



FORCE MANAGEMENT'S THE Oracle

“Equipping The Army”

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MANPRINT: THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF FORCE INTEGRATION

by MAJ Samuel B. Phillips



In the 1980s, Army leadership directed examination of the development process of several newly fielded weapons systems to see could have been done better. The result was the establishment of a directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel—MANPRINT, the Manpower and Personnel Integration Program. The focus of the new directorate would be to support the need to integrate manpower, personnel, and training considerations into the system acquisition process.

In a world dominated by the offices of the Army G-3 and G-8, is the MANPRINT Directorate, the only element of the Army G-1 functioning in the realm of Force Management, an effective and valid player in the Force Management process? This question has been answered by defining MANPRINT, examining the seven domains, discussing the organizations employing similar analysis, reviewing the regulations and directives empowering MANPRINT, and finally exploring the results produced by this directorate and its future.—The Author

Throughout the FA 50 Qualification course, we have been briefed by several civilians and officers from G-3 and G-8. We have discussed issues such as Strategic Plans and Policy, and duties of the Requirements Staff Officer as well as Transformation of the Army, all from the G-3. The G-8 responsibilities have been displayed through briefings about Program Analysis and Evaluation and the duties of the Staff Synchronization Officer. We also have reviewed several of the duties of the Army Secretariat, to include the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FMC)), and the Acquisition, Logistics and Technology office (ASA(ALT)). These experiences in the FA 50 Qualification Course have led me to wonder if any organizations other than the Army Secretariat, the G-3 and G-8 are involved in the Force Management process.

A recent presentation by Dr. Michael Drillings, Director, U.S. Army MANPRINT Program, answered this question. The MANPRINT—or Manpower and Personnel Integration—Program is organized within the G-1. Now I am left to wonder if the MANPRINT Directorate, the only element of the G-1 functioning in the realm of Force Management—a world dominated by the offices of DA G-3 and G-8—is an effective and valid player in the Force Management process.

MANPRINT is a comprehensive management and technical program set on improving total system (Soldier, equipment, unit) performance by focusing on Soldier performance and reliability. This is achieved by the continuous integration of the Seven Domains—manpower, personnel, training, human engineering, system safety, health hazards, and Soldier survivability considerations throughout the materiel life-cycle. Each domain and its influence

Read About It In

THE Oracle

COVER STORY

**MANPRINT:
Manpower and Personnel
Integration**

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

- Army G-37 FM gives us
The Force Validation Process
- Photos from the Field
FA 50's Showcase AOR
- **NET CENTRIC WARFARE**
by Mr. Sean Tuomey
- Reserve Component Corner:
Strategies into Capabilities
by LTC Timothy Zack and Mr.
Mark Gerner
- Army National Guard:
**Materiel Programs Transform
Guard**
by MAJ Rodney Rudolph
- Army National Guard
The Right Force Structure
by MAJ Brian Halloran

MANPRINT continued on next page

| DOMAIN | DEFINITION | DISCUSSION |
|---|---|---|
| MANPOWER  | The number of military and civilian personnel required, and potentially available, to operate, maintain, sustain, and provide training for systems. | MANPRINT analysis recommended an increase in crew size from 2 to 3 in the non-line-of-sight-cannon FCS platform based on workload and security issues. |
| PERSONNEL  | The cognitive and physical capabilities required to be able to train for, operate, maintain, and sustain materiel and information systems. | The human requirement for the T800 engine used in the Comanche helicopter [cancelled in 2005] called for no increase in aptitude from its predecessor engine and reduced the number of maintainers; the resulting MANPRINT effort reduced organizational tool kits from 64 to eight; also reducing the number of maintenance tasks. |
| TRAINING  | The instruction or education, and-on-the-job or unit training required to provide personnel their essential job skills, knowledge, and attitudes. | Tests employing improvements resulting from MANPRINT analysis showed an increase from 20 to 98% in mine clearing with the AN/PSS-12 Hand-held Mine Detector. |
| HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING  | The integration of human characteristics into system definition, design, development, and evaluation to optimize human-machine performance under operational conditions. | MANPRINT conducted evaluation of candidate body armor side protection systems for PEO Soldier, including assessment of individual movement techniques, cross-country movement, weapon compatibility, and vehicle accessibility. |
| SYSTEM SAFETY  | The design features and operating characteristics of a system that serve to minimize the potential for human or machine errors or failures that cause injurious accidents. | Human figure modeling was used to assess the ability of the C-130 Loadmaster to traverse each vehicle when loaded inside the cargo area, and investigated the maintainability of defined safety aisles. |
| HEALTH HAZARDS  | The features and operating characteristics of a system that create significant risks of bodily injury or death; sources of health hazard include acoustic energy, chemical or biological substances, temperature extremes, radiation energy, oxygen deficiency, shock (not electrical), trauma and vibration. | MANPRINT provided guidance for tactical redesign of construction techniques for the Medium Girder Bridge (NCOs with long term exposure to MGB construction experienced significantly high musculoskeletal problems); this should greatly reduce musculoskeletal stress on Soldiers, reducing injuries and possibly decreasing construction times. |
| SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY  | The characteristics of a system that can reduce fratricide, detectability and probability of being attacked, as well as minimize system damage, Soldier injury, and cognitive and physical fatigue. | MANPRINT evaluation of the Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR) revealed a fratricide issue: 38% of Soldiers incorrectly reported their position rather than their target's during a simulated Call for Fire scenario; a warning message was incorporated resulting in 100% Soldier success rate when retested. |

FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT

Feedback is Important, at All Levels



BG Charles A. Anderson
Director, Force Development
Executive Agent for FA 50

Team,

One of the many things I've learned as the Director of Force Development and FA 50 Executive Agent has been just how important it is to have a cadre of men and women who really understand how the Army runs, and who can use that understanding to make things happen. Right now and for the foreseeable future, we are in an era of Transformation, when we are almost completely reorganizing and re-equipping a Cold War Army for the challenges of a new century. You Force Managers are the Army's experts in using and manipulating the many systems, databases and processes involved in turning resources—money, materiel, people and time—into fully equipped, trained and ready units.

