

The Oracle

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Report from Afghanistan Force Management Training

Read About It In
The Oracle

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Readiness Branch Chief, G-8 Force Development Office

I just returned from a short six week trip to Headquarters RESOLUTE SUPPORT, formerly ISAF, in Kabul, Afghanistan, along with my battle buddy Lieutenant Colonel John Hollar from G-3/5/7 FM. We were on the ground to support a tasking from Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to teach basic Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) and Force Management Development classes to Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior (Afghan Police) and the Ministry of Defense (Afghan Army). The training was a huge success for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) students and the Coalition. The instructors observed a need for

FROM THE EXECUTIVE AGENT: — — — — —



Maj. Gen. Robert Dyess, Director
FA50 Executive Agent

Force Management Practitioners,

I am very proud of your achievements, both individually and as a Functional Area, over the past three years as I served as the Director of Force Development and Executive Agent for the FA50 Branch. Your accomplishments here in the National Capital Region (NCR) and in the Commands and Agencies around the world are vital to our national security. We have been at the tip of the spear in the largest change in the history of the Army since World War II. We shaped the force, documented the change and worked to equip those formations for the warfight as well as to support home station training. Take pride in your contributions as I have. I am PCS-ing to the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) as the Deputy Director and Chief of Staff this summer. Though I will pass the baton to Major General Cedric Wins, I will still be

interested in your work. Maj. Gen. Wins is the Director of Requirements Integration at ARCIC and brings a wealth of experience from his years in PA&E, as well as working requirements at ARCIC.

I want to recognize and bid farewell to a great leader and Soldier, Colonel Paul Shelton. Colonel Shelton, who served as my Assistant Deputy Director (Military), is retiring from the Army. His professionalism, dedication and wealth of knowledge will be greatly missed. I wish him and his family the best of luck in their future. Our new Assistant Deputy (Mil) is Colonel Jeffrey Abel. Col. Abel served as the Chief of the Force Integration Division at the Office, Chief Army Reserve in the G-3/5/7 Force Management Directorate. As a seasoned FA50 Officer, Col. Abel understands the demands that are placed on our officers. He will be a valuable asset not only to the Force Development Directorate, but to all FA50 Officers across our Army and Joint Staff. Welcome aboard, Jeff!

Part of this issue of the Oracle is focused on updates to our professional development programs. My proponent office and HRC are working with different agencies, both inside and outside the Department of Defense, to provide the best developmental opportunities for FA50 Officers. One program in particular is the Command General Staff College (CGSC) Fellowship Program which enables our officers to work with various federal interagency partners in the NCR. This is another broadening opportunity that assists our officers in developing their skills as force managers, and also demonstrates to other organizations the capabilities FA50s can provide. Look for further information from Lieutenant Colonel Brannon and Major Ison regarding packet submission and the selection process in the coming months.

In closing, I would like to say thank you for your support to our Nation and to the Soldiers who are serving in this great Army. Thank you,

MG Robert Dyess
ARMY STRONG!



Brigadier Neil Dalton OBE, Chief, CJ5, Headquarters Resolute Support, ten graduates of the MOI Force Management Class, Instructors, Coalition Members and our interpreter at the graduation ceremony February 4th, 2015.

continued Coalition Force Management support in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

The Afghan term for Modified Table Of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) is Tashkil. John and I (along with the assistance from the G-37 FM and G-8 FD team) developed a training plan for the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) to instruct students how to make changes to their Tashkils using the DOTMLPF-P analysis tool. We trained ten MOI National Police students and 21 MOD Army students from their version of Force Management departments during back-to-back two week courses, and were impressed by the knowledge and abilities of the students on a daily basis.

The MOI and MOD Force Management offices each have their own challenges. Beginning

with MOI, the Coalition and instructors arguably learned more than the students. The Coalition transitioned the management and responsibilities of the MOI Tashkil about two years ago in order to demonstrate that this was an area of success. Since then, we discovered that our MOI students demonstrated competence by executing Tashkil change requests from the field to support growth in certain units with corresponding bill payers from other units to maintain the 157,000 personnel cap, mandated by policy and paid by the Coalition.

Although there is some evidence of "rank creep," or using the Tashkil as a tool for promotion by increasing the grade, this is a minor issue. However, if the MOI needs additional personnel slots, they create another unit that is on additional Tashkils, called the Alternate and the Over Tashkil. There are over 64,000 additional policemen



Brigadier General Neil Dalton OBE, Chief, CJ5, Headquarters Resolute Support, addresses the ten graduates of the MOI Force Management Class, after the February 4, 2015 Graduation Ceremony at the Headquarters Building, Resolute Support.

authorizations on these other Tashkils that are paid by other sources. The Afghan Police equipment is simple compared to the Army, consisting mostly of small arms weapons, trucks and handcuffs. However MOI does not have equipment in the Tashkil database, managing it only with an Excel spreadsheet. From our training and discovery, CSTC-A has started to provide preliminary oversight on the MOI Tashkil and will add equipment to gain oversight and control of additional Tashkils.

Unlike the MOI, the Coalition has maintained oversight and control of the MOD Tashkil. The CSTC-A Force Management Team, consisting of a Finish Defense Force lieutenant colonel and three contractors, with coordination of the Afghan Force Management staff and Coalition advisors, physically manages to include data entry the Afghan Army Tashkil. The MOD students are assigned to the

MOD HQ (ANA version of the Army Secretariat) and the General Staff (Army Staff). The division of labor between these two staffs is not clear in policy, and is often redundant. Compared with MOI, the MOD Tashkil change requests are similar in number but far greater in magnitude. Current items in staffing are a new Kabul Garrison Command, Aviation restructure to incorporate the M530 Helicopter fielding, inactivating major commands, and several others, while remaining under the 195,000 Soldier cap, paid by the Coalition. If the threat or demand for forces increases in a certain province, the MOD procedure is to create a new unit to deal with the threat instead of tasking an existing unit. The bill payer for these decisions over the past two years was the Infantry, where one team leader and one Soldier was taken out of each Infantry squad in the ANA, reducing the nine man squad to seven, and completely changing the capability across the force.



Major General Todd Semonite, Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) congratulates the Honor Graduate of the MOD Force Management Course during the February 18, 2015 MOD Force Management Graduation Ceremony at the Headquarters Building, Resolute Support.

Co-Class Leader Colonel Rashid of the MOD Force Management Class salutes Major General Moeen after the February 18, 2015 MOD Force Management Graduation Ceremony at the Headquarters Building, Resolute Support.



Lieutenant Colonel Robb Mitchell, Brigadier General Neil Dalton OBE, Chief, CJ5, Headquarters Resolute Support, Major General Moeen, Director of Force Management, Afghan Ministry of Defense, Major General Todd Semonite, CG, CSTC-A, and Lieutenant Colonel John Hollar, HQDA G-3/5/7 Force Management after the February 18, 2015 MOD Force Management Graduation Ceremony in front of Headquarters Building, Resolute Support.

