS Process

Established Institutional Army processes always have room for improvement and the ONS process is no different. As the Army's ONS process experts, Force Managers should routinely look for areas of the process that require change to improve overall process performance. With the development of the ONS Playbook, the Army has already taken a significant step forward in addressing specific areas that required modification, clarification or additional guidance. An end-to-end review of the ONS process was conducted resulting in numerous changes or modifications to improve overall process performance with significant participation from the Force Management community and experts

in Lean Six Sigma techniques. Many areas, such as clarifying roles and responsibilities at each echelon, explaining the difference between an ONS and a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS) and making required field or data entry changes within the Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) tool, were relatively simple and could be implemented quickly. Other challenges such as improving the linkage of ONS solutions with logistics systems for improved in-transit visibility and property book accountability required more extensive work to develop necessary solutions. Perhaps, the most noteworthy outcome was the rapid development and publishing of "The ONS Playbook," which serves as a practical "How To" guide that provides clarifying information on the key components and procedures associated with the ONS process. As a result of this focused and collaborative effort, "The ONS Playbook" serves as official interim guidance for the ONS process until incorporation into the next AR 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination revision.

A Better Process

Without doubt, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have tested and stressed the Army's ability to rapidly meet urgent operational needs. The ONS, as a Force Management tool, has proven its versatility and value as a means to provide warfighting forces needed capabilities for operational missions. Like many other established processes, the ONS process is not perfect and must adapt to meet the dynamic conditions of the current operational environments. Certainly, Force Managers have learned many lessons about the use of ONS over the last decade and have played a leading role in influencing change to this critical process. The Force Management community listened to input from the field and worked collaboratively with other functional stakeholders to identify areas requiring change and we developed solutions for implementation to make the process better. These important lessons and others from our recent experiences must be captured and archived for future reference.

An article about JUONS lessons learned is a worthy follow-on discussion...

Professional Development Sources

Warfighting Capabilities Determination, AR 71-9, Dec 28, 2009

“How The Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook” 2011-2012

“The ONS Playbook,” 18 May 11

DOD Should Have A More Comprehensive Approach For Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs, GAO Report-11-417T, Mar 1, 2011

Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs, DoDD 5000.71, Aug 24,2012





JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS – STATE REDESIGN:

Force Management Frontier?

By: LTC Mike Yocum, USAMAA

Introduction

Force Managers are increasing their involvement in organizational design through their expanded presence in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the United States Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA). These entities play key roles in organizational design and development - TRADOC for the Operating Force (OF), USAMAA for the

Generating Force (GF). Force managers assigned to these organizations will face a rapidly evolving organizational design environment created partly by fiscal circumstances and partly by planning and development of requirements to meet emerging strategy.

Increasing resource constraints will inevitably increase requirements scrutiny, and by extension organizational design, particularly in the GF. Also, the Army

Operating Concept 2016-2028 (AOC) envisions enhanced capabilities for Army organizations, particularly HQs. As the AOC states: “[in the future] Army Headquarters at theater, corps, and division-level [will be] capable...of serving as a joint task force (JF) or joint force land component command headquarters.” And: “[these commands will] ensure the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national efforts”.

These seemingly disparate “future” trends in fact have an existing precursor: the National Guard (NG) project to convert its state-level HQs into a single joint entity almost perfectly embodies the future force design environment as described above. As such, it can provide some insights into the future of organizational design Army wide.

This project, known as “JFHQ-State Redesign,” will result in an organization similar to a Division HQ in its command structure and responsibilities, with capabilities like those the AOC attributes to future Division HQs. JFHQ-State consists in part of an Army National Guard (ARNG) table of distribution and allowance. As a TDA-based operational HQs, it is an excellent example of GF and OF mission “blurring,” the term TRADOC PAM 525-8-1 uses to identify the increased blending of GF and OF roles.

This article outlines the organizational design elements of the JFHQ-State Redesign project conducted under the auspices of the ARNG G-3 Force Management Division (ARNG G-3 FM). It describes some key lessons learned and connects them to the larger themes outlined in the AOC and our potential future

force structure environment. Read on for a glimpse of the future.


Conversion to JFHQ-State

The NG State-level HQs are commanded by a Major General, the Adjutant General (TAG). Before 2003, the ARNG and Air National Guard (ANG) maintained separate HQs at the state level. The ARNG HQ title then was “State Area Readiness Command (STARC).”