Past issues of the Oracle have featured a number of articles by FA 50 professionals in the field, at the brigades and divisions and in the AOR, about how they are coping with the challenges of modernization and Modularity. If you haven't yet read MAJ

George Turner's piece in the September issue about his work in 3ID, I heartily recommend you do. Many of you will say "I could have written that," or "Hey, they have some good ideas that I could use." But I know that a few others will say, "Wow, is that what's going on down there?"

Just as important as knowing your job, as you all do, is sharing your experiences, problems and solutions with your colleagues. The Oracle is the ideal venue for letting the community at large know how Modularity is progressing in your piece of the Army.

I also need feedback from you in the field to us here at HQDA. A number of forums—equipping and re-equipping conferences focused on specific units, FD/ACOM equipping laydowns, SRU VCT preps, VTCs with the AOR and FORSCOM, and AERCs—all are opportunities for FA50s to tell us what works, what doesn't work, and what we can do better. I talk to commanders and support folks all the time, but I'd like to hear directly from you, too. You are the "creative managers of change," so let me hear you speak up.

Thanks for all you do. Keep it up. ○

Chuck Anderson

The ORACLE is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army's FA 50 Proponency Office. Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.

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www.fa50.army.mil

G-8 HONORS BOB LEBRON

Robert Lebron, Jr. was recognized for outstanding support to the Army Force Management School, the FA 50 Proponent Office and, in particular, the FA 50 Qualification Course. Over the past three and a half years, Mr. Lebron has worked tirelessly to develop the contractor statements of work, identify funding, and manage the contractor effort that has resulted in our relatively new Q Course for all FA 50 Officers (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and Career Program 26 Manpower and Force Management civilians.

Mr. Lebron also provided outstanding support to the Advanced Force Management Course (the 4-week course). As Course Manager, his interaction with the students (military and civilian) has helped not only to improve the course, but also to assist parent organizations on how best to plan and program their projected student quotas, helping them to get their Soldiers the latest Force Management training while still meeting current Operational Tempo demands.

Mr. Lebron was also responsible for transforming the antiquated classrooms in Humphreys Hall into “state-of-the-art” facilities, ensuring each student has a workstation with a laptop and all training material on CD ROM. The facilities were outfitted with new furniture, ceiling fans, lockers, VTC capability, and other amenities to provide a more professional/collegiate environment.

After 24 years of service, he retired from active duty as a first sergeant in November 1996. He has been assigned to DCS G-3/7 as the AFMS Representative since July 1998. A consummate professional, Mr. Lebron is held in the highest esteem not only across the Army Staff, but within the Army Reserve and National Guard communities as well.

The citation reads:

For outstanding civilian service as the Army Force Management School’s Representative while assigned to the Army Force Management School, Force Management Directorate, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, from January 2004 to September 2007. Mr. Lebron’s transformational vision, untiring planning, synchronization efforts and exceptional leadership were instrumental in the implementation of the FA 50/Force Management Qualification Course and in support of the Advanced Force Management Course. His passion for excellence and devotion to duty was the force behind ensuring all FA 50 officers, Active Component, Reserve and Guard officers as well as CP 26 civilians were supported with state-of-the-art technology in the classroom and associated materials as well as expert contract support during the course of their studies. His devotion to duty and professional flair for excellence reflects great credit upon himself, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, and the United States Army. ◉



LTG Speakes and Mr. Tison congratulate Civilian Service awardees, Mr. Robert Lebron, Jr. and Ms. Debbie Kirkland.

MANPRINT continued from page 3

on Soldier performance capabilities are carefully considered during all stages of the acquisition process. After a system has completed the MANPRINT process, it is readily distinguished from one that has not been given the same consideration. The system now includes the most critical element—the Soldier.

MANPRINT is the Army’s systematic and comprehensive program for improving the effectiveness of system performance at minimum costs for personnel, maintenance and repairs (www.manprint.army.mil). The first step to understanding the contributions of MANPRINT is to ensure the definition of MANPRINT is understood. The Army’s MANPRINT program considers both Soldier and unit needs throughout the system acquisition process and life-cycle. MANPRINT ensures an emphasis on Soldier considerations is a high priority in system design, and that system operation, deployment/employment, and maintenance requirements are matched with Soldier capabilities, training, and availability. MANPRINT’s value has been demonstrated in programs such as Comanche and Longbow Apache, where its application led to significant cost avoidance and enhanced mission effectiveness. With MANPRINT, Army systems will become increasingly user-centered, reliable, and maintainable, leading to significant reductions in life-cycle costs and increased mission effectiveness. MANPRINT is further defined later in this paper through the discussion of the Seven Domains. It is also important to mention that MANPRINT is more commonly known in the corporate world as Human Systems Integration (HSI)—the emphasizing of human considerations in systems design/acquisition to reduce life-cycle costs and optimize system performance.

HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS

In an earlier state, MANPRINT served as an interesting setting to further define the program. The surge in Force Modernization during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was the Army’s attempt to generate greater combat power through technology. There were great advances, however, two recurring issues were observed. First, when new systems actually were field-tested, they did not always

meet predicted standards. Second, technologically complex systems generated greater requirements. For example, Soldiers had to be more highly skilled, and often higher ratios of operators, maintainers, and support personnel were necessary, compared to the systems being replaced. Dr. John Weisz, Director of the U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground during the 1960s, determined this method of development unaffordable. Additionally, this cost would be multiplied under wartime conditions.

It was not until 1982 that GEN Maxwell Thurman, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), directed the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) to review the development process of recently fielded systems and consider how the process could have been better managed, with particular consideration given to the integration of manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) issues. The resulting report, known formally as the Reverse Engineering Project, found that things could be greatly improved through the integration of MPT early in the development process. In 1987, MANPRINT became an official Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

In review of the original purpose of this paper, is the MANPRINT Directorate an effective and valid player in the Force Management process? We not only find the answer to this question in the definition of MANPRINT, but also through discussion and examples of MANPRINT successes among the seven domains. “We see systems through the eyes of the warfighter.” The positive results of MANPRINT are validated in the establishment of similar organizations in other branches of the Armed Forces employing similar analysis tools. I conclude that MANPRINT is an effective and highly valued member of the Force Management process. Now, additional questions arise. What does the future hold for MANPRINT and similar organizations in the other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces? Will there eventually be one JPRINT Directorate responsible for development and integration of systems across the realm of joint operations?

MAJ Phillips is assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Full-Time Support Directorate. He is a graduate of the FA 50 Qualification Course, Class 01-07.

DOCTRINE DISCUSSIONS

NET CENTRIC WARFARE: A SOLUTION FOR NON-TRINITARIAN WARS?



Sean Tuomey

by Michael Sean Tuomey

In my last article I wrote about the enduring nature of warfare and the theory concerning the “four generations of warfare.” If warfare has not changed, however, if terrorism or insurgencies have always been with us, and Fourth

Generation Warfare [4GW] is just another tag for an academic concept, why are we struggling? What do Joint forces need to do to ensure American victory now and in the future? Again, we should look to the well-known strategist Carl von Clausewitz and his epochal work, On War, first published in 1832. — The Author

Clausewitz describes a “paradoxical trinity” that plays certain roles in war. These are the people, the commander and his army, and the government. In a speech in 2005 to the Principles of War seminar in Washington, DC, Dr. Martin van Creveld pronounced, “For the last 350 years, the western world has fought wars using this classical division of labor: the government directs war, the armed forces fight and die in the war and the civilians pay and suffer.” Dr. van Creveld claims that in future war, the three sides of the trinity may be mixed together or non-existent. It is this trinity that has spawned the terms Trinitarian and Non-Trinitarian Wars (NTW). We are accustomed to trinitarian wars. It is the non-trinitarian wars with which we have little success. What about the converse to the trinity? What is it that we should use against our enemies? Where should we direct our efforts? What is the trinity for the enemy?

Clausewitz identifies war’s three “broad objectives” — the armed forces, the country, and the enemy’s will. These three areas are where Joint forces should strive to attack. These must be the foci of our efforts. As stated above, all three sides of the enemy trinity may be mixed together or non-existent in the future. In a world where these three centers of attention are fleeting or not present, what is the best capability to apply to all three,

simultaneously and in decisive dosages? What does a military that has so much technology at its disposal use that still addresses the immutable truths of warfare?

In looking at future warfare, perhaps we should not use models like 4GW or NTW. Maybe we should look at future Joint warfare in regards to a societal model. Perhaps it is not a study in the generations of warfare or the evolution of modern combat. Conceivably, it is the evolution of mankind from the agrarian to the industrial age to the information age. We must move the Joint force into the information age—all services, all agencies, all levels of government, and to the extent we can, our allies as well.

In June of 2004, Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski (USN Ret.), Director of the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, affirmed, “The predominate pattern of human behavior in the information age is network behavior. Network centric warfare is about human behavior in a networked environment, and in warfare, human behavior ultimately determines outcome.” The shifting features of warfare take on the uniqueness of their time. As the lines blur between human behavior and network behavior, especially in warfare, we see the basic metrics that network centric warfare provides to the future Joint force. The DoD Office of Force Transformation identifies four metrics for success in the information age for the future Joint force. These are: 1) create and preserve options; 2) develop high transaction rates; 3) develop high learning rates; and 4) achieve overmatching complexity at scale. If the form of warfare is changing, then these must be the characteristics of the future Joint force.

The first metric is creating and preserving options. This is the ability to take action or preserve future action. Options give future Joint forces adaptation and flexibility. Creating or preserving friendly options also complicates the courses of action of those who oppose us.

NET CENTRIC WARFARE continued on page 7



NET CENTRIC WARFARE continued from page 6

Metrics 2 and 3 are closely related. Transaction rates and learning rates equal speed. As the battle space becomes less linear and more dynamic, the mass of information must move more quickly and securely. As we increase the number of players on the battlefield, the need for high information rates increases. More than ever, we need to increase transaction rates as we integrate different services and units from other nations. The concept of high data exchange rates also speaks about high learning rates. Ideally, the future Joint force should be covering lessons learned within days and weeks after operations and not waiting for the next doctrinal manual five years later.