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While proficient with managing current year Tashkil changes, MOI and MOD are both challenged by long-term planning, payroll, and authority. First with planning, the Afghans do not have any mechanism similar to the Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), or the Long-Range Investment Requirements Analysis (LIRA). Tashkils are approved at the Minister level within weeks of execution. The goal is to produce



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the next year's Tashkil one to two years in advance. The right answer for MOD and MOI is for is Afghan control of the Tashkils with Coalition oversight and a clear agreement for what the Coalition will fund.

Secondly the Afghan pay system for MOI and MOD is very immature. The Afghans budget but also distribute payroll by the Tashkil spaces and faces. This would be like merging DFAS and USAFMSA in our Army. In practice, if a unit commander is authorized 100 Soldiers, and his pay officer receive the pay for 100 Soldiers on the Tashkil, the commander has an incentive for corruption by having 80 Soldiers assigned and personally keeping the pay for the remaining 20. Afghan Personnel and Finance directorates are making improvements to ID Cards and individual bank accounts, but there is much more work to be done. Correcting the Tashkil, personnel, and payroll systems would significantly reduce corruption and greatly improve the effectiveness of the ANSF.

Third, the ANSF Force Managers are very competent, capable of providing short term analysis and recommendations for DOTMLPF-P solutions, but they have no authority and their analysis is not taken seriously by their leadership. This is a top driven system where the General Officers direct changes without considering the second and third order impacts across DOTMLPF-P. Many times, a good idea comes from a Coalition Advisor. The Afghans and Coalition must act as one team to identify the capability gaps and program solutions to increase ANSF capability without growing in number.

Our recommendation to CSTC-A was for their Force Management Team to provide balanced oversight to the MOI and the MOD. Equitable oversight for MOI and MOD would include adding oversight to MOI, which has been without, and give full control of Tashkil data entry to the MOD, which relies on Coalition now. CSTC-A's Force Management Team should be led by a FA50 qualified COL or senior

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lieutenant colonel Force Manager which is currently not resourced. This officer would supervise CSTC-A's Force Management Team and bring senior level credibility to the team at senior meetings.

The Force Management training mission was a success for all parties including, Afghans, Coalition, and the Force Management training team. 🌍

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell is currently the Readiness Branch Chief in HQDA G-8 Operational Integration (FDO). Prior to work as an FA50 Force Manager, Lt. Col. Mitchell spent 16 years as a Field Artilleryman with overseas assignments in Korea, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan. As an FA50, Lt. Col. Mitchell has served as a Requirements Staff Officer in HQDA G-3/5/7

DAMO CIC, the JUONs Branch Chief in HQDA G-3/5/7 G-38, and the Executive Officer for the HQDA Assistance Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7.



Lt. Col. Robb Mitchell
Operational Integration (FDO)
Readiness Branch Chief,
U.S. Army G-8



MESSAGE FROM THE PDO CHIEF



Lt. Col. Stephon Brannon
FA50 Chief, Personnel
Development Office

Teammates; Spring is here and I know all of you are looking forward to the summer months. With that said, there are many changes and updates I would like to bring to your attention that will take place over the summer.

In my last message I mentioned our effort to establish an additional Training with Industry (TWI) partnership. Well, I can say we successfully accomplished this mission and are now partnered with Amazon Headquarters, located in the State of Washington. Our first FA50 Officer who will take the lead and pave the way for future FA50 Officers to follow is Lieutenant Colonel William Fairclough. As usual, we as FA50s tend to set the bar high for others to follow and Lt. Col. Fairclough is the right fit to continue that tradition. Lt. Col. Fairclough will join the Amazon team this upcoming summer for a one year training experience. I know his expertise as a FA50 will prove value to the success of the organization's mission and goals. Good job, Mike!

In addition to the TWI program, the proponent office and HRC are working with the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Interagency Fellowship Program Manager on various fellowship positions for FA50 field grade officers (typically majors). The CGSC Interagency Fellowship Program is a one-year program, consisting of 24 federal interagency partners, which enables selected Army officers to gain an in-depth understanding of the capabilities, missions, procedures and requirements of Federal agencies and other organizations both inside and outside the Department of Defense (DoD) through experiential learning. This program is designed to provide a broadening opportunity for Army Officers as part of a professional development exchange between the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and selected governmental departments and agencies in the National Capital Region. Officers participating in this program must complete their Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and the 14-week FA50 Qualification Course. This will be considered as a PCS move for all officers who choose to participate. I encourage everyone who is interested in participating in a fellowship program to consider this program. Information about packet submission and selection process will be provided to the field in the near future.

I hope you got a lot out of our FA50 Officer Professional Development (OPD) training. The OPD was scheduled for 7 April 2015 in the HQDA G-8 Conference Room. Major Jason Ison (HRC Branch Manager) was on site to discuss assignments with interested officers. Lastly, the Senior Force Managers Seminar will take place May 20-21, 2015, with a Council of Colonels forum on May 19, 2015. This year we will conduct a Capitol Hill visit, which will be day two of our seminar. Mr. Sean Tuomey will provide more information on both the seminar and Council of Colonels forum, to include registration information.

In closing, I will ask each of you to continue to improve each day. As FA50 Officers we have a big challenge, a challenge that demands our very best.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stephon Brannon". The signature is stylized and written over a background image of a desert landscape with a military vehicle.

ARMY STRONG!!!



REPORTING READINESS IN THE PACIFIC



by Lieutenant Colonel Jason S. Liggett

Upon arrival to United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) in August 2014, I was immediately assigned as the Chief of Readiness. To set the stage I entered USARPAC pre-positioned to assume my Centralized Selection List (CSL) position in October 2015. The point here is that readiness is of such importance in the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) that lieutenant colonel FA50's are assigned as branch chiefs just as force structure and integration CSL positions are in the Force Management (FM) Directorate. Having served as a Unit Status Reporting officer in a past life and as a school trained FA50 I made the early assumption I knew readiness. Well not every assumption holds water as I would soon learn. The dynamics of reporting in an ASCC has some unique challenges based on reporting to Headquarters Department of the Army (HODA) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).

MANAGING REQUIREMENTS

In order to effectively manage requirements properly I had to first completely understand the process. After assuming my position it was evident the process in place was working very well. Increasing my knowledge base and experience would ensure the continued excellence in reporting and allow me to adjust or add to the process to take it to the next level. My increase in knowledge moved quickly because readiness reporting requirements and associated venues are lock step every month.

The process is two-fold with the Defense Readiness Reporting System Army (DRSS-A) for Operational level reporting and Defense Readiness Reporting System Strategic (DRSS-S) for the Strategic level reporting. These two systems are interdependent in accurately reflecting the true state of readiness for the ASCC and its

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subordinate units. Figure 1 shows an overview of managing requirements we will discuss in depth at the operational and strategic level.