However, the ARNG HQs has an operational focus which has become more important over the past several years, very similar to a Division HQ in scope in that the ARNG HQs provides mission command for state air and land forces in a state. They also perform many functions typical of installation and training support organizations elsewhere in the Army, as reflected in the earlier STARC title.

The resulting organizations are complex and multi-faceted. They vary in size from about 180 to 350 force structure authorizations and reflect, in size and composition, the force structure diversity of the 54 entities with NG presence, the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam. For simplicity’s sake this article will refer to “the 54” collectively hereafter as “states.”

Transition to a single state-level joint headquarters in each of the 54 states began in earnest in 2003. Then, the Chief National Guard Bureau (CNGB) issued guidance based on a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) memo that outlined initiatives to enhance



NG command and control. Several events, such as lessons learned in the responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, and the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) spurred these initiatives.

One goal of these initiatives was to create a joint headquarters at state level that would have more robust capability for operational mission command and an enhanced capability for interagency, intergovernmental, and federal military coordination, much as the AOC outlines future force capabilities. The conversion of the NGB to a joint entity with 4-Star General leadership also grew from these initiatives, and increasing NG jointness enhanced officer professional development by providing more joint assignment opportunities.

In response to CNGB guidance, NG force managers developed and implemented interim doctrine and the supporting organizational structures needed to transition STARCs and ANG HQs into a single joint HQ, JFHQ-State. A 2006 report to the President on lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina response (commonly called the “Townsend Report”) validated the efficacy of the JFHQ-State concept, then early in implementation, and urged its further development.

The Department of Defense formally approved a final JFHQ-State concept in January 5, 2011, by publishing Department of Defense Directive (DODI) 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQ-State). The DODI authorized JFHQ-State as a joint headquarters consisting of a joint staff and supporting ARNG and ANG staffs. The DODI gave JFHQ-State a much more operational focus than the earlier STARCs and ANG HQs, to include requiring the capability to command and control joint task forces.

Force Management Considerations

JFHQ-State Redesign impacts over a third of the ARNG generating force, approximately 12,400 force structure authorizations, as each of the 54 HQs has between 180 and 350 authorizations. Any proposed force structure changes must address the concerns of state civilian and military leaders, a powerful set of stakeholders who have legal authorities (much outlined in the Constitution) in some cases equal to that of the Federal Government in determining how their military forces are arrayed. These facts had implications on project development, data management, and implementation pace.

ARNG G3 FM addressed three goals during its portion of the redesign project: develop updated personnel requirements in accordance with Army validation standards, to include an updated organizational structure, personnel grades and duties; develop updated “doctrine” (STARCs operations were governed by an NG Regulation); and examine potential authorization realignments among the states based on updated requirements. This last was a key issue among state stakeholders since many felt that personnel authorization misalignments existed.

For TDA units like a JFHQ-State, data for all these goals is normally developed under manpower validation protocols as outlined in AR 570-4, Manpower Management, and AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies. These protocols center on the results of manpower requirements studies and models generated by command manpower requirements organizations, in this case the ARNG G1 Manpower Requirements Branch, and approved by USAMAA.

Although requirements development and validation efforts were ongoing, it was clear at the outset

of the project that completion would take several years. However, key stakeholders desired progress sooner, not only to address the authorization realignment, but also to address horizontal and vertical functional integration as outlined in AR 71-32. The increased focus on Homeland operations as reflected in the redesign of NG HQs and the establishment of USNORTHCOM placed a priority on developing standardized, functionally integrated organizational HQs in each of the states that external staffs could “plug into” seamlessly.

Project Managers divided the redesign into two phases. Phase I, which concluded in 2010, concentrated on developing an updated organizational structure and personnel grades and duties while working within existing personnel requirements and authorizations. Phase I data was generated primarily by a series of stakeholder working groups that developed a standard structure to meet JFHQ-State mission requirements and facilitate transition from existing state HQ structures. Phase I culminated with a command implementation plan submitted and approved in accordance with Army command plan guidance.

Phase II began in parallel with Phase I and is still underway as of this writing. It focuses on implementing the results of validated manpower model and study data and articulating this data to senior leadership for potential decisions on authorization realignment. Phase II will end with completed JFHQ-State “doctrinal” products, as of this writing an organization and functions manual. Pending leader decisions on requirement implementation, Phase II may generate a concept plan.

Keys to success: portents of the future?

While all the details of project implementation are beyond the scope of this article, three key lessons learned could prove useful for force managers and the

Army as a whole in aligning training, operations, and support to address future force management.