The fourth metric concerns what some believe are the biggest threats we face. These are low mass, low technology adversaries with high complexity. The future Joint force must overmatch that complexity and the future Joint force must match their scale. Admiral Cebrowski uses an example of the guerrilla force versus an armor unit. The armor unit is quite simple and straight forward, and communications is easy, while the guerrilla force is complex because it is spread out, thereby making communications difficult. "This is also why a guerilla force can give an armored division fits." (Cebrowski, 2004, p. 7). Scale relates to the same measure or same amount of data. The generation of high transaction rates requires matching scale with scale. The future Joint force must be able to address the imbalance of scale when the number and character of data transactions changes in battle from fire and maneuver to information, intelligence and mobility. The future Joint force must be aware when the enemy's imbalance of scale occurs as well.

War has not changed and will not change for a long time. Warfare itself and the way we fight change. The catalysts that change warfare are changes in technology. 4GW and NTW give us neat models to classify what has happened over the years with regard to waging war but do nothing to explain what capabilities we need or how these capabilities should be employed—now or in the future.

The study of Clausewitz gives us some insight into the fixed, incontrovertible nature of war and warfare. The study of Clausewitz also gives us some insight into the players in war, not only on our side, but also the enemy. If we cannot shake our love of "techno-centric" warfare, then perhaps we need to apply our advanced technology to the proliferation of information technologies for the current and future Joint force. We must embed the emerging characteristics of the information age into the Joint force before it is too late. We must move forward as quickly as practicable with Joint Functional Concepts incorporating the four basic metrics or tenets outlined in this article. We cannot wait for doctrine. We must update doctrine or create it anew as soon as possible. Perhaps information and network behavior should become one of the principles of war? Because in the future, mass, offensive, surprise, security, unity of command, objective, maneuver, economy of force and simplicity may mean victory of defeat in the nanosecond of a digital burst.

Mr. Tuomey, SYColeman, supports the FA 50 Personnel Proponency Office. He is a U.S. Army Reserve Colonel commanding the 1398th Deployment Support Brigade, Baltimore. ◉

MATERIEL PROGRAMS DIVISION WORKING TO TRANSFORM ARMY GUARD

by MAJ Rodney Rudolph

Force Management is a complex process involving a series of simultaneous and sequential actions ranging from requirements determination and design concept development to stationing and modernization considerations—personnel recruitment and training, equipment procurement and disposition, operational imperatives, budgetary dynamics and political factors must be carefully assessed. During the last two years these elements of the force management process became manifestly important as the Army National Guard (ARNG) conducted the critical task of Rebalancing its force—a rebalance that promises to impact not only the 54 states, territories, and District of Columbia, but the entire Army as well.

The ARNG's Rebalance began with the National Defense Strategy asserting the likelihood that irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges will dominate our national interests in the foreseeable future. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 provided guidance for creating a new force structure to meet the new challenges in an era of persistent conflict. In response to the National Defense Strategy and QDR, the Army will continue its Rebalancing via the modularization of its Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The QDR 2006 indicated the ARNG will resource 28 of the Army's 70 BCTs. Additionally, because of the ever-changing needs of the Army, ARNG force managers would have to prepare for the conversion of six combat brigades to multi-functional and functional brigade headquarters as part of the overall Rebalancing effort.

Accordingly, a collaborative effort began with HQDA, ARNG, and the states and territories to address the force structure changes associated with the Rebalancing requirement. The ARNG commenced the effort by converting six BCTs into four Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEBs) and two Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (BFSBs). The MEB brings an array of increased



capabilities to the battlefield and is uniquely suited for Stability Operations, Homeland Defense, and support to civil authorities with its mix of Engineer, Military Police, Chemical, and combat forces. The BFSB provides intelligence collection, target acquisition, and limited interdiction with its Reconnaissance and Surveillance squadron.

Another component to the ARNG's Rebalancing effort was the resourcing of 17 Tactical Combat Forces (TCFs) aligned with the ARNG MEBs. The TCF will provide the MEB an important advantage in combat power and force protection during Stability Operations. For the ARNG, the types of TCF formations to be resourced are eleven infantry battalions, three combined arms battalions, and three Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadrons. TCF units are not organic to brigade formations, but are attached as reinforcing elements to MEBs deploying into a theater of operations. With the ARNG resourcing 17 TCFs, the Army is provided increased strength and capability by this unique structure.

The Army stated it is committed to fully funding the Rebalance effort and continue the modernization of all ARNG formations. The ARNG will receive the equipment needed to train and deploy with for future operations. This promises to continue the ARNG's transformation from Strategic Reserve Forces to that of ready Operational Reserve Forces.

The ARNG's rebalancing effort not only increases the depth and breadth to the Army capabilities, but as the ARNG resources more formations, its Soldiers will be provided greater predictability about their deployment rotation schedule. This will reduce the stress on the ARNG force structure as it continues to fulfill deployment requirements.

The rebalance initiative in conjunction with the "Grow the Army Plan" will give the ARNG 358.2K of end

MATERIEL PROGRAMS continued on page 9

MATERIEL PROGRAMS continued from page 8

strength by fiscal year 2013. With this increase, the ARNG's force structure will resource 112 brigades, including 28 BCTs (20 Infantry, seven Heavy, and one Stryker), 46 Multi-functional Brigades (eight Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB), 16 MEB, seven Fires, six BFSB, and nine Sustainment Brigades), and 38 Functional Brigades.