OPERATIONAL REPORTING

The DRSS-A report serves as the base line reporting system where the first look is available on unit readiness through NET USR. This is where our branch develops the first picture for the command on status of units. We then assemble the DRSS-A briefing for the leadership from quad charts developed by the units to discuss personnel, equipment, and training which encompass the first three quadrants. The final quadrant is for the commander's comments where they have an opportunity for more specificity or to expound upon issues affecting their ability to execute missions across the spectrum of operations.

In USARPAC the commander's comments are evaluated by the staff and then briefed to the leadership with the expectation that the staff will drive processes to assist in finding or creating solutions. In some instances it is a first glance at an issue enabling the staff to gain greater understanding of the issue and develop a way forward. If areas arise that do not have a status or is an emergent need for the command then the staff takes it for action immediately. A memorandum explaining staff assistance and actions taken is due back to subordinates within seven days from the DRSS-A briefing.

This memorandum is a feedback mechanism through the USARPAC Chief of Staff to commanders. This ensures that feedback is provided at every level of the process. It holds staff accountable to the commands and the USARPAC leadership. When these actions

are complete and there has been full integration between all staff, commanders, and senior leaders we then forward this operational assessment to HQDA and move into building the strategic picture through DRSS-S.

STRATEGIC REPORTING

The DRSS-S is a fully integrated effort across the staff with the outputs briefed in forums at HQDA




Figure 1. USARPAC Operational Readiness Reporting construct

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and USPACOM which we will discuss further later in the article. We need to focus on the criticality of developing a targeted strategic vision for the USAPRAC leadership. As the readiness branch chief, it is my responsibility to understand and articulate the concerns of the leadership, ensuring top readiness priorities are synchronized with those of the leadership.

The operational planning team (OPT) takes the senior leader guidance and priorities and evaluates against current Operational Plans (OPLANs). The staff evaluates requirements or resources the command requires to fully execute the plans.

This list is expanded further into current and persistent issues. Although two categories all remain top concerns. All issues share the same characteristics in that they require some type of resource whether it is personnel, equipment, or funding. Current issues are ones that have been recently identified and the staff is looking for solution sets with HQDA and USPACOM. Persistent issues are ones that require long-term solutions for example a two-year wait for a piece of equipment based on a production schedule.

An important forum for assisting in refining readiness concerns or initiatives is the Strategic Readiness Action Group (SRAG) hosted by the Army Readiness Division (DAMO-ODR), which tries to resolve readiness issues at the action officer level first before they gain visibility at the general officer level. If an issue is not resolvable at this level then the format and scope of the issue will be clarified and brought into the next appropriate venue the HQDA Strategic Readiness Update (SRU), where it will receive attention from many directorates in the Pentagon. Most topics in the SRAG deal with funding, procedural or doctrinal issues that may need coordination with other commands to resolve the issues.

In addition to the unresolved issues from the SRAG top concerns of the ASCC are briefed at HQDA in the Strategic Readiness Update to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. This venue provides USARPAC the opportunity to highlight either current or persistent top concerns to Army senior leaders for assistance. The same is true for the USPACOM Readiness Forum where USAPRAC top concerns are briefed at the Joint level. These venues provide the opportunity for resourcing at the Army and Joint level. It also assist leaders in the ability to prioritize or reprioritize resources to the ASCC based on the strategic implications to the mission.

STRATEGIC MESSAGING

The DRSS-A is the cornerstone for reporting and is further refined and assimilated into the DRSS-S building a comprehensive strategic view of readiness. This comprehensive view has now set the parameters for strategic messaging to HQDA and USPACOM as previously discussed, through monthly venues. In addition to the process of messaging are the monthly memorandums on readiness sent to HQDA and USPACOM. There is also a quarterly memorandum in which General Brooks, USARPAC Commander, discusses top concerns and highlights other major initiatives on going in the command. All these documents originate in the readiness branch for the senior leaders making it essential that the analytic rigor is completed effectively to build the most up-to-date and accurate picture of readiness integrating DRSS-A, DRSS-S, and senior leader guidance. This messaging is also consolidated for informational purposes to inform visiting dignitaries to discuss challenges facing the command and subordinate units.

READINESS INTEGRATION

Figure 2 depicts other areas of support and influence USARPAC G3 FM supports across the command as well as to external agencies.

I will begin with support to Force Structure and Force Integration. These two branches within the FM Directorate are critical in the DRSS-A process. Once the DRSS-A is assembled, we conduct a detailed analysis of the commanders quad chart to identify any structure or integration issues. The analysis provided helps commanders solve issues, gain current status at USPACOM or HQDA, or initiate process to assist. The integration and structure branches are working many of the commander’s issues in forums parallel to the DRSS-A which aid in fixing commanders issues. The branches attend all DRSS-A senior leaders briefs furthering synergy in the readiness effort across the staff.

On behalf of the command, the readiness division supports numerous HQDA forums for example The Army Campaign Plan (ACP). The readiness division is the lead for USARPAC for the Army Campaign Plan attending all meetings and providing updates to the command regularly. The most challenging piece of the ACP is the management of Strategic Efforts. The success of this effort is to ensure the staff is fully integrated across the efforts. Not all venues are solely related to readiness but have sub-components requiring readiness information and data. We maintain the calendar for all working groups, Council of Colonels, General Officer briefings internally and externally on strategic efforts.

Readiness touches major initiatives in the command on a daily basis. We have made great strides in expanding influence across our formations in improving and streamlining reporting. We created the quarterly Readiness Summit to talk major issues impacting reporting, lessons learned, and subject matter experts. This venue is designed and executed for the subordinate units to broaden their perspective on the importance of accurate and detailed reporting. This forum also integrated readiness experts from HQDA and USPACOM to provide




Figure 2. G-3 FM Readiness Reporting construct

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a holistic view of readiness at all levels. The first Readiness Summit was conducted on February 11, 2015 and comments provided back that it was an outstanding approach to assisting units. The readiness division has seen improvements already in reporting as a result of the forum.

Results from the Readiness Forum at USPACOM led the first functional component overview of the Theater Joint Force Land Component Command (TJFLCC) which consists of USARPAC, Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), and Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC). This was the first time mission, roles, responsibilities; functions were briefed at the USPACOM level. This took not only intense staff synchronization in USARPAC but was conducted across the services. The initial briefing and design is now the start point for further development and reporting for the TJFLCC.

CONCLUSION

Readiness reporting is a critical resource for commanders to accurately assess unit's ability to execute missions at the operational and strategic level. Readiness must be included in planning and fully integrated across staff elements. It drives priority of distribution of resources and unit sourcing for missions. Readiness cannot be fully appreciated until your initiative or project requires the associated analytics of readiness either at the operational level or strategic. The article has been an opportunity to broaden the scope, awareness, and importance of readiness reporting within the ASCC for the reader. The role of an ASCC readiness officer expands exponentially from reporting into other forums requiring readiness expertise. I would encourage FA50 officers to become fully integrated in their commands readiness programs.