Strategic Communication

Establishing unity of effort among the joint stakeholders in this project proved paramount to its progress. Key to achieving unity of effort was effective strategic communication.



Joint force management issues faced in this project included redesigning 54 of the most senior NG HQs, reallocating resources between joint and service staffs in these HQs, and potentially moving force structure authorizations among states. These issues generated strong contingents of stakeholders with often divergent perspectives. Transparent, clear (easily understood outside the force management community) strategic communication became vital.

Although this might seem “basic good staff work,” in this joint force management environment effective strategic communication proved the central driver of progress. Joint, ARNG, and ANG managers had to speak with one voice to external stakeholders, many of whom were unfamiliar with force management processes, to ensure all understood the complexity of the project, timelines for completion, and the effects of decisions in one area on progress in other areas. Although force managers typically face these issues



wherever they work, they become acute in the joint environment where issues are “multi-dimensional.”

To develop this single voice, force management stakeholders, which included service and joint personnel and force structure staff members, invested considerable effort “behind the scenes” to develop a unified voice on project milestones and status. Developing this common voice was an important education process in itself, as participants had to achieve a common understanding of each other’s processes and timelines, and put them into a common “language” easily understood by them and external stakeholders.

Enhancing standardization of widely disparate force structure (“menu system”)

One of the issues in this project, and an issue faced in other entities comprising the GF, was how to “standardize” organizational structures among 54 HQs that over time had morphed to reflect significantly disparate state missions and force structure. No JFHQ-State would ever be precisely like another in terms of personnel authorization numbers, even with validated manpower requirements data, due to overall force structure and differences in ranks and military occupational specialties (MOS) available in each state.

However, it was initially clear functions and capability could be standardized. The challenge then became how to articulate this standard structure while still allowing state staffs the flexibility to address the structure within their available resources.

The solution arrived at was to build a “menu.” This menu, which was significantly larger than even the highest authorization levels present in JFHQ-State, had a standard organizational structure, military occupational specialties (MOS), and grades. State leadership could then “spend” their existing requirements and authorizations within this structure to

configure their JFHQ-State with some flexibility to address state priorities.

Although a dangerous analogy, this system is akin to having a large table of organization and equipment (TOE), in this case represented by the menu, which was only partially populated to create a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), in this case represented by the final TDA. The analogy is dangerous because the “menu” is not intended to drive personnel requirements (unlike a TOE), but does provide a structure, standardized to line level, that allows states some flexibility for utilizing existing authorizations.

Since the TOE/MTOE construct doesn’t exist in the GF, managers formally implemented the menu as a highly modified standards of grade. The menu exists as Table 11-27 of the MOS “Smart Book,” an on-line database comprising a part of DA PAM 611-21. The menu system demonstrates a viable pathway for increasing standardization among other GF entities which have similar standard missions, but don’t require the same resourcing levels.

Data Collection and Management

The data management issues faced in this project could also have broader implications for data management in joint and generating forces. The fundamental process of data management involved collecting TDA personnel requirements and business rules for their application from multiple joint and service sources, providing a mechanism for transitioning existing TDA authorizations to reflect the new requirements, and providing state-level managers the ability to manage this change.

The intent was to accomplish all this while enabling national-level force managers the ability to change business rules and provide quality control prior to

submitting information for upload into the Force Management System Web Site (FMS Web). Also, in matters of strategic communication, state stakeholders, many outside the force management community, wanted a degree of transparency on how requirements data was applied to their particular JFHQ-State versus other JFHQ-States, i.e., what were the underpinning calculations and data that generated a particular requirement for them?

In terms of raw numbers, this entailed disseminating over 70,000 requirements data elements for state managers to convert into draft TDAs representing over 12,400 authorizations all while maintaining the utmost quality control to ensure no one violated Army policies for TDA management. Initially, managers accomplished all this by brute force (spreadsheet), which proved barely tenable. At one point this method entailed people checking over 12,400 authorizations line by line. The volume and variety of data generated in the project rapidly dictated more efficient methods.

The response was to build “in house” a relatively sophisticated Access® database that addressed data management issues. This distributable database allows state-level managers to take existing TDAs (preloaded into the database) and redistribute them into updated organizational structures in accordance with business rules and requirements data provided by national-level managers. The database displays these business rules and provides validation dashboards and reports that allow managers at all levels quickly to identify any errors or deviations from business rules as authorizations are realigned. The database can then output a draft TDA in a format suitable for upload into FMS web by TDA managers. The database is very “user friendly,” making training requirements minimal.