Given the quantity and type of structure the ARNG is to have, ARNG force managers face the challenge of balancing the Army's requirements with the ability of the states, territories, and the District of Columbia to satisfactorily resource the new units. Balancing and rebalancing force structure is the key task of the ARNG's force managers with the aim of providing the Army with ready units while improving the States' command and control of their structure. Prior to Rebalance, the 207th IBCT in Alaska had assigned units in six different states and territories, from Guam to Indiana. Converting the 207th IBCT to a BFSB permitted Alaska to station the entire brigade within the state and simultaneously fulfills the Army's force structure requirement for this formation. The BFSB requires less Force Structure Authorization (FSA) than a BCT and was easily accommodated by existing FSA in Alaska. Another example of the ARNG's force managers successfully rebalancing the force is Indiana. Indiana had four infantry companies assigned to battalions outside the State. A solution to this issue was to activate an infantry battalion in Indiana, incorporate the four infantry companies into it, and subsequently assign the battalion as TCF in support of the MEB. Finally, with the Joint Readiness Training Center located at Fort Polk, La., it was deemed beneficial for the 256th Heavy BCT to convert to an Infantry BCT, thereby avoiding the transport of men and equipment to the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif. With the second and third order affects, rebalance affects almost all of the States and Territories.

Rebalancing provides the ARNG with numerous advantages. States and territories will have ready forces to support the Governors in times of crises. The ARNG can provide more ready units and thereby provide the Army with greater operational depth. Rebalancing also ensures the states', territories', and the District of Columbia's essential ten capabilities are safeguarded, if

not enhanced. ARNG force managers attempt to station aviation, security, engineers, transportation, medical, chemical, maintenance, logistics, signal and command and control capabilities in each state and territory in support to civil authorities.

The ARNG formed The Adjutant General General Officer Steering Committee (TAG GOSC)

to involve the states in the process, as well as represent all the states and territories during rebalancing. The TAG GOSC consists of 20 TAGs and Assistant TAGs (ATAGs) representing a cross section of the nation. This committee was instrumental in the decision making process for ARNG Rebalance and worked closely with the HQDA Director of Force Management and Director of Force Development.

The FA 50s working behind the scenes piecing together the ARNG force structure like a large jigsaw puzzle created a win-win situation with HQDA, ARNG and the states and territories. The ARNG Rebalance ended with a ceremony at the Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting in Washington D.C. this past October. Army Vice Chief of Staff GEN Richard Cody, Army National Guard Director LTG Clyde A. Vaughn and TAG GOSC Chairman MG Bennett Landreneau signed a Memorandum of Understanding to formalize the agreement for ARNG Rebalance. The signing ceremony demonstrated the unity of effort between HQDA, ARNG, and the states and territories and highlighted the positive impact of force management on improving the capabilities in the Army and ARNG.

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FROM ARMY G-37 FM THE FORCE VALIDATION PROCESS

by COL Steve Stebbins

Force Integration is at the heart of Force Management. FA 50s lead the integration of documentation and Title 10 support to provide the Army with capable units at the right time and place. Army Force Managers, uniquely trained in how the Army runs, synchronize the efforts of other staff agencies and commands to transform, station, and deploy the force to meet a variety of requirements. On Army Staff, much of this work is centered in the Directorate of Force Management, G-3/5/7.

The Force Validation Committee, or FVC, is one of the core processes G-37/FM uses to affect this synchronization. Led by the Force Integration Branch (FIB), the FVC process assesses the manning, equipping, training, and facilities of transforming and deploying units, and other units with special interest from Army senior leaders. The FVC focuses typically on units at the brigade headquarters level and higher of all three components. FIB, in cooperation with Army National Guard and Army Reserve force managers, develops an annual schedule of units for monthly FVC reviews.

The FVC is a top-down projection by the ARSTAF, intended to identify potential issues early enough for HQDA resolution if required. With this in mind, the FVC aims to look at units 9-12 months before their e-date or Latest Arrival Date (LAD), as appropriate. In this the FVC is fundamentally different from the Strategic Readiness Update (SRU), a monthly review of Unit Status Report (USR) data presented to Army Senior Leadership. While the FVC is top-down, the USR is bottom-up, from the commander's perspective. The two processes complement each other. If the FVC process has successfully identified and facilitated the resolution of issues well in advance of the e-date or LAD, then those issues should not surface in the SRU. To some extent, then, the SRU validates the effectiveness of the FVC.

Within the FVC Process, Organizational Integrators (OIs) and Force Integrators (FIs) lead the force

integration for their respective units. Each month an Action Officer Working Group (AOWG) kicks off the FVC cycle. OIs and FIs, supported by representatives from G-1, G-4, G-8/Force Development, G-37/Training, Army Materiel Command (AMC) and ACSIM, brief the status of their units with a view towards identifying issues requiring ARSTAF resolution. Opportunities to resolve these issues occur first at a Council of Colonels (CoC), then a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) chaired by the Director of Force Management. These forums provide a valuable opportunity to integrate staff activities at the Colonel and one/two-star level. Most issues are resolved at these levels; those that cannot are carried forward to the monthly Army Synchronization Meeting chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA).

A Standard Format. FVC assessments use a standard format of quad charts supported by a "chiclet chart" with supporting drilldowns from each staff proponent. The standard green/amber/red presentation with supporting bullet comments is familiar to leaders and provides a way to quickly summarize unit status and issues. Seeing a selection of Army units monthly in a consistent format facilitates the identification of trends and enables senior leaders to identify major Army-wide issues for resolution. As units are presented each month, patterns emerge in shortages of Soldiers in particular grades and specialties or the same equipment items. While senior leaders are often aware of these challenges, seeing them presented in relation to a specific deploying or transforming unit can lead to new perspectives and insights. This use of the FVC as a platform for discussion among the Army's senior leaders is one of its great values.