USARPAC READINESS:

WE'LL LET YOU KNOW IF YOU'RE READY!

Lieutenant Colonel Liggett is the Chief of Readiness, Force Management Division, United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Northern Arizona University and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University. He is currently pursuing his PHD from Capella University. 🇺🇸

THE BATTLES ON THE RIO GRANDE: PALO ALTO AND RESACA DE LA PALMA


by Michael Sean Tuomey

The Battles on the Rio Grande: Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma were the first battles of the War with Mexico, also known as The Mexican-American War. It was the first major conflict driven by the idea of "Manifest Destiny"; the belief that America had a God-given right, or destiny, to expand the country's boundaries from "sea to shining sea".

This idea would eventually cause a great deal of suffering for many Mexicans, Native Americans and United States citizens. After the earlier Texas War of Independence from Mexico, tensions between the two largest autonomous nations on the North American continent grew as Texas

eventually became a state. Disputes over the border lines sparked military confrontation, helped by the fact that President Polk keenly sought a war in order to seize large tracts of land from Mexico.

The Mexican-American War was largely a conventional conflict fought by traditional armies of the time consisting of infantry, cavalry and artillery using established European-style tactics. President Polk, in July 1845, sent an "Army of Occupation," led by General Zachary Taylor to Corpus Christi, on the banks of the Nueces River. The Army was officially sent to help protect Texas from a potential Mexican



Rio Grande continued on page 15

attack, but also represented a display of power as a U.S. negotiator headed to Mexico. As American forces penetrated into the Mexican heartland, some of the defending forces resorted to guerrilla tactics to harass the invaders, but these irregular forces did not really influence the outcome of the war.

After the beginning of hostilities, the U.S. military embarked on a three-pronged plan designed to seize control of northern Mexico and force an early peace. Two American




Mexican President Mariano Paredes

armies moved south from Texas, while a third force under Colonel Stephen Kearny traveled west to Santa Fe, New Mexico and then to California. In a series of battles at Palo Alto and Resaca de Palma (near current-day Brownsville, Texas), the army of General Zachary Taylor defeated the Mexican forces and began to move south after inflicting over a thousand casualties.

In July and August of 1846, the United States Navy seized Monterey and Los Angeles in

California. In September 1846 Taylor's army fought General Ampudia's forces for control of the northern Mexican city of Monterey in a bloody three-day battle. Following the capture of the city by the Americans, a temporary truce ensued which enabled both armies to recover from the exhausting Battle of Monterey.



U.S. President James K. Polk

During this time, former President Santa Anna returned to Mexico from



GENE TAYLOR AT THE BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA.

Army of General Zachary Taylor defeats Mexican forces at Palo Alto and Resaca de Palma.



General Taylor's "Army of Occupation" at Corpus Christi

exile and raised and trained a new army of over 20,000 men to combat the invaders. Despite the losses of vast tracts of land, and defeat in several major battles, the Mexican government refused to make peace. It became apparent to the Polk Administration that only an absolute battlefield victory would end the war. Continued fighting in the dry deserts of northern Mexico convinced the United States that an overland expedition to capture of the enemy capital, Mexico City, would be perilous and difficult. To this end, General Winfield Scott proposed what would become the largest amphibious landing in history (at that time), and a campaign to seize the capital of Mexico.

On March 9, 1847, General Scott landed with an army of 12,000 men on the beaches near Veracruz, Mexico's most important eastern port city. From this point, from March to August, Scott and Santa Anna fought a series of bloody, hard-fought battles from the coast inland toward Mexico City. The other important battles of this campaign include the Battles of: Cerro Gordo (April 18), Contreras (August 20), Churubusco (August 20), Molino del Rey (September 8) and Chapultepec (September 13).

Finally, on September 14, the American Army

entered Mexico City. The city's populace offered some resistance to the occupiers, but by mid-October, the disturbances had been quelled and the U.S. Army enjoyed full control. Following the city's occupation, Santa Anna resigned the presidency but retained command of his army. He attempted to carry on military operations against the Americans, but his troops, beaten and disheartened, refused to fight. His government soon asked for his military resignation. Guerrilla operations continued against

Scott's lines of supply back to Veracruz, but this resistance proved ineffective.

On February 2, 1848, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed, later to be ratified by both the U.S. and Mexican Congresses. The agreement called for the annexation of the northern portions of Mexico to the United States. In return, the U.S. agreed to pay \$15 million to Mexico as compensation for the seized territory. The bravery of the individual Mexican soldier goes a long way in explaining the difficulty the U.S. had in prosecuting the war. Mexican military leadership was frequently lacking, at least when compared to the American leadership. And in many of the battles, the superior cannon of the U.S. artillery divisions and the innovative tactics of their officers turned the tide against the Mexicans. The war cost the United States over \$100 million, and ended the lives of 13,780 U.S. military personnel. America had defeated its weaker and somewhat disorganized southern neighbor, but not without paying a terrible price.

There are many lessons learned to be learned from this first encounter with Mexico where the United States Army was victorious. At last, the Americans had professional leaders. They were mature and

experienced. Some had graduated from West Point. The US Soldiers were well trained. Many of the US Soldiers had frontier experience, and the US Soldiers were well disciplined.

The Mexicans had incompetent leaders and poorly trained Soldiers. There was some political infighting amongst the Mexican officer corps. The Mexican soldiers were very ill-equipped; a number of them had not eaten for quite some time. And, the Mexican soldiers had absolutely no experience or training in how to conduct a fight. They especially had no experience or training with any sort of a "close in" fight.

General Arista's army was stretched a mile wide



General Arista's army stretched a mile wide.

making an American bayonet charge, Taylor's first option, impossible. Taylor, in an unlikely move, advanced his artillery to attack the enemy. It was this "Flying Artillery," the tactic of using light artillery to attack, then quickly move to another location and fire once more, developed

by Major Samuel Ringgold that won the battle for the Americans. The Mexican artillery, heavy and slow, was futile in the thick steel-wool brush at Palo Alto. Arista ordered cavalry charges to flank the artillery gunners, but the American "Flying Artillery" was able to mobilize, relocate, and repel the oncoming soldiers.

Mexicans suffered large casualties compared to the Americans for a number of reasons. The Mexican army had poor gunpowder compared to the Americans, shortening the range of their cannon and musket fire. The poor powder had a tendency to explode prematurely and caused many soldiers to pour smaller amounts of gunpowder, further affecting the range of their weapons.