As the Army focus on GF requirements increases, it is not difficult to envision, based on the lessons learned from this project, areas for improvement of current

force management data systems to better manage the GF. These include providing the capability for force managers to apply standard business rules across multiple organizations, or to explore alternatives based on various courses of action.

More robust data management capabilities like this could enable quicker, higher quality decision making, and could possibly prove cost beneficial in terms of manpower needed to manage the GF and more precise management of overall personnel requirements.

Conclusion

Force managers are moving into new arenas of organizational design, and these arenas are changing rapidly even as this happens, with a new emphasis on joint organizational design taking place in the backdrop of a resource constrained environment. JFHQ-State Redesign, which has taken place under these same conditions, provides insight into broader implications for organizational design in the future and for force managers supporting organizational design.

The force manager of the future must be proficient not only in Army force management procedures but those of sister services and the joint community. Regardless of the broader future of Army force structure, increased emphasis on GF requirements and authorizations dictate an increased understanding of how this force structure is managed, and how processes, to include automated processes, can potentially be modified to hone GF missions and requirements.



cost efficiencies rapidly in response to changes in the occupational environment by adapting goods and services to meet customer demands and taking advantage of human resources. In traditional linear “waterfall” methods, development teams only have one chance to get each aspect of a project right. Whereas in an agile paradigm, every aspect of development – including requirements, design, demonstration, testing, and feedback – is continually revisited throughout the life cycle. However, there is a difference between “doing agile” and “being agile.” The real agility of adopting an Agile Process is not about the product delivered, but in seeking to change what the organization values, measures, and delivers (i.e., placing value on collaboration, personal interactions, and adjustments to change).

Why is the Army moving toward Agile methods?



For decades, the DOD fundamental belief was that you must apply rigid manufacturing principles to acquisition and systems engineering to have successful weapon systems. Current

acquisition, testing, evaluation, and fielding processes typically take several years to complete, which is years longer than the technology maturation cycle. Hence, systems being fielded are not benefitting from the latest mature technologies nor are they responding to the latest Army needs. Consistent with National Defense Authorization Act §804 legislation and the OSD Report to Congress, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) directed the Army Staff (ARSTAF) to implement agile business solutions that would address these shortcomings and bring efficiency, effectiveness, and affordability to the otherwise untenable processes. With the adoption of the Agile Process, Army leadership anticipates the result to be improved effectiveness in the assessment and acquisition of capability solutions.

Rapid Equipping Force (REF)

The Army started implementing agile business practices over the past decade with Rapid Equipping Force (REF) initiatives in support of OEF/OIF. REF has served to equip operational commanders with commercial-off-the-shelf and government-off-the-shelf solutions to increase effectiveness, reduce risk, and insert future force technologies. REF has acted as a surrogate to validate concepts and speed capabilities to Soldiers and assess Army business practices, desired capabilities, and acquisition techniques to effect institutional Army change. REF initiatives have been the catalyst for bringing the military, industry, academia, and the science community together for existing and emerging technologies and getting these technologies to the Soldier much faster than traditional requirements and acquisition processes. However, fielding warfighter capabilities through responsive business practices has a downside. In some instances, combatant commanders felt the burden of rapid fielding through of the lack training and sustainment of these new technologies. As a means to make improvements and take the burden off commanders, the Army would



send its matured technology to Fort Bliss and practice the integration piece in an operational unit to work out the bugs, before fielding it.

The Agile Process and Network Integration Evaluation

The Army recently transformed its current acquisition methods by implementing a seven-phase Agile Process, which includes the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) at Ft. Bliss, Texas. The objective is to improve efficiency and effectiveness by reducing the time and resources necessary to respond to the rapid changes in Soldier requirements associated with current operations, emergent information technology and modifications to the Army Force Structure.

Through the Agile Process, the Army assesses capability gaps, rapidly forms requirements, solicits mature industry solutions and performs laboratory and field evaluations to inform acquisition decisions better.

The NIE is an Army hosted six-week event conducted twice a year. It is a Soldier-driven evaluation designed to integrate and mature Army capabilities and the tactical network. Its primary goal is to conduct parallel system tests of Army programs, with a secondary goal of evaluating capabilities of the current, theater provided, and emerging networks. Before the evaluation event, the Army integrates Warfighting capabilities using a full Brigade Combat Team to assess both network and non-network capabilities, to determine their implications across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF). The NIE assesses these potential Warfighting capabilities, with much focus on Network capabilities in the early NIE rotations, in a robust operational environment to determine whether they perform as needed, conform to the Network architecture, and are interoperable with existing systems. The NIE ensures the potential capabilities satisfy functional requirements of the force, and relieves the end user of the technology integration burden.