Priority focus. The FVC process can also be used to bring focus on high-priority units that need intensively managed support from HQDA. In early 2007, the Director of Force Management charged FIB with leading the coordination of HQDA Title 10 support for the deployment of five additional BCTs to

THE FORCE VALIDATION PROCESS continued on page 11

THE FORCE VALIDATION PROCESS continued from page 10

OIF. Starting with the core ARSTAF FVC players, FIB quickly formed a team that modified the FVC process to assess and track the progress of the BCTs until they deployed and met their LAD. In weekly CoCs, GOSCs, and briefings to the senior leadership at the weekly Saturday Army-wide SVTC, the team was able to focus HQDA support on the successful preparation and deployment of these five BCTs. Working in close partnership with FORSCOM, resourcing challenges requiring HQDA resolution quickly were identified, raised to the appropriate level and then resolved. The personal coordination and senior leader visibility provided by the FVC process served as a bureaucracy buster that helped to ensure that these five BCTs prepared and deployed successfully.

One subjective indicator of the FVC's success is when senior leaders start to use it as a verb: "Let's FVC that unit." With the many challenges of transforming, modernizing and restationing an Army while at war, we've been hearing this often. The FVC process, a collaborative effort between the ARSTAF and Commands and led by Force Integrators, has proven itself as a trusted and essential vehicle for force integration at HQDA.

COL Stebbins is the Force Integration Branch Chief, HQDA G-37/FMF. ○



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USAR FORCE MANAGEMENT: TRANSLATING STRATEGIES INTO CAPABILITIES

by LTC Timothy Zack and Mr. Mark Gerner

The art and science of force management in today's operational context requires an ability to translate a variety of strategies for war and conflict into capabilities. This article explores how force management methods can build operational depth for the Army, with a focus on the transformation of the Army Reserve from a strategic "force in reserve," to a truly operational force capability. — The Author



In 2003, the Army Reserve began to execute a series of force management strategies to optimize its capabilities, focused around six major strategies for the Force. This process was comprehensively called the Federal Reserve Restructure Initiatives (FRRI). This comprehensive program provided a baseline for the application of the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) concept.

Army doctrine visualizes three major areas that comprise full-spectrum operations, each of equal importance: Offense, Defense, and Stability. The requirement for the Army to conduct full-spectrum operations is derived from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Security Program Directive (NSPD) #44, DoD Directive 3000.05 (Stability Operations), and Army Campaign Plan, Change 6. These program and policy directives require sets of capabilities to support eight Joint Operational Concepts: six are operational and two are managerial. To address the requirement to execute full-spectrum operations, the Army Reserve has directly applied several force management strategies to enhance its ability to generate the required capabilities over time.

First of these strategies was to address the imbalance between force structure and manpower, and to reduce force structure no longer relevant for the Army or for Joint force commanders. To correct this imbalance, the Army Reserve programmed approximately 10,000 of the 205,000 structure into a "Trainee, Transient, Holders, and Student" (TTHS) account to gain efficiencies by

eliminating the burden of force accounting from the operational commanders, and to bring as many AR units to a level of ALO 1.

Theater- and corps-level combat support and combat service support capabilities long have been the centerpiece of organizations for the Army Reserve. Force reductions in the 1990s amounted to approximately 35 percent overall, and the necessary risk and re-balancing within the reductions caused a significant portion of Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) to be filled by the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve's strategic commitment to fulfill the vision of the Army Campaign Plan has been to build 68 brigade force equivalents: 11 Multi-Functional Support Brigades and 57 Functional Support Brigades.



The strength of the Army Reserve is that its Soldiers are rich in skill sets (capabilities) essential to the Army's roles, functions, and missions. Consistent with Army Modular Force (AMF) doctrine, many of these skills reside in small teams and units such as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Medical Forward Surgical units, and Military Intelligence teams that now reside in the newly formed Functional Operational Commands.

USAR FORCE MANAGEMENT continued on page 13

Application of a Means and Mission Framework (MMF) strategy provides a logical, comprehensive structure to enable the analysis and comparison of organizations and allocation of capabilities. The result is a comparative analysis of capabilities, functions, services, and echelons. Using this structure and methodology, one can conduct a gap analysis to determine what capabilities may not be served by the current organizational set. This includes the envisioned effects and the sources of the required capabilities:

Apportioning capabilities. MMF facilitates the ability to organize units and derivative units (UIC and DUIC) in timeframes or packages that build the “force depth” by command. (Figure 1, below).

The management methods incorporated into this figure is one of Allocating and Apportionment, the basis of the Joint Sourcing Capabilities Program (JSCP).

As efficiencies increased, the management tool that enabled the Army Reserve to move toward operational formations has been the AREF. AREF became a main operating principle for how the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) doctrine was built and how it has been implemented for the past two years in the Army Reserve.

The underlying principle of the AREF was to provide worldwide capabilities for missions while maintaining the health of the force, and to apply the Army Modular Force (AMF) doctrine into the future.




Figure 1




Figure 2

AREF is organized with a cycle time of a five-year model, adjustable to any length of time that strategies may require. The concept is one basis of the ARFORGEN concept, and could likely prove to be a primary driver of how to develop the force. With units now organized around operational efficiencies, the Army Reserve applied provision of its capabilities to support both operational domains: current operations and stability operations.