Mexican soldiers were often afraid of the volatile gunpowder. Lastly, the Mexicans, as was typical throughout the war, had technologically inferior weaponry to the Americans. The musket Arista's soldiers used was the British Brown Bess – the same weapon the British had used during the Napoleonic and

Revolutionary War a century before.

The Americans used the element of surprise. And, they had used some TTPs (Tactics, Techniques & Procedures) of the British from earlier wars – the use of Dragoons. A Dragoon

was traditionally a soldier trained to fight on foot, but transport himself on horseback. In other words, a dragoon moved as cavalry but fought as infantry.

As the attack pressed forward after some severe skirmishing, in which a part of his army was engaged, General Scott ordered Captain May, leader of the U.S. dragoons, to charge upon an artillery battery. Rising in his stirrups, May called out to his troops, "Remember your regiment! Men, follow!" and, dashing forward in the face of a shower of shot from the battery, he made his powerful black horse leap the parapet. He was followed by a few of his men, whose steeds made the fearful leap. They killed the gunners, and General La Vega, who was about to apply a light to one of the pieces, and 100 men were made prisoners by the Americans.


What were the immediate effects on the war, as a whole? How did these first battles set the tone? Well, at first, these battles ended the Mexican siege of Fort Texas. These battles easily determined that the war would be fought on Mexican soil, not American soil. The Mexican Army was kept on the defensive throughout most of the war. And, many of the "junior" leadership got some useful combat experience;

2LT George C. Meade, 2LT Ulysses S. Grant; and many others including Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson and William T. Sherman.




Captain May at Resaca de la Palma

The United States acquired the northern half of Mexico. This area later became the states of California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. President Santa Anna lost power in Mexico following the war. U.S. General Zachary "Old Rough and Ready" Taylor used his fame as a war hero to win the Presidency in 1848. A true irony is that President Polk, a Democrat, pushed for the war that led to Taylor, a Whig, winning the White House. Relations between the United States and Mexico remained tense for many decades to come, with several military encounters along the border.



Port Isabel (Fort Polk): "Daniel Webster" sailing with U.S. troops.

But, what are some of the force management implications? Can we apply our DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities) model? It is clearly apparent that Winfield Scott's tactics were extremely useful against the Mexican forces. It is said many of the Mexican soldiers were conscripted Indians. Obviously, they were not up to the task of engaging a professional army – an organized



Resaca

federal army - much less engaging a modern army with modern tactics.

When you study these battles, you will hear of the “flying artillery”. The concept of “flying artillery” gets my blood moving. As a former artillery officer, I can tell you that “flying artillery” doctrine is something we have attempted to replicate for many years. Shoot, move and communicate, right? As force managers, haven’t we also taken part in the many, many discussions regarding capabilities and limitations of heavy (or medium) artillery versus light artillery? METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain/Weather, Troops Time Available, and Civilian Considerations) easily drives what sort of artillery you need to bring to the fight and/or how that artillery should be employed. Much earlier than that process, force managers determine the types of

artillery available and which artillery combatant commanders have from which to choose. Having an individual weapon from the previous century is not a good thing, as the Mexicans discovered. Didn’t we have a similar problem when the Korean War broke out? Okay; in Korea, the weapons were not a century old, but, no upgrades or modernization had taken place between WWII and Korea. The poor gunpowder just made things worse for the Mexicans. Is this only a lesson in readiness?

Am I missing anything? Did these battles and this war have any other force management implications? Please contact me with your thoughts.

My next article will be on the Battle of Bull Run – only 16 years later. Where I went to school – it was the Battle of First Manassas. Better get ready! 🇺🇸


Retired Colonel Michael Sean Tuomey was born in Washington, D.C. and raised in Potomac, Maryland. Upon graduating from The Citadel in Charleston, S.C., he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the active Army Field Artillery. He has served as a brigade commander twice and as a battalion commander with more than 17 years of command time overall. He has served as a faculty instructor at The U.S. Army War College and he also served as adjunct faculty at The National Defense University. He holds a Master of Public Administration/Public Policy from Illinois Institute of Technology and a Master of Strategic Studies from The U.S. Army War College. Sean currently works as a strategic communications program manager in the FA50 Professional Development Office. Sean is married to the former Kimberly Anne O’Connor of Manalapan, New Jersey. Sean and Kim reside in Alexandria, Virginia.

Cyber Corner

Is the Hardening of Systems Truly Enough to Defend Networks?

By Major Dan Rogne

US Army Cyberspace Command



Do you know how much of an investment in defensive cyber capabilities is necessary in this age of information technology?

This is a common question asked in many businesses and government agencies in the United States, if not worldwide. There is a false sense of security that enhancements in technology, the very nature of security enhancements to hardware, for some people, means a malicious cyber attack can't happen to me. The truth is, if we aren't thinking about cyber security or if we discount its importance, the pure activity of reacting to attacks is not timely and robust.

We need to do more to understand the kinds of attacks, who frequently targets types of networks, who frequently uses what types of techniques to gain access to or maneuver within networks, storage capacity to support historical forensic files of intrusions. Also, we need to understand our own vulnerabilities through red-team

assessments (play the role of the adversary and probe/penetrate our own network).

Richard Clarke, a former National Security Advisor, wrote of President Bush's reaction to hearing how vulnerable financial networks and the U.S. economy were to cyber attacks in his book "Cyber War; the Next Threat to National Security and What to do About It." His account of the president's reaction on page 114, "At this point, (President) Bush... began gesturing for emphasis as he spoke... 'Information technology is supposed to be our advantage, not our weakness.'"

There are two major camps when discussing the need for software systems developed to equip our cyber protection teams supporting their mission to defend U.S. Army networks. One camp thinks that purely placing added emphasis on perimeter defense or layers of authentication and encryption alone are enough to defend our information, as well as our ability to command and control.

Hardening of Systems continued on page 21

The other camp believes that we need to plan the development of capabilities based on anticipated threats and know that with buildup of a hardened perimeter comes a very soft center of networks. Having a risky, soft center means those who focus on the perimeter will have to transition from monitoring broad scanning security (perimeter security i.e. lengthy security scanning) to a specific vulnerable location within the Army's networks, where potential adversarial activity is detected. The issue is that transition may not be quick enough to focus on an interior risk; where a group of professionals who perform targeted network analysis with deep forensics tools can respond in a more efficient manner.

A group which focuses on monitoring perimeter security and taking their attention off the perimeter to perform within the soft interior could create an additional, unintentional vulnerability, providing adversaries two entry points to maneuver through. Ultimately, it's not the perimeter security or the interior security alone which defend the network; it's the use of passive defense on the outer layer coupled with an active defense within the interior of the network, building a defense in depth physically and virtually.