The ultimate end state of the Agile Process/NIE is to procure and align systems that meet pre-defined operational needs or gaps, and demonstrate success through Soldier evaluations during the NIE. Those needs are identified within TRADOC and fed to the acquisition community to solicit and exercise potential solutions. To move a potential solution forward, it must be endorsed by TRADOC at the conclusion of an NIE event. TRADOC and the Army acquisition community must ensure those solutions are aligned with a newly developed or pre-existing requirement for the materiel enterprise to conduct any procurement activities within the rules of the Defense Acquisition System (DoD 5000.01/.02). This

alignment and requirement identification begins at the start of the Agile Process when gaps are identified and potential solutions are submitted for laboratory assessment.

Testing and Evaluation (T&E) Community in Support of the Agile Process

By employing the Agile Process, the Army has successfully brought together the test, acquisition, and doctrine communities to evaluate Warfighting capabilities in a completely integrated fashion. A laboratory “federation” comprised of Army assessment, development, and integration laboratories at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and the Detroit Arsenal, Warren, Michigan, supports the integration, verification, and development of a final Capability Set solution. These Army laboratories, in conjunction with the Central Technical Support Facility (CTSF), validate potential solutions prior to fielding. For the T&E community, the Agile Process has taken their responsibility beyond the management of cost, performance, and schedule of a single product, to responsibility for testing the end-to-end integration of hardware and software systems in the operational unit.



Agile Process Benefits and Recommended Improvements

To date, the Agile Process initiatives have proved that we are implementing a new process for all the right reasons. NIEs conducted in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 cost \$298 million, and projected FY12 costs are \$276 million. Costs will continue to decrease over time, with FY13 projections at \$214 million. The DCS G-8's target estimate in POM 14-18 is \$200 million per year, plus \$25 million per year to allow the Army to procure capabilities proven during the NIEs.



As stated earlier, the benefits of the NIE far exceed testing and evaluation costs. System integration on 2/1 Armored Division platforms has helped developers realize that our Platform and Network Modernization Strategies are not synchronized. Planned power system limitations (size, weight, power, and cooling (SWAP-C)) impact future fielding strategies at company grade levels. The original WIN-T Increment 2 fielding plan was on HMMWVs, not Fighting Vehicles. The lessons learned from the NIE construct have helped the Army avoid approximately \$6 billion in planned spending and reallocate resources to other priorities.

In a decade of American conflict in the Middle East, REF and Agile methods have empowered the Army to deploy impressive technologies to Soldiers in record time allowing them to be extremely effective on the battlefield. However, as with any new process, the Agile Process has room for improvement. As a near-term objective to gain increased return on investment from the NIE, the Army can improve in two ways:

1) The Army should align capability gaps and solution candidates as closely as possible to existing Joint Capability Integration and Development System approved requirements documentation as criteria for consideration to participate at an NIE. This provides the most optimal case in which an existing program already contains the requirement for the system. Regardless of whether the requirement is a Threshold (T) or Objective (O), minimal requirements work is necessary for the Army to apply funds to the candidate system. In this situation, a candidate system is then aligned under an existing acquisition program for sponsorship and follow on milestones and decision points are determined at the stage in which the candidate system has entered the acquisition process.

2) Improving the identification of contractual and legal aspects of providing for agile acquisition. The number one question asked by people about the NIE

is: “What is the Army going to buy?” This has become a great concern for both leaders and industry. Companies are nervous because they are spending millions of dollars bringing equipment and staff to Fort Bliss demonstrating their system readiness for weeks. They worry their investment might not pay off and want the Army to prove that programs of record are not sacred and that challengers have a fair shot. “It might take only six months for the Army to evaluate and decide it wants to buy a particular system, but it takes 30 months to award a contract.” Improved oversight of contracts throughout the entire Agile Process is necessary. Existing contracting policy, rules, regulations, and procedures inhibit the realization of the full benefits of the Agile Process.