Packaging Capabilities. The Army Reserve is engaged in the most extensive and dramatic transformation in its 100-year history. It is moving from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve in capability, force structure, policy, and training strategies to fight a sustained long war and transform. Continuous operations demand the Army Reserve manage a modular force in sets of capabilities, operationally grouped in time periods. The result is

a method and a force that is organized to achieve a “depth” of selected capabilities that has influenced the training and readiness strategies to orient on cycles of readiness and operations. The product: an operational, predictable set of capabilities that can be sustained over time.

LTC Timothy E. Zack is assigned to HQDA, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, as the Army Reserve’s Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Force Integrator. Mr. Mark Gerner, Calibre Systems, Inc. supports OCAR G-3 Plans. Retired as an Army Colonel in 2000, his last assignment was as Chief of Force Integration on the DA Staff.

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FA 50 MILESTONES



The ORACLE congratulates the latest graduates of the FA 50 Qualification Course, who completed their studies earlier this month. They are:
1st row: MAJ Paula S. Martin, LTC Donna Williams, MAJ Ramiero Sandoval;
2d row: CPT Dennis Watters, MAJ Leonard Jones, MAJ Kyle Stokes, Mr. Jose A. Torres, Jr.; 3d row: MAJ James Blain, MAJ Leslie Buford; 4th row: CPT Christopher Johnson, Ms. Shanna Lawing, MAJ Mike Gossett, LTC Dave Smith; Top row: MAJ James Glover, MAJ David Madrishin, MAJ Christopher Reid, Mr. Stefanos Kariotis, MAJ Martin Griffith.

Congratulations and welcome to the following captains of Year Group 00 who recently were accessed into the Force Management functional area:

Latrice K. Clark
Casey Daniel Coyle
Michael Angelo DeCicco
Robert Andrew Erickson
Timothy C. Friedrich
William Jack Godfrey

Colin D. Hoyseth
Benjamin Duane Jones
Willie H. Mason
Michael Yates Massey
Jeffrey D. Noll
Peter Kristjan Nunn

Brian Lee Parker
Daniel Jason Poole
Jeffrey Alexander Smith
Joel Charles Spinney
Andrew S. St. Laurent
Brendan S. Taylor

The PPO and the Oracle also congratulates these majors: **David Bernard, William Fitzhugh, and H. Clay Lyle**, who will graduate in January from the George Mason University (GMU) Masters of Business Administration program.

Finally, four FA 50 officers have been selected for promotion to the rank of colonel. They are **Tim Burns, Brian Eberle, Dave Smith, and Robert Stavnes**.

**Please check the HRC and FA 50 websites, or contact MAJ Halloran at 703-325-8647 (brian.halloran@us.army.mil) for the latest information from your Assignments Officer on upcoming selection and promotion boards, procedures and timelines for Advanced Civil Schooling applications, assignment and education opportunities, etc. ◉*

FROM THE Q-COURSE

FA 50 Q-COURSE ATTENDEE IS AMC FELLOW



Ms. Lawing

Ms. Shanna Lawing is an Army Materiel Command (AMC) Fellow with a primary career program of Manpower and Force Management (CP 26) and a secondary career of Human Resources (CP 10).

In the FA 50 Q-Course, Ms. Lawing says she has seen where AMC fits into several Army processes that

support its mission to provide acquisition support and logistics to the warfighter. A few of the many processes include linking AMC to the Nation's strategy documents, where the ACOMs fall in PPBE, how force structure is changed, and how equipment moves through the Defense Acquisition System. Essentially, the Q-Course teaches how to manage change. As AMC changes with

the Army, this is important knowledge that will aid her in her duties. Ms. Lawing says this course has been an invaluable experience for an upcoming Manpower and Force Management careerist, and she expects to benefit beyond measure from this knowledge gained.

The AMC Fellows program is a five-year internship designed to build "multifunctional, mobile cadre of highly qualified personnel for AMC." It consists of graduate-level training followed by several rotational assignments. Since her entrance into the Fellows program in 2003, Ms. Lawing has worked throughout Headquarters AMC, including Resource Management (G-8), Strategy and Concepts (G-3/5), and Personnel (G-1). AMC has plans to send Ms. Lawing to the Pentagon in the spring for more experience before she returns to AMC, G-3 in September of 2008. ◉

FDQ CHIEF BIDS FAREWELL



COL Hopkins

COL Juanita (Janie) Hopkins served in the Force Development Directorate, Army G-8 as the Chief, FDQ (Strategic Communications). While the FA 50 Personnel Proponency Office (PPO) is temporarily without a uniformed chief, COL Hopkins has also had the additional duty of providing general oversight of the PPO's activities for the Executive Agent. During her short tenure, the PPO has made significant progress on a number of initiatives, such as the implementation of the Force Management Hall of Fame, the revision of the MBA Program under the auspices of the Advanced Civil Schooling program, the proposal to conduct a Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) to obtain Lessons Learned, and addressing the CSA's concern of ensuring that the Army has sufficient inventory of FA50 officers to support the MNSCTI mission.

As she prepares to PCS to Norfolk to assume duties as an instructor at the Joint Forces Staff College, the Oracle and FA 50 PPO staff wish to thank COL Hopkins for her service here, and wish her well in her new assignment. ◉

FA 50s IN THE FIELD

What Some of Our Colleagues are Doing in the AOR



LTC Dave Delmonte photo

The Coalition builds a Commando Training School on the outskirts of Kabul. Current plan calls for six Commando Battalions, the Commando School, and possibly a Commando Brigade Headquarters.