Without the network perimeter and interior security, persons with malicious intentions and use of advanced methods/capabilities will be empowered to attack and possibly return, based on perception that there is ease in entering a particular network. Lauren Ingram of Penn State University states this fact in her recent article, "Laws and regulations that the majority of the world adheres to mean very little to a growing faction of cyber criminals, commonly referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors... use sophisticated tools and tactics to gain access..." "With economic and political motivations, these groups are characterized by their ability to patiently infiltrate computer networks and remain undetected for up to two years on average before being caught or revealing themselves — by then, the data breach has already happened."

Having technical depth and reach comes with advanced analytics, forensic tools, intelligence, and an experienced group of cyber professionals.

Ingram further states, "...the University's (Penn State's) cyber security team identifies and blocks approximately 157,000 hostile systems from accessing 200,000 computers on the University network on any given day. The cyber security model is shifting from an entirely prevention-driven approach to one that blends prevention with incident detection."

The advanced nature of adversarial activities have escalated the need for cyber security to the point where businesses can not just air gap or physically separate high risk systems from the network. There are emerging technologies which do not require a network connection in order to collect data from a computer. However advanced the technology, the emphasis on the physical layer of security is still an essential ingredient to cyber security.

This is evidenced by the article written by Michael Kassner published by Tech Republic. According to Kassner, "...the cyber security labs at Ben-Gurion University in Israel have developed 'AirHopper.' A breakthrough method for leaking data from an isolated computer to a mobile phone without the presence of a network'... (it) can capture EM radiation from an air-gapped computer using a mobile phone. The mobile phone then sends the captured data to a remote server where the attackers can analyze the data..."

Kassner further stated why this electromagnetic capability is significant are how many businesses and various agencies within governments worked in their physical site security.

He adds, "...the common policy in secure organizations is to leave your mobile phone in some locker when you enter the facility and then pick it up when you go out. We at the cyber security labs challenged this assumption and found a way to leak data from a computer

inside the organization to a remote mobile phone without using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.”

In Kassner’s article there is an embedded video link which demonstrates the application performing while a computer is disconnected from a network and the user is typing a message. The phone was close to the computer showing it was duplicating what was being typed on the computer only to see another person walk in from across the hall through glass doors with another phone gathering the same data. With this in mind, the emphasis on physical site security is relevant, but just one component of what is systematic in the nature of cyber security.

Based on the capabilities demonstrated on the data enabled mobile phones, a study to assess the standoff range supporting collection of data via electromagnetic pulses should be conducted to re-establish the distance between phone lockers and work areas within secure facilities.

The merging of physical site security and the security for the soft interior components of a network can be understood to combat insider threats. Insider threats are a source of more harm in many cases than threats from outside of a network. It is important to screen your day to day workforce initially and monitoring their on-net activities while at work on a regular basis. The same should be done for visitors as well.

Considering the physical site security initiatives, network security is doubly important for the interior when considering the workforce’s access to high risk data and massive data stores within virtual infrastructures like VMWare. There was recent survey of over 200 Information Technology Managers from within the U.S. Government which had some interesting outcomes regarding insider threats.

According to Aaron Boyd of the Federal Times, there is an issue with vulnerabilities created by unwitting users or unintentional insider threats as he wrote, “A survey of 200 federal IT managers and decision makers showed data breaches

due to careless and untrained insiders is the top cybersecurity concern, but that is not reflected in their spending... External threats still get the lion’s share of investment.” According to Boyd, the survey listed untrained users as the top threat followed by external threats and malicious insider threats trailing in third place.

The addition of sensory and analytics within a network can also provide some situational awareness into unintentional and malicious insider threats in a relatively timely manner allowing cybersecurity analysts the opportunity to close down on the vulnerability relatively quick before too much damage is issued. According to Boyd, situational awareness of workforce activities is key later in his article when he writes, “Contrasting the prevalence of insider IT security threats against a general lack of threat prevention resources and inconsistently enforced security policies, federal IT pros absolutely must gain visibility into insider actions to keep their agencies protected, Chris LaPoint, lead for the study, said.” The issues of insider threat are just as bad if not worse when discussing privileged users and the amount of data they have access to.

With the physical and compute defense in depth combined with a trained and experienced cyber workforce, networks may not become more secure but can become more responsive. The issues beyond managing systems are further enhanced by better network hygiene due to a better trained workforce of users who understand the impacts of vulnerabilities like plugging in portable media on workstations which have been used on personal computers. The vulnerabilities to networks and data at the hands of privileged users increase when applied to the virtualized layers. The next frontier within the cybersecurity fight is the aspects of authentication as applied to VMWare. 🌈

Major Daniel J. Rogne was born and raised in Green Bay, Wisconsin. He enlisted in the Army in 1990 as a Bio-medical Electronics Technician later serving as a Civil Affairs Sergeant and an

Hardening of Systems continued from page 22

Army Recruiter. After graduation from Excelsior College, he attended Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, GA and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant within the Infantry. Later he served with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in OIF-I. As an FA50, he has served with III Armored Corps G-5, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) J3 FM, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-8, FD. He holds a Masters in International Relations from Webster University and is currently studying in pursuit of a Masters in Cybersecurity from Utica College with acceptance to transfer to George Mason University's Cybersecurity program. His current assignment is with Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) as the Capability Requirements Officer.

<http://news.psu.edu/story/346526/2015/02/27/research/sophisticated-cyber-crime-methods-are-changing-definition-hacking>

4.) Kassner, Michael, "Air-Gapped Computers Are No Longer Secure," Tech Republic; CBS Interactive/ ZDNet, 26 January 2015, Accessed on 22 February 2015

<http://www.techrepublic.com/article/air-gapped-computers-are-no-longer-secure/>

Sources:

1.) Boyd, Aaron, "Survey: Insider Threat Fears Not Reflected in Spending," *Federal*

Times, 27 January 2015, Accessed on 28 February 2015

<http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/2015/01/26/survey-concerns-over-insider-threats-dont-match-spending/22353787/>

2.) Clarke, Richard and Knake, Robert, "Cyber War; the Next Threat to National

Security and What to do About It." HarperCollins Books, New York, New York, 2010

3.) Ingram, Lauren, "Sophisticated Cyber Crime Methods Are Changing the Definition of Hacking," *Penn State News*, 27 February 2015, Accessed on 28 February 2015

The Battle of Bosworth Field (or Battle of Bosworth) was the last significant battle of the Wars of the Roses, the civil war between the Houses of Lancaster and York that raged across England in the latter half of the 15th century. Fought on August 22, 1485, the battle was won by the Lancastrians. Their leader Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond, by his victory became the first English monarch of the Tudor dynasty. His opponent, Richard III, the last king of the House of York, was killed in the battle. Historians consider Bosworth Field to mark the end of the Plantagenet dynasty, making it a defining moment of English and Welsh history. The weapons used were cannons, billhooks, longbows, crossbows, swords and

lances. Researchers have discovered numerous lead cannon projectiles of widely varying sizes. This lead round shot has not only allowed us to finally discover the actual location of the Battle of Bosworth, this evidence provides fascinating new information about the use of early cannon in medieval war. The pattern of distribution of the unearthed three dozen cannon lead projectiles suggests an exchange of artillery fire by both sides. The billhook was a widely used agricultural tool. But, in its use as a military weapon, it was similar to the halberd (toward the bottom of the picture on page 24). The billhook consisted of a pole with a bill-like blade mounted below a spearhead, with spikes added to the back of the blade to increase the versatility



Thom Atkinson photograph

Trained Band Caliverman, Tilbury, 1588

of a matchlock firing action. Like its successor the musket, it is a smoothbore firearm, but was initially lighter and easier to carry. At Tilbury, the British were preparing to repel the invasion of the Spanish Armada.