Conclusion

The Agile Process is a fundamental change in how the Army will deliver capabilities to the total Army. This is the first step in a long-term effort to reshape Army and DOD processes. Through the Agile Process, the Army has successfully brought together the requirements, acquisition, and testing communities in one place to leverage industry innovation. Agile methods have made possible the rapid procurement and fielding of advanced technology systems that would be unachievable by traditional acquisition strategies. However, the boundaries of requirements, acquisition, and contracting regulations do have limitations as to how “agile” the Army can really be.

The SSFP Fellowship

By: CPT Bradley Denisar

Take every chance you get for a broadening opportunity; you never know what you will learn. One of the ideas I implemented into my basketball program came from a football coach.

– Roy Williams, UNC head Basketball coach, who visited the Fellows during class

The Army provides a broadening opportunity for younger officers, specifically Captains, called the UNC-IDB Strategic Studies Fellowship Program (SSFP), spearheaded by The Institute of Defense and Business (IDB) and in collaboration with the UNC Partnership for National Security, Indiana University, the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, and the Triangle Institute for Security. The SSFP is designed to expand the mind, challenge personal views, and place students in situations outside of their normal comfort zones.

The Army Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs believe a flexible, educated, and experienced officer corps will help the Army in resolving current and future challenges. The SSFP aligns precisely with this goal and will enable these Captains, today and throughout their career, to deal with novel and ever-changing challenges.

Top professors in their fields, in collaboration with top military officers, teach classes centered around a multitude of strategic issues. Classes focus on national strategies with supplemental classes on other areas such as business negotiations, problem solving, diplomacy, and storytelling.

Specifically, each week is devoted to a distinct focus: Week 1-Foundation and Context; Week 2-Strategy; Week 3-Communication; Week 4-Business and Technology; and Week 5-Change and Action.

In general, all Fellows are required to give briefings, formulate and defend opinions, respond to daily blog questions, read a variety of articles, legislation, books and periodicals, participate in a staff ride, and complete a capstone project.

The SSFP capstone project challenged each group to analyze a strategic issue, which culminated all SSFP

lessons into one final assignment. My group, Dr. Green Thumb scoped our strategic issue to, "What role should the US Army contribute to the counter narcotics agenda in North America?" The capstone project demanded each team to research, formulate, present, and make and defend our final recommendation on our project.

After the final presentation, each graduate receives a certificate of completion from UNC and IDB and earns three graduate academic credit hours from Indiana University's Kelley School of Business.

Twenty-five captains, representative of all branches and functional areas, were brought together at UNC-Chapel Hill's campus for this five-week summer program. They were selected for their unique perspectives, experiences, and expertise. I am honored to say that I am a graduate from the SSFP, the MVP for our group and an alumnus of IDB.

I would encourage officers to look into IDB's additional educational programs and spread the word to other deserving Captains, as the SSFP program is tentatively scheduled to expand to 50 fellows next summer. Branch managers will have additional information on the SSFP.

Captain Denisar is a newly-designated FA50. He is currently in the Q Course at AFMS, en route to the ARSTAF G-3/5/7.



AFMS Update

Army Equipping Enterprise System

By: Mr. Joe Albert

A February 2012 Out-of-Cycle (OOC) Structure and Composition System (SACS) Total Army Equipping Distribution Program (TAEDP) update is now available in the Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S). This version updates initial on-hand and projected new deliveries but uses the same SACS. At this time it is not known when the next version of SACS will be released so this file is an update of those items that have changed significantly since the last SACS TAEDP update in February 2012. Specifically,

the February 2012 FEB12 OOC SACS TAEDP v2 file uses: 1) the February 2012 OOC SACS file, the 23 July 2012 Logistics Integrated Warehouse (LIW) on-hand position; 2) equipment deliveries from Equipping the Force (EquipFor) and the Force Development Investment Information System (FDIIS) Logistics Quantity Amount (LQA) as of 23 July 2012; and 3) the Dynamic Army Resourcing Priority List (DARPL) update as of August 2011.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S)

Home | Reports Directory | Help & Training | Calendar | Contacts About | Logout

- » Staff Books
 - * Selections are defaulted to the ACTIVE DATASET
 - APS
 - BRANCH
 - COMPO
 - DIV-BDE
 - COMMAND
 - TYPCO
 - FORCE STRUCTURE
 - INSTALLATION
- » Expert System
 - BI Tool
 - Expert System
- » AE2S Systems
 - FDIIS
 - CEaVa
- » Support

» Active Dataset

SELECT ACTIVE DATASET
The selected DATASET will be the active dataset for the Staff & Functional Books

FEB12 OOC SACS TAEDP V2

AS OF DATES:

Force Structure: 2012-02-29

Equipment OH: 2012-07-23

Personnel Assigned:

» What's New

2012-08-09: DATA SET: A FEB12 Out-of-Cycle (OOC) SACS TAEDP update is now available in AE2S. This version updates initial on-hand and projected new deliveries but uses the same SACS. At this time it is not known when the next version of SACS will be released so this file is an update of those items that have changed significantly since the last SACS TAEDP update in FEB 12. Specifically, the FEB12 OOC SACS TAEDP v2 file uses: 1) the February 2012 OOC SACS file, the 23 JUL 12 LIW on-hand position; 3) equipment deliveries from EquipFor and FDIIS LQA as of 23 JUL 12; and the DARPL update as of August 2011.

- » Functional Books
 - * Selections are defaulted to the ACTIVE DATASET
 - Equipment Books
- » EQUIPFOR
 - EQUIPFOR Home
 - EQ-4 Rolled/Exempt LIN
 - HQDA LIN List
- » Executive Views
 - Transparency Files
 - SECOP
 - Spreadsheet Tool
- » Reports
 - Reports Directory
 - AAO
 - Reports Mgt System

ATTENTION: Equipment ratings presented on NIPR AE2S are NOT based on AR 220-1... MORE

HRC Update



FA50 Assignments Newsletter



October 2012

Team,

This month's newsletter is dedicated to professional military education (PME), based on CSA mandated changes to ILE/CGSC and SSC policies. If you have any concerns please contact me at Jamie.garcia@us.army.mil or (502) 613-6681. Have a great Fall and please remember our comrades in harm's way!

“Army Strong!” —Jamie

ILE is reconfiguring to the previous competitively boarded model of CGSC. The Army will replace ILE with CGSC.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

- The CSA directed YG 04 to undergo a CGSC eligibility board nested with its current primary board selection for intended attendance in FY14—the tenth year of active commissioned service.
- In order to dedicate FY14 CGSC classes for YG 04, the Army will attempt to seat YGs 01-03 this FY to a benchmark of 50% residence attendance for ILE Common Core (CC).

WHO DOES THIS AFFECT?

- For the FA 50 branch, all officers will attend a resident AOC in the form of the Force Management Qualification Course. For FA 50 Branch, only changes to CC apply.
- For YGs 01-03 this year will be the last opportunity for a resident CC. More senior YGs are ineligible to attend a resident class.
- Based on the seating constraints, HRC conducted a selection board for YG01-03 resulting in a multiple year order of merit list (OML).
- The Resident OML identified nine officers in the branch to attend a resident CC.
- The remainder of officers must enroll in a distance learning (DL) CC to obtain GCSC accreditation.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?

- The CSA intent for DL is it does not constitute a promotion discriminator. The ORB entry for PME experience will mask the education venue. The CSA directed ORB's to read “CGSC graduate” regardless of venue.
- I will contact the remainder of officers conducting DL CC and will enroll them via ATTRS.
- The DL CC is an 18th month self-paced curriculum with some officers completing in as little as four months.
- While Resident CC and DL are to be immaterial to career development, failure to complete CGSC constitutes greater selection risk for promotion, nominative assignments, and subsequent PME opportunities.
- CGSC completion in any form is essential element of development and broadening.



FA50 Assignments Newsletter



October 2012

Senior Service College (SSC) is also evolving to a lesser extent than CGSC. While SSC remain largely unchanged, certain timelines for slating and procedures are important to communicate to officers currently under SSC consideration.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

- The CSA directed that the analysis for officer availability, slating, and requests for deferment reduce from four to two months.

WHO DOES THIS AFFECT?

- Any officers (LTC or COLs) identified as primary SSC attendees must provide HRC with any extenuating circumstances requiring deferment. Some deferment criteria are Joint Billets, CSL command completion, deployments, and personal requirements.



WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?

- The compressed process requires timely communication with me (or the Senior Leader Division representative LTC Wehmeyer).
- All deferment requests are due to the HRC CDR by 31 Dec 12 for consideration. After this suspense, requests are accepted on emergent circumstances under increased scrutiny.
- The HRC CDR is the approving authority for LTCs, while the VCSA is the authority for LTCs(P) and COLs.

WHAT ARE SCHOOL SLATING CRITERIA AND LIMITATIONS?

- All National Defense University venues are JPME II and Masters Degree conferral programs. Joint qualified officers will not attend.
- Sister Service Colleges confer masters as well.
- Most fellowships require a masters degree
- The SAMs fellowship is a two year assignment with the first year attending the program and the second year as an instructor.
- JAWS attendance requires a follow-on joint assignment.
- In order to promote senior leader broadening, a sister service school's internal population cannot exceed 60% of the total class (e.g. Naval War College is limited to 60% Naval Officers).

FA 50 Projected FY13 Spring/ Summer Moves (as of 5 Sep 12)



Assignments Process

- In September, I will contact officers projected for an FY13 move to discuss assignment options and personal preferences.
- 1-15 September confirmation for officers in the FY 13 Assignments cycle
- 15 Oct: Assignment preference sheet due to me.
- ~ Nov brief the FY 13 Spring and Summer assignments slate to the Branch Senior leadership for final submission to the Commander. HRC.
- Tentatively in late December, I will notify the moving officers of their intended assignment.
- O/A Feb 13: release RFOs.

Considerations

Retirements/Separations	Constraints
Planned Retirements/Separations	EFMP
Length of Time on Station	MAC
By Name Request	NON-DEPLOYABLE
Requested Extensions	PERSONAL ISSUES
Skill Set	
Applying for ACS	
Potential for Colonel	
SSC	



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www.fa50.army.mil

AKO: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/194547>

Facebook: <http://www.facebook.com/army.fa50>


AFMS Online: <http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil>

WHATZIT?

**Looks like an old collar insignia disk, but
what branch? The Flying Hat Corps?**



twobooks




Dawn's Daughter: A Complete Guide to a Successful, Fulfilling Personal and Professional Life

By: Dawn Baker
ebonyLotus Publishing, 2011

Personal and professional development are not only for military members but our families, too. Reaching back through generations, *Dawn's Daughter* brings to the surface those time honored values that facilitate personal development. And that is where *Dawn's Daughter* takes us, by helping to develop young minds, particularly those of our young women. Basically, it is all about the choices we make. *Dawn's Daughter* is a conversation across the kitchen table between two women. It is good, down-to-earth advice for women of all ages.

Dawn's Daughter provides a common sense approach that gets us started and also guides us on the road of self-improvement. All of those who are vested in cultivating the character of our young women will find Dawn's Daughter a must read!

— Malik R. Watkins, Ph.D.




Dawn teaches invaluable lessons on relationships, career, and how to be the best you can be. In *Dawn's Daughter*, learn how to:

- Become strong and independent
- Make decisions that are right for your life
- Define yourself; know who you are and take responsibility for your life
- Set and achieve realistic goals
- Understand the value of a good education
- Become more successful in the workplace
- Avoid destructive behavior in personal relationships
- Understand the value of saving money and becoming financially sound
- Gain an appreciation for serving your fellowman

War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa, 1941-42

By: Robert Kershaw
Ian Allan Publishing, 2001



... you need have no worries, everything is so well prepared here, hardly anything can go wrong.

— Gefreiter, Artillery Regiment, writing to his family about the coming invasion of Russia.

This is the ground level view of Operation Barbarossa, from the invasion in June 1941 to the gates of Moscow. It is very much a look through the eyes of the individual German soldier. By the way, despite all the post-war excuses for the Wehrmacht's behavior, this book is certainly not very sympathetic to them. Based in large part on published and unpublished memoirs and diaries, the author concludes that the professional Army, if not the initiators of the atrocities that were committed by the SS and others, they were certainly willing enablers.

Why would this be of interest to U.S. Army Force Managers? Barbarossa is a case study in overconfident planning at the strategic and operational levels, flawed assumptions, and unforeseen second and third order effects. The officers planning the operation had all read up on Napoleon's Russian campaign, they had the maps and photo reconnaissance. They

thought they had adequate intel and sufficient supply lines

and the element of surprise. After early success, they didn't anticipate the Soviet counterattacks that reduced German strength and dragged the campaign into the winter. They were caught off balance by the vicious resistance by the Red Army and the civilian population. And the political leadership's refusal to hear the truth about what was happening led to the failure to capture Moscow, followed by the brutal winter campaign, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk in 1942 and 1943, and the continuing siege of Leningrad until final catastrophic failure in the East in 1944. (Follow this up with William Lubbeck's *At Leningrad's Gates*, a company commander's story of the disintegration of Army Group North in the retreat back to Germany.)

For professional 21st Century Soldiers accustomed to having everything they could ever think of in terms of units, equipment, weapons and ammunition, vehicles, fuel, transport, tac air, food and clothing – this is sobering reading.