FA 50s IN THE FIELD



SFC Mark Henderson photo

REF OST C travels from FOB Salerno to FOB Ghardez (Afghanistan) to meet with units to collect equipping requirements.



SFC Mark Henderson photo

MAJ Bob Lenz sends a report to REF Rear (Fort Belvoir) via prototype Pioneer IMMARSAT system at FOB Ghazni, Afghanistan.

FA 50s IN THE FIELD



LTC Harry Hicock at work with the Iraqis in the M9 Directorate (The Iraqi equivalent of G-3 FM.)



CPT Don Smith photo

Iraqi Army Commander COL Nazar and a Soldier. The commander was killed last January in an IED attack while we were sitting in his office. He was a good commander who did all he could to support his troops and Coalition Forces.



MAJ Bob Lenz photo

Soldiers from 4BSTB, 82d prepping for ground movement from FOB Ghardez to the camp at Pul-e-alam to collect equipping requirements.

CAREER MANAGEMENT

NEW YEAR: BRAC, ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

by MAJ Brian Halloran



MAJ Halloran

I hope all is well with you and your families as we head into the holiday season, and that all of you get a chance to take some time off and spend some time away from the office. Please take a few minutes to remember the members of the Force Management Team who are currently deployed.

I'd also like to take this opportunity to update everyone on a couple of significant events in the human resources arena.

Multi-Component Management. As part of BRAC, in 2010, HRC will relocate to Ft. Knox. HRC-Alexandria and HRC-St. Louis will merge, which means there will be multi-compo management of career fields for the AC and USAR. As part of the pilot test for the merger, FAs 50 and 59 were chosen to be the first career fields to go to multi-compo management. Having a single career manager for both the AC and USAR is a great benefit to our force. Some specific benefits are as follows:

A holistic look at the FA 50 strength of a unit. Previously, no one at HRC could look at the strength of a unit across components. HRC-Alexandria would work the AC (compo 1) and HRC-St. Louis would manage the USAR (compo 3), but there was very little unity of effort. By having a holistic approach, we can best apportion our limited manpower (we currently are at 73 percent available strength) across the force. That doesn't mean we can assign an AGR to an AC billet, or vice-versa, but we can look at the entire unit to ensure they have their fair share of FA 50s. For example, if FORSCOM HQs is authorized six AC FA 50s and four USAR FA 50s, HRC now has visibility of all 10 authorizations. Therefore, if the AC FA 50 corps

is 73 percent, we can make sure that organization has its full slate of AGR FA 50s to try to offset the shortage on the AC side. Additionally, we can better synchronize education of FA 50s across the force with PCS moves to maximize the number of FA 50s that go to the qualification course, and try our best to limit the turbulence on families.

As we make this merger, there have been some issues that have to be worked through. Most of those are internal to HRC, but some are not. Beyond HRC, we are re-looking how assignments in the USAR AGR community have been worked in the past. Since the FA 50 community in the USAR is so well thought of, the great team at OCAR Force Programs had assisted HRC-St. Louis in working many assignment actions. Although I still meet frequently with OCAR-FP, all USAR AGR 50s need to send their assignment issues and questions to me, not to OCAR-FP.

Speaking of assignments, we have now entered the season for working Summer 2008 assignments. On the AC Side, we are about 90 percent done. Officers set to move have been notified, and have submitted their preferences. Once the slate is finalized, I'll brief the Executive Agent, BG Anderson, and then begin cutting RFOs hopefully by Christmas, but it could be the first part of January 2008.

On the USAR AGR side, the assignment cycle for Summer 2008 moves will begin in early to mid-January 2008. The driving force is that the authorization document (aka, "The Overlay") for AGRs will not be published until January. The tentative timeline for USAR AGR Summer 2008 moves is as follows:

- January: Publish valid FA 50 USAR AGR authorizations via website and email.
- January: Notify officers that are due to move, and what positions will be available. I will consider someone as eligible to move after having been on station for at least 36 months.

NEW YEAR: BRAC, ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS continued from page 20

- Notification + 2 weeks (approx 1 Feb 2008): Officers who will be moving give their preferences back to me.
- Mid-February: I'll develop slate for AGR officers, and brief the Director, Force Programs at OCAR, and the FA 50 Proponent on the slate. Once approved, I'll start cutting RFOs.

Some quick rules of thumb when working :

- If you have a preference, let me know. I can't make it happen if I don't know your desires.
- Be realistic in your choices, don't have them all in one location.
- If you haven't deployed to OIF or OEF, plan on deploying in the next 12-24 months.
- Be professional, call or email me yourself, don't have a mentor call or email on your behalf.
- Remember, being an FA 50 was NOT the Army's way of telling you that you and your family would never have to move again.

Another topic I'll cover is the results of the AC COLs board. Congratulations to the four FA 50s selected for O6. It is against HRC policy to publish statistics, but based on knowing the population and seeing the results I can provide some broad feedback. Foremost, the strength of an officer's file was the determining factor in being selected for promotion. The only other factor that stood out is that the officers selected had performed very well in multiple organizations. This reinforces the fact that we need to broaden our officers' bases of experience.

As always, it is a pleasure to serve you as the FA 50 Career Manager. Thanks to each of you for giving your all to Army and our Nation. Have a great holiday season.

MAJ Halloran is the Human Resources Command FA 50 career manager. Reach him at 703-325-8647, or email brian.halloran@us.army.mil. ◉