The “New Model Army” of England was formed in 1645 by the Parliamentarians in the English Civil War, and was disbanded in 1660 after the Restoration. It differed from other armies in the series of civil wars referred to as the Wars of the Three Kingdoms in that it was intended as an army liable for service anywhere in the country (including in Scotland and Ireland), rather than being tied to a single area or garrison. Its soldiers became full-time professionals, rather than part-time militia. To establish a professional officer corps, the army’s leaders were prohibited from having seats in either the House of Lords or House of Commons. This was to encourage their separation from the political or religious factions among the Parliamentarians. The Battle of Naseby (see corresponding picture on page 26) was the decisive battle of the first English Civil War. On 14 June 1645, near the village of Naseby

in Northamptonshire, the main army of King Charles I was destroyed by the Parliamentary New Model Army commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell. Pikes and swords were still present in the weapon inventory. But, now muskets could be found. Musketeers carried a matchlock. Although the matchlock was not very accurate it could kill a man from three hundred yards. The main disadvantage of the matchlock was the time it took to reload after each shot. To solve this problem, musketeers in the front line fired their matchlocks and then they retired to the back to reload. Another strategy involved the musketeers in the first line kneeling, the second line crouching and the third line standing. The three lines of musketeers all fired at the same time. After firing, these men went to the back and were replaced by the next three lines of musketeers. This is an early method of “massing fire”. Not too many longbow archers in this battle. By the end of the 17th century, longbows had disappeared from the battlefield.

FA50 CAREER MANAGER UPDATE

by Major Jason Ison, HRC FA50 Career Manager



Maj. Jason Ison
HRC FA50 Career Manager

I hope this quarterly update finds everyone doing well. It has definitely been an interesting winter, especially for me here at Fort Knox. I am glad that spring and warmer temperatures are quickly approaching. For this quarterly update, I plan to provide some updates on a few key topics. Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns.

FY16-01 (FALL/WINTER) MOVEMENT CYCLE UPDATE

I am in the process of compiling the initial FY 16-01 movement slate in preparation for the slate approval brief to the FA50 Executive Agent currently scheduled for 8 April 15. If all goes well, I expect to begin releasing 16-01 RFOs o/a 15 Apr with the goal of being complete NLT 15 May. If you have any questions or concerns about your next assignment, please feel free to give me a call.

For the 16-01 Movement Cycle, there are a total of 15 officers identified to move (OIMs) competing for

22 available billets. With the addition of 6 or 7 VTIP officers I expect to transfer to FA50 next month, I will be able to fill all valid vacancies and keep the functional area at a 100% fill rate.

NEW MOCK SELECTION BOARD TRAINING


Be on the lookout for a new training package that explains everything there is to know about the board process. This training is called Exportable Mock Board and is scheduled to be released end of March via a link on the HRC

web page. The DA Secretariat created the product to educate the field on the board process and how officers can prepare for their own boards. The Exportable Mock Board provides Facilitator Instructions, as well as a presentation covering what a DA Selection Board is, types of boards, Memoranda of Instruction, board file composition, voter philosophy, the Army Selection Board System (ASBS), how to prepare for a board,

and the importance of evaluations.

16-01 OIMs	16-01 Billets
7	11
8	8
6	3

OIMs to Billets



FY 16-01 Assignments Timing

and the importance of evaluations.

The second portion of the training contains fictitious Mock Board Files for six candidates appearing before a lieutenant colonel promotion selection board. The mock

FA50 Career Manager continued from page 22

Board file for each candidate consists of a DA Photo, an ORB, and three evaluations. The facilitator instructions include a mock promotion selection board word picture, a voting score roster, and rules for executing the Mock Board. Officers will be able to download directly from HRC and take the training individually or as a group; the session takes about an hour. I will forward the link as soon as it is released. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

are the best spokesperson for the career; please help inform young officers about our Functional Area.



FA50 Population by Year Group

HEALTH OF THE FUNCTIONAL AREA

Overall FA 50 Strength			
	Auth	OH	%
Overall	220	272	124%
O6	24	38	158%
O5	73	91	125%
O4	113	126	112%
O3	10	17	170%

Overall FA50 Strength

FA50 remains very healthy as a functional area. We recently added 9 x CPTs to our ranks through the VTIP

process and expect to add an additional 6 or 7 next month. VTIP Panels occur quarterly, so watch for future announcements. FA50 will continue to target YGs 2006, 2007, 2008 in the next few VTIP panels. We will also accept transfers from officers in more senior YGs on a case-by-case basis. Acceptance of these officers is based on their manner of performance and the strength of their year group within the functional area. Bottom line, if the officer has a strong file and the YG has space, we will accept him/her. I encourage all FA50s to be recruiters. You

For additional resources, please go to the HRC OSB/ESERB website at:

<https://www.hrc.army.mil/Officer/Officer%20Separation%20and%20Enhance%20Selective%20Early%20Retirement%20Boards>

Major Jason Ison is originally from Kentucky and received his commission from ROTC. He holds a B.A. in history from Morehead State University and also holds a M.A. degree in Business Administration from the University of Kentucky. Originally a Logistics Officer, he became an FA50 in 2008. Major Ison is currently assigned to HRC as the FA50 Career Branch Manager. 🇺🇸

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"Farewell to Mike McDaniel, stalwart for FA50s"



At the end of January, 2015, we said farewell to a long time colleague of ours, Mr. Mike McDaniel. At a wonderful ceremony in the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes, Mr. McDaniel was recognized for his superior civilian service, while serving as a Program Analyst for the Functional Area 50 (FA50) Personnel Development Office, Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Mr. McDaniel's contributions, selfless actions and professional leadership have contributed significantly to the development of Force Managers across the Force Management community and reflect great credit upon himself, the United States Army, and the Department of Defense.

Over the last three years, Mr. McDaniel dedicated his time, professionalism and efforts to ensure the continued development of the FA50 Qualification Course. His dedication provided future FA50 officers the opportunity to apply up-to-date and relevant information during 14 weeks of training to achieve mission success.

While serving as the liaison between the Army Force Management School and the FA50 Proponent Office, Mr. McDaniel spearheaded the funding requirements, through the Joint Deployment Training Center, to support travel for the Capabilities Requirements Management Team to instruct the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager Training and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System at the FA50 Qualification Course. This block of instruction provided FA50 officers the ability to work Global

Mike McDaniel continued on page 25



Marla Hurtado photos

Force Management related functions during various deployments and within the different levels of Army commands. As part of his flawless effort and dedication, FA50 officers are now ready for success. Civilian enrollment in the FA50 Qualification Course increased from an average of one student per course to an average of five students per class for Fiscal Years 2011 through 2015.

Mr. McDaniel also managed the FA50 Officer Professional Development (OPD) program in support of the FA50 Professional Development Office. His contributions include coordinating guest speakers for presentations, integrating outline stations for participation, managing both

audio and visual equipment during the presentation and developing and timely publishing after action reports.

Mr. McDaniel is, without question, one of the most professional and effective members of the G-8 Force Development team. His integration of the FA50 Personnel Development Office with the Army Force Management School have proven invaluable and have solidified his utility as an integral member of the FA50 community. His superb management and comprehensive knowledge contributed directly to the improved training and leadership development which makes him truly deserving of the Superior Civilian Service Award. 🌟

Mike will be missed and we in the FA50 community owe him a great deal. Thanks!

OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE: A FORCE MANAGER'S PERSPECTIVE

by Major Andy St. Laurent

Returning from a year-long deployment to Afghanistan as the Combined Joint Task Force-101 Force Manager from January 2013 to January 2014, I believed two things: 1) I had completed my last Rendezvous with Destiny (an endearing term for deployments in the 101st Airborne Division), and 2) after three combat deployments, I was well-prepared for any situation the Army could throw at me.

On 16 September 2014, President Obama announced the United States was sending up to 3,000 troops to help fight the deadly Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Liberia in what would be known as OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA). Ten days later, the Secretary of Defense approved the requirement for a division headquarters, and the 101st Airborne Division was hand-picked to lead Joint Forces Command-United Assistance (JFC-UA). At that moment, I realized I was wrong on both accounts.

The Division deployed to Monrovia, Liberia, in October 2014. The mission seemed simple enough—provide support to the lead federal government agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Through mission analysis questions without answers began to emerge: What does “support USAID” really mean? What were the required capabilities for the mission? Who would source the requirements? How long would it take to get assets into theater and what would be the priority of flow? What would the command relationships be?

Let's just start small here – does anyone have a recent map of Liberia? It became readily apparent there would be more questions than answers until we had eyes on the objective, and could assess requirements for ourselves.

Upon arrival in Monrovia, I assumed responsibility of the JFC's force structure, which consisted of over 6,360 personnel and over 130 elements, and included both deployed and prepare to deploy ordered (PTDO) forces; these forces were ordered on our behalf by United States Army Africa (USARAF) to serve as the initial JFC set. Unlike Afghanistan with established global force management (GFM) systems in place, the mission in Liberia had none.

In the absence of information on the area or mission requirements, Requests for Forces (RFFs) were developed based on educated guesses with the understanding that requirements would be refined along the way. A key piece missing from that initial planning, however, was the absence of force management expertise. Planners largely planned without including those who were experienced with the nuances of GFM. The result was hastily thrown together RFFs that called for broad capabilities using standard designs from Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) in lieu of scoping the size and composition of requirements to meet the actual requirements of the mission. Additionally, little initial thought was given as to which capabilities were needed to flow into theater first (contracting and Logistics Civil Augmentation

OUA continued on page 33

Operation United Assistance (OUA)

Program (LOGCAP)) and which capabilities could deploy later (medical trainers and select sustainment personnel). Consequently, the JFC immediately had to tackle disjointed force flow, an over-abundance of some capabilities and a serious lack of others.

Integrating GFM with planning is not a new concept, of course. By MTOE, the Division force manager is in the future plans cell. The 101st Airborne Division learned from our time in Afghanistan that it was critical to fully integrate GFM into planning. A force manager who is intimately familiar with all aspects of mission planning can provide advice to ensure only required capabilities deploy. If done properly, the result is a perfect synchronization of requirements and force flow into theater.

With this in mind, I began the work of establishing the JFC-UA's GFM processes and worked with JFC planners to "right-size" JFC-UA against ever-changing requirements and conditions. I also set out to learn the idiosyncrasies of the Combatant Command the JFC operated under – United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Since the JFC was a joint, two-star command, the 101st Airborne Division reported directly to AFRICOM. In the first days of deployment, I was introduced to the AFRICOM ways of conducting Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) coordination, RFF production, and Change Request procedures. As a force manager in Afghanistan, I had worked with other services to an extent; my primary counterparts were always from the Army. Under AFRICOM, however, my counterpart was from another service. I soon learned that what was intuitive to an Army force manager did not always translate well to other services. For example, I quickly found that not everyone knew what a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) was or that Army force structure was located on Force Management Support (FMS) Web https://fmsweb.army.mil/protected/secure/req_account.asp.

Additionally, I had to adapt to the subtleties of the AFRICOM GFM lexicon, such as remembering to use the term non-standard spreadsheet vice ad-hoc spreadsheet when I spoke to my counterpart. I learned to be explicit with requirement requests, adaptive in my approach, and aware of how my products would be interpreted.

AFRICOM GFM personnel transitioned in December, and an Army force manager with ties to the 101st Airborne Division became my link to AFRICOM. Though a relationship had already been established from working together during previous assignments, I did not forget the lessons learned from earlier in the deployment. We spoke daily, jointly reviewed AFRICOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), identified potential friction points, and charted viable courses of action to solve GFM problems. Together, we worked through rapidly changing



Operation United Assistance (OUA)

force management actions to include Request for Forces (RFFs) for possible Reserve and National Guard replacements, an EVD Response PTDO force, a zero option requiring no replacements for the division, and finally the transition force that would come in under the OUA banner as the JFC stood down.

In conclusion, deploying to Liberia as part of the JFC supporting USAID in the fight against Ebola not only gave me another opportunity for a Rendezvous with Destiny, it brought me out of my comfort zone and afforded the opportunity to gain valuable experience supporting a humanitarian mission. As a force manager, it forced me to learn to work as part of a joint force using a whole of government approach. I became comfortable being uncomfortable. Adapting to the joint environment and understanding the Combatant Command's idiosyncrasies were critical to success. I also focused on building relationships with GFM stakeholders. While email was a great medium for sharing information, I discovered it was better suited as a secondary or tertiary form of communication. I made it a point to call or video conference frequently to build rapport: talking through issues enabled me

to accomplish much more in a shorter amount of time than by blasting out emails and waiting for responses. Finally, the Division integrated GFM into all phases of planning, which enabled the JFC to turn plans into reality through tailored requirements and synchronized force flow into theater. 🇺🇸